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RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN CHRISTIAN-MAJORITY DEMOCRACIES FROM 1990 TO 2014

Abstract

This study examines patterns in societal and government-based religious discrimination (SRD and GRD) against 307 religious minorities in 67 Christian-majority democracies using the Religion and State-Minorities round 3 (RASM3) dataset. Despite expectations that all forms of religious discrimination, especially GRD, should be lower in Western liberal democracies, it is, in fact, lower in developing countries. I argue that three factors explain this discrepancy. Economically developed countries have more resources available for discrimination. Western democracies have higher levels of support for religion than Christian-majority developing countries and countries which more strongly support religion are more likely to discriminate against religious minorities. Finally levels of SRD are higher in the West and SRD is posited to be a cause of GRD. Empirical tests support these propositions.

Keywords: Societal Religious Discrimination, Governmental Religious Discrimination, Democracy, Christianity

This study examines patterns of religious discrimination against 307 religious minorities in 67 Christian-majority democracies using the Religion and State-Minorities round 3 (RASM3)² dataset.³ Specifically, I look at two types of discrimination. First, government-based religious discrimination (GRD) is defined as restrictions placed on the religious practices or institutions of minority religions by governments.⁴ Second, societal religious discrimination (SRD) is defined as actions taken against minority religions by members of society who do not directly represent the government.

While theories on religious freedom in liberal democracies predict that religious discrimination, especially GRD, should be lower in Western democracies,

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3 For a discussion of how the term democracy is operationally defined see this study's data description and analysis section.

4 Jonathan Fox, *Political Secularism, Religion, and the State: A Time Series Analysis of Worldwide Data*, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2015; Fox, Jonathan Fox, *The Unfree Exercise of Religion: A World Survey of Religious Discrimination against Religious Minorities*, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2016.

empirical evidence from this study as well as previous studies⁵ shows that this is not the case and GRD is lower in developing countries. I posit that three factors can help to explain this discrepancy: economic development, government support for religion and SRD. The empirical evidence I present in this study supports this argument. That being said, the empirical evidence also shows that GRD is common across all Christian democracies and SRD is also common but less common than GRD.

This study proceeds and follows. First, I examine the assumption of religious freedom in liberal democracies. Second, I discuss the reasons I predict that economic development, government support for religion and SRD are all potential causes of GRD. Third, I use the RASM3 dataset to test these hypotheses.

The Assumption of Religious Freedom in Western Liberal Democracies

While it is traditional to first discuss one's theories then perhaps discuss any literature which makes different predictions, in this case I do the opposite. This is because both the theories in this study and the findings that support them run counter to a major and influential trends in the literature. Accordingly, I first describe the theories which I posit are flawed followed by those factors which I believe are the reasons for these flaws.

There are two general assumptions in the literature that I address here. First, liberal democracies hold religious freedom as a core value and in practice maintain religious freedom for all citizens, including religious minorities. Second, the countries in the "West" are liberal democracies and are the strongest supporters of religious freedom.

This religious freedom supposedly exists within a larger context where governments maintain some level of separation of religion and state. There are different partially overlapping meanings for religious freedom and separation of religion and state. These can include: (1) at a bare minimum maintaining the free exercise of religion, (2) avoiding the persecution of religious minorities in areas other than religion such as economic and political rights, (3) maintaining neutrality with regard to religion, that is treating all religions equally including in matters of support for religion, (4) governments avoiding interfering in religion in any way whether to support it or restrict it, and (5) maintaining a secular public space but preserving religious freedom in the private sphere.⁶ While there is no agreement on which of these conceptions, or which mix of these conceptions, is the proper one for liberal democracies, restricting the religious practices or institutions of a minority religion in a manner that the government does not restrict the majority religion—the definition of GRD used in this study—violates all of these conceptions.

5 Ibidem; Jonathan Fox, *A World Survey of Religion and the State*, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2008.

6 Fox, 2016, *op cit.*, pp. 12-26.

There are several reasons for these linked assumptions of religious freedom in liberal and Western democracies. Some of these explanations focus on how Christianity influences religious toleration. Martin, for example, links the rise of Protestantism to increased toleration for four reasons. First, the Protestant reformation created religious pluralism in the West which, in turn, increased religious toleration. Second, Protestant denominations were less often symbiotically connected to the state. Third, Protestantism focuses more on individualism. As a result, Protestants are less likely to consider the Church superior to the state. Finally, the doctrine of election present in some Protestant theologies evolved into free grace which in turn led to support for universal rights.⁷ Woodbury & Shaw similarly argue that Protestantism promotes pluralism, an independent civil society, economic development, reduced corruption, mass education and religion's independence from the state, all important foundations for democracy.⁸

Others focus their arguments on evolving Catholic ideology. Philpott and Anderson argue that Vatican II (1962-1965) resulted in three relevant changes in the Catholic Church. It has become more tolerant of religious minorities, more supportive of democracy, and more explicitly and actively supportive of human rights, as well as economic and social justice. Also, the Church became less entrenched in local politics, leaving more room for democracy.⁹

Others focus more generally on Western culture and ideals which, they argue, support religion freedom, sometimes in the context of the West's secular nature. For instance, Calhoun argues that "the tacit understanding of citizenship in the modern West has been secular. This is so despite the existence of state churches, presidents who pray, and a profound role for religious motivations in major public movements."¹⁰ Cesari, similarly argues that "drawing on the historical experience of Western countries, an academic consensus has emerged that modernization, democratization, and secularization are inextricably linked in any process of political development."¹¹ There is no shortage of examples of this consensus. Appleby argues that "the core values of secularized Western societies, including freedom of speech and freedom of religion, were elaborated in outraged response to inquisitions, crusades, pogroms, and wars conducted in the name of God."¹² Huntington, argues that this is unique to the West. "The sep-

7 David A. Martin, *A General Theory of Secularization*, Blackwell, Oxford UK, 1978, pp. 25-49.

8 Robert D. Woodbury, Timothy S. Shaw "Christianity and Democracy: The Pioneering Protestants", in: *Religion and Foreign Affairs: Essential Readings*, Dennis R. Hoover, Douglas M. Johnston (eds.), Waco, Tx: Baylor University Press, 2012.

9 Daniel Philpott, Explaining the Political Ambivalence of Religion, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 101, No. 3, 2007, pp. 505-525; John Anderson, The Catholic Contribution to Democratization's Third Wave: Altruism, Hegemony, or Self-Interest?, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2007, pp. 383-399.

10 Craig Calhoun, Secularism, Citizenship and the Public Sphere in. *Rethinking Secularism*, Calhoun Craig, Mark Juergensmeyer, Jonathan Van Antwerpen (eds.), Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 2012, p. 86.

11 Jocelyne Cesari, *The Awakening of Muslim Democracy: Religion, Democracy, and the State*, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2014, p. 1.

12 Scott R. Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*, Rowman and Littlefield, New York, NY, 2000, p. 2.

aration and recurring clashes between the church and state that typify Western civilization have existed in no other civilization. The division of authority contributed immeasurably to the development of freedom in the West."¹³ Demerath & Straight similarly argue that "there is no question that the secular-state secular-politics combination is often associated with Western Europe in particular."¹⁴ Beit-Hallahmi takes this perhaps to its extreme when he argues that "whenever, and wherever, religion in the West manifests itself in a form which is more than a matter of private faith, it will be defined in most Western societies as disruptive and judged to be marginal and deviant."¹⁵

A third theme in the literature contrasts between the secular West and the less secular developing world, particularly Islam. Facchini's article which is titled "Religion, Law and Development: Islam and Christianity—Why is it in Occident and not in the Orient that Man Invented the Institutions of Religious Freedom?"¹⁶ is a clear example, but there are many others. Cesari argues that modernization led to religious freedom in the West but not the Muslim world.

The modernization of Muslim societies, unlike Western ones, did not lead to the privatization of religion but to the opposite, that is, the politicization of Islam in a way unprecedented in premodern Muslim societies. This is not because Islam does not separate religion and politics (which is by the way historically false) but because the Islamic tradition was integrated into the nation state-building that took place at the end of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷

Hurd argues similarly that a "policy consequence of Euro-American secularist epistemology is that the forms and degrees of separation between public and private, sacred and secular, Islam and politics that do exist in contemporary Muslim-majority societies either do not appear at all, or appear as ill-fitting imitations of a Western secular ideal."¹⁸

Haynes focuses more generally on the developing world. "Secularization continues in much of the industrialized West but not in many parts of the Third World."¹⁹ Imboden (2013: 164) similarly contrasts the West and non-West. "The post-Enlightenment tradition in the West of treating religion as an exclusively

13 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, Simon and Schuster, New York, NY, 1996, p. 75.

14 N.J. Demerath III, Karen S. Straight, Religion, Politics, and the State: Cross-Cultural Observations, *Cross Currents*, Vol. 47, No. 1, 1997, p. 47.

15 Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, The Return of Martyrdom: Honour, Death, and Immortality, *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2003, p. 11.

16 Francois Facchini, Religion, Law and Development: Islam and Christianity—Why is it in Occident and not in the Orient that Man Invented the Institutions of Religious Freedom?, *European Journal of Law and Economy*, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2010, pp. 103-129.

17 Cesari, op. cit. xiii.

18 Elizabeth S. Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations*, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 2007, p. 349.

19 Jeffrey Haynes, Religion, Secularisation, and Politics: A Postmodern Conspectus *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1997, p. 709.

private and personal matter sometimes prevents policymakers from perceiving the public and corporate nature of religion in many non-Western societies.²⁰

While much of those discussed so far contrast Western secularization to non-Western religiousness, a fourth theme focuses more specifically on secularization theory—the prediction that modernity will reduce the influence of religion in government and society. This argument was more influential in the past but some supporters still remain.²¹ The specific formulation of this type of claim varies, but their common denominator is the argument that a part of the world variously described as the West, Europe, or specific parts of Europe is secularizing. This implicitly includes a decline of religious discrimination. Berger, for example, argues that Western and Central Europe and certain intellectual circles are the exception to a world where religion is resurging.²² Marquand & Nettler similarly argue that “Western Europe appears to be an exception ... Organized religion almost certainly plays a smaller role in politics in 2000 over most of the territory of the European Union than it did in 1950.”²³ Some explicitly contrast the West’s secularization to the centrality of religion in politics in the Muslim world.²⁴ Others who support secularization theory, explicitly limit their arguments to the West, implicitly contrasting it to the non-West.²⁵

A fifth type of argument focuses on specific political and social processes unique to the West and argues they are the reason for secularization and, implicitly, increased religious freedom. Haynes focuses on how Western governments have co-opted and subordinated religious institutions as well as instituting equality policies.²⁶ Crouch argues that the rejection of religion in politics due to past religious wars as well as increased individualism and liberalism among Europeans is reducing the demand for restrictive collective identities. This has reduced European Churches’ political influence. In addition, increased adherence to the ideals of liberalism in Europe has forced its churches to focus

20 William Imboden, “Religion and International Relations: How Should Policymakers Think about Religion?,” in: *Religion and International Relations: A Primer for Research*, Michael C. Desch, Daniel Philpott (eds.), Mellon Initiative on Religion Across the Disciplines, Notre Dame University, 2013, p. 164.

21 For a review and discussion of the theory see: Fox, 2015, op. cit. and Phillip S. Gorski, Ates Altinordu After Secularization, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 24, 2008, pp. 55-85.

22 Peter L. Berger, Secularism in Retreat, *The National Interest*, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 3-12; Peter L. Berger, Faith and Development, *Society*, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2009, pp. 69-75.

23 D Marquand and R. L. Nettler, Forward, *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 71, Supplement 1, 2000, p. 2.

24 Eg. Robert H. Hefner, Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization, *Sociology of Religion*, Vol. 62, No. 4, 2001, pp. 491-514, and Bassam Tibi, Post-Bipolar Disorder in Crisis: The Challenge of Politicized Islam, *Millennium*, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2000, pp. 843-859.

25 Steve Bruce, *God Is Dead: Secularization in the West*, Blackwell, 2002; Steve Bruce, “Secularization and Politics”, in: *Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics*, Jeffrey Haynes (ed.), Routledge, New York, NY, 2009, pp. 145-158; Loek Halman, Veerle Draulans, How Secular is Europe?, *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 57, No. 2, 2006, pp. 263-288; Kars B. Kaspersen, Johannes Lindvall, Why No Religious Politics? The Secularization of Poor Relief and Primary Education in Denmark and Sweden, *Archives of European Sociology*, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2008, pp. 119-143; Malina Voicu, Religion and Gender Across Europe, *Social Compass*, Vol. 56, No. 2, 2009, pp. 144-162.

26 Haynes, 1997, op. cit.; Jeffrey Haynes, *Religion in Global Politics*, Longman, New York, NY, 1998. *Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics*, Jeffrey Haynes (ed.), Routledge, New York, NY, 2009.

more on tolerance.²⁷ In fact, Kuhle explicitly argues that in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland the governments have forced their national (Lutheran) churches to take more liberal stances on a wide variety of issues including gay marriage and the ordination of women. In this case the reason is that the close relationship between religion and state in these countries has given the government sufficient leverage over these choices to alter their ideologies and theologies on significant issues.²⁸

Taylor argues the opposite. He posits that religion no longer legitimizes the state in the West because the West has shifted from “a society where belief in God is unchallenged...to one in which it is understood to be one option among others.”²⁹ Norris & Inglehart argue that the key process is economic. In developed countries, including the West, increased existential security is reducing religion’s influence. Specifically, when one no longer need worry about basic issues like food, shelter, and safety, the need for religion decreases.³⁰

Based on all of the above we would expect religious GRD in the West to be low and declining and that the West has disproportionally low levels of religious GRD compared to other Christian-majority democracies. As I show in the empirical portion of this study, this is not the case.

Why Would We Expect Less GRD in the Developing World?

Previous studies of GRD have found that among Christian-majority countries GRD is lower in developing countries than in Western democracies and the former Soviet bloc. However these studies examine this issue as part of a larger focus on GRD worldwide and devote limited attention to why GRD is lower in the developing world. In addition, they examine the Christian world in its entirety and do not focus on democracies. Despite this, quantitative studies on the causes of discrimination identify three factors that may help account for why GRD is lower among Christian states in the developing world. The first is economic development. They find consistently that more developed countries, as measured by per-capita GDP, engage in higher levels of GRD. However, there is little discussion of why this might be the case.³¹

One potential explanation is that GRD takes resources and resources are scarcer in less developed countries. Gill makes this argument in his discussion of the causes of religious liberty. His focus is on rational choice explanations for why politicians choose to support religious freedom policies. He argues that

27 Colin, Crouch, *The Quiet Continent: Religion and Politics in Europe*, *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 71, Supplement 1, 2000, pp. 90-103.

28 Lene Kuhle, *Concluding Remarks on Religion and State in the Nordic Countries*, *Nordic Journal of Religion and Society*, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2011, pp. 205-213.

29 Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2007, p. 3.

30 Pippa Norris, Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2004.

31 Fox, 2015, op. cit. 2016, op. cit. 2018, op. cit.

supporting a religious monopoly has costs but these costs are worth it because if the supported religion gives the government legitimacy and teaches the population to be moral this lowers the costs for law enforcement and repression.³² Supporting a religious monopoly can also involve repressing religious minorities. In fact many argue that without repressing minority religions, religious monopolies are not possible.³³

Repression itself is costly in material resources. It requires manpower. This can include police or other similar government agencies, courts, and prisons.³⁴ These individuals' organizations, and agencies require buildings, supplies, and other resources. In countries with less resources, there will be greater competition for existing resources which makes repression more of a luxury. For this reason, countries with less resources are more likely to avoid spending their scarce resources on repression. This can be described in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: States with lower levels of economic development will engage in less GRD.

Of course this influence is not absolute. As Gill points out, states with fewer resources can still choose to use these scarce resources for repression, especially if this repression is necessary to remain in power.³⁵ Though these states tend to be less democratic and this study focuses exclusively on democracies so this is unlikely to be a major factor. Also, the influence of economic development is posited by Finke to have the opposite effect on SRD. Protecting religious freedom from limitations placed on it by societal actors can cost resources. Finke argues that "like other freedoms, protecting religious freedoms can be both inconvenient and costly. Even when the state lacks explicit motives for restricting religious freedoms, the state often allows restrictions to arise because it lacks either the motive or the ability to protect such freedoms."³⁶ This is because "when the state is weak... the tyranny of the majority and the actions of religious, political, and social movements can quickly deny the religious freedoms of others."³⁷ To the extent these societal actors can influence the government it might also lead to higher levels of GRD. Nevertheless, I posit here that the overall influence

32 Anthony Gill, *The Political Origins of Religious Liberty*, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2008; Ani Sarkissian, *The Varieties of Religious Repression: Why Governments Restrict Religion*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 2015 makes similar arguments but focuses exclusively on non-democracies.

33 Gill, 2008, op. cit. Jose Casanova, *The Secular and Secularisms*, *Social Research*, Vol. 76, No. 4, 2009, pp. 1049-1066; Paul Froese, *After Atheism: An Analysis of Religious Monopolies in the Post-Communist World*, *Sociology of Religion*, Vol. 65, No. 1, 2004, pp. 57-75; Rodney Stark & Roger Finke, *Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion*, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 2000.

34 Sarkissian, op. cit. p. 15.

35 Gill, op. cit.

36 Roger Finke, *Origins and Consequences of Religious Restrictions: A Global Overview*, *Sociology of Religion*, Vol. 74, No. 3, 2013, pp. 301-302.

37 Finke, op. cit., p. 303.

is that more developed countries will engage in higher levels of GRD.

The second explanation is support for religion. Previous studies show that, on average, developing Christian-majority countries engage in less support for religion. This is likely because support also requires resources. If this finding also holds for Christian-majority democracies in the developing world it can provide an explanation for lower levels of GRD.

This is because when states are linked to a religion, the likelihood of GRD increased dramatically.³⁸ As noted above, this can be a political calculation based on state support for a religious monopoly. It can also be a result of theological, doctrinal, or ideological motivations. In fact, religious ideologies are often theorized to be a primary cause of religious discrimination. They identify an exclusive truth and are usually intolerant of incompatible beliefs. As Stark argues “those who believe there is only One True God are offended by worship directed toward other Gods.”³⁹

Stark argues that Christianity, as one of the Abrahamic religions, is particularly intolerant of competition.⁴⁰ Wald similarly argues that Christianity can be particularly intolerant when it creates ultimate values which can inhibit the ability to compromise or accommodate others.⁴¹ This is especially true when a religion believes there is only one path to salvation or when beliefs are based on an exclusive divine revelation.⁴² This can be described in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: States which more strongly support a religion will engage in higher levels of GRD.

A third potential explanation for variances across as well as within states in GRD is SRD. Grim & Finke demonstrate that SRD and prejudices are a precursor to GRD. They argue that societal prejudices can influence government repression through a variety of avenues. When a minority is unpopular, this can be a signal to political leaders that engaging in GRD may enhance their political fortunes. In addition the attitudes of these politicians toward the religious minority may reflect those of their constituents and these societal attitudes may give these politicians license to follow their own prejudices. Religious pressure groups and religious political parties may also pressure governments to engage in discrimination. They imply this when they argue that “heightening the tension between groups and socially isolating them from other groups also serves to stimulate

38 Fox, 2008, op. cit.; Fox 2015, op. cit.; Jonathan Fox, A World Survey of Secular-Religious Competition: State Religion Policy from 1990 to 2014, *Religion, State & Society*, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2019, pp. 10-29; Brian J. Grim, Roger Finke, *The Price of Freedom Denied*, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2011, p. 70.

39 Rodney Stark, *One True God, Historical Consequences of Monotheism*, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 2001, p. 32.

40 Stark, op cit.; Rodney Stark, *For the Glory of God*, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 2003.

41 Kenneth D. Wald, *Religion and Politics in the United States*, St. Martins, New York, NY, 1987, p. 267.

42 Stark, 2001, op cit.; Stark, 2003, op cit.

the growth of religious, social, and political movements that drive conflict."⁴³ If levels of SRD are lower in developing countries than in Western democracies this could at least partially explain the lower levels of GRD in these countries. This can be described by the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: Religious minorities which experience higher levels of SRD will also experience higher levels of GRD.

While Grim & Finke's data was collected at the country-level, the RASM3 data used in this study was collected separately for each religious minority so this study can test this hypothesis based on the links between SRD and GRD against specific minorities. This focus on specific minorities is important because attitudes toward minorities can have deep historical and cultural roots. For example, Kaplan & Small demonstrate that anti-Semitism in a region in the past can predict current anti-Semitism.⁴⁴

It is important to note that while it is possible to argue that due to the secular nature of many democracies they are not truly Christian-majority, I posit that they are for the purposes of this study. First, nominally, all of the countries in this study identify as Christian. Second for all of them Christianity is part of their history and culture and, as Smith argues, for many of them it is part of their nationalism.⁴⁵ Third, GRD is specifically government-based discrimination and this study as well as previous studies⁴⁶ show that many Christian-majority democracies strongly support Christianity.

In the case of SRD, in contrast, it is often difficult to tell the perpetrators of the anti-minority activities. Thus, it is difficult to ascribe SRD to religious ideological motivations, and in many cases it may be due to non-religious motivations such as anti-immigrant sentiment or atheist extremist groups. However, it is not necessary for SRD to be religiously-motivated for the relationship posited here to hold. The core argument is that animosity in society can motivate discrimination by governments is a mechanism that can work regardless of the motivation for that animosity.

It is important to stress that I do not argue that these factors replace the influence of democracy on discrimination. Rather, I argue that liberal democracy does create a tendency to engage in less discrimination. However, other factors can overpower this liberal tendency. In this case, I argue that economic development, government support for religion, and SRD in combination are sufficient

43 Grim & Finke, op. cit. p. 211.

44 Edward H. Kaplan, Charles A. Small, Anti-Israel Sentiment Predicts Anti-Semitism in Europe, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 50, No. 4, 2006, pp. 548-561.

45 Anthony D. Smith, The Sacred Dimension of Nationalism, *Millennium*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2000, pp. 791-814.

46 Eg. Fox, 2015, op. cit.; Alfred Stepan, Religion, Democracy, and the 'Twin Tolerations', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2000, pp. 37-56.

to cause significant differences in discrimination levels between developing countries on one hand and Western and European countries on the other hand, among Christian-majority democracies.

Data Description and Analysis

This analysis uses the Religion and State-Minorities round 3 (RASM3) dataset which has added features to those of previous rounds which enable this study. While RASM2 includes minority-specific data on government-based discrimination (GRD), RASM3 adds new data on societal discrimination (SRD). This study focuses on the data from 1990 and 2014, the earliest and most recent data currently available, for 307 religious minorities in 67 Christian-majority democracies. These democracies were selected by including all Christian-majority countries whose score on the Polity index⁴⁷ was 8 or higher. Countries with no polity score were included if they were determined to be “free” by the Freedom House democracy index.⁴⁸

As with previous rounds, to collect RASM3, each country was examined using multiple sources including primary sources such as laws and constitutions, media reports, government reports, NGO reports, and academic sources. These reports provided the basis for coding the variables.

Minorities which meet a population threshold of at least 0.2% in a country were included in the study. Smaller Jewish and Muslim minorities were included due to their prominence in current World politics. Minorities are divided into the following categories: Christian (e.g., Protestants in a Catholic-majority country), Muslims, Jews, and other. While the “other” category includes diverse minorities including Hindus, Buddhists, Animists, Sikhs, Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Rastafarians, Baha’i, Scientologists, Animists, and Chinese religions, there are not a sufficient number of any of these groups to form a category large enough for meaningful statistical analysis.

In the analysis I categorize countries based on world region into 26 Western democracies, 15 former Soviet bloc states, and 26 in the developing world (Asia, Africa, and Latin America). I also divide states along denominational lines into Catholic, Orthodox, and other types of Christianity, though some world regions do not include states in all of these categories.

RASM3 uses similar procedures for constructing both SRD and GRD. Both are additive indexes and the components within the indexes were coded on a scale of 0 to 2. The 27 types of SRD were each coded as follows:

47 <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>, (accessed October 10, 2019)

48 <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018>, (accessed October 10, 2019). For a discussion of alternative ways to measure the influence of democracy on religious discrimination, see: Roger Finke, Dane R. Mataic, Jonathan Fox, Assessing the Impact of Religious Registration, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 56, No. 4, 2017, pp. 720-736.

- 0 = There are no reported incidents of this type of action against the specified minority.
- 1 = This action occurs on a minor level.
- 2 = This action occurs on a substantial level.

These 27 types of SRD include acts of economic discrimination, speech acts against minorities such as anti-minority propaganda by clergy, the media or political party campaigns, acts against property such as vandalism and graffiti, non-violent harassment and violent acts against the minority. The codes for the 35 types of GRD are:

- 0 = The activity is not significantly restricted or the government does not engage in this practice.
- 1 = The activity is slightly restricted or the government engages in a mild form of this practice.
- 2 = The activity is significantly restricted or the government engages in a severe form of this practice.

These types of GRD include restrictions on the religious practices, institutions, clergy, and proselytizing by the minority. The resulting variables range from 0 to 70 for GRD and 0 to 54 for SRD. However, none of the minorities in this study reach the highest levels of either measure.⁴⁹

Before explaining *why* there is a difference between GRD among Christian-majority democracies, it is important to establish *whether* such differences exist. Table 1 examines mean levels of GRD. The results show that overall, GRD is lower in developing countries with statistical significance but this result has several nuances. First, it is highest in the former Soviet bloc. Second there is considerable variation in GRD within each region based on majority Christian denomination. In both Western democracies and the former Soviet bloc Orthodox-majority states engage in higher mean levels of GRD, though in Western democracies this is based only on two countries, Greece and Cyprus. In non-Orthodox-majority Western democracies Catholic-majority states engage in higher levels of GRD than do other states.⁵⁰ However, in developing countries, the "other" states engage in less GRD than Catholic-majority states. In fact, the differences between Catholic-majority states in Western democracies and the developing world are relatively small so the large difference between the developing world and Western democracies among Christian majority democracies is largely driven by the differences between those regions' non-Catholic non-Orthodox-majority states.

49 For a more detailed discussion of sources, data collection procedures, how the data was coded, a reliability analysis and a discussion of why RAS composite measures are additive rather than weighted see Fox 2008, op. cit.; 2015, op. cit.; 2016, op. cit. and Jonathan Fox, Roger Finke and Dane R. Mataic, New Data and Measures on Societal Discrimination and Religious Minorities, *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion*, Vol. 14, No. 14, 2018.

50 Despite this Greece and Cyprus do not drive the results. In robustness tests excluding these two countries, the results remain basically the same.

Table 1: Government-Based Discrimination against Religious Minorities in 1990* and 2014

Region and majority religion	Mean levels of discrimination												% of Countries which discriminate against at least one minority	
	All Cases		Christian				Muslim				Minority religion			
	1990*	2014	1990*	2014	1990*	2014	1990*	2014	1990*	2014	1990*	2014	1990*	2014
Western Democracies	2.42	2.95c	2.16	2.42b	3.65	5.38c	2.42	2.63	1.70	1.79	88.5%	96.2%		
Catholic	1.82	2.02	1.27	1.40	2.64	3.55	1.36	1.18	2.38	2.25	80.9%	100.0%		
Orthodox (2 countries)	9.80	11.00a	12.00	14.00	10.00	11.50	8.50	9.00	na	na	100.0%	100.0%		
Other Christian	2.27	2.96c	2.40	2.67a	3.54	6.00c	2.38	2.85	1.48	1.64a	84.6%	92.3%		
Former Soviet	4.39f	5.13af	4.90e	5.87af	5.20	5.93	2.80	3.07	1.00	2.00	86.7%	100.0%		
Orthodox	6.00d	7.31bf	6.64d	8.36be	6.83	7.50	3.67	4.67a	na	na	100.0%	100.0%		
Non-Orthodox	3.20d	3.51f	3.37d	3.68e	4.11	4.89	2.22	2.00	1.00	2.00	77.8%	100.0%		
Developing Countries	1.73f	1.66f	2.24	1.97e	1.26f	1.57f	2.25	2.08	1.54	1.46	65.4%	76.9%		
Catholic	2.45f	2.22f	3.13f	2.74f	1.67	1.93	3.00a	2.56	2.23f	1.98e	76.5%	88.2%		
Other Christian	0.32f	0.55f	0.20f	0.20f	0.50	1.13	0.00a	0.67	0.35f	0.57e	44.4%	55.6%		
All Cases	3.49	3.68c	3.06	3.36	4.19	4.57c	2.49	2.62	1.59	1.58	79.1%	89.6%		

*1990 or the earliest year available

a = Significance (t-test) between 1990 and 2014 < .05

b = Significance (t-test) between 1990 and 2014 < .01

c = Significance (t-test) between 1990 and 2014 < .001

d = Significance (t-test) between marked mean and other world regions or majority religion within same region < .05

e = Significance (t-test) between marked mean and other world regions or majority religion within same region < .05

f = Significance (t-test) between marked mean and other world regions or majority religion within same region < .05

(For Western democracies we compared only Catholic and other non-Orthodox-majority states)

Third, as found by Fox, GRD varies across religious minorities but this variation is different across groupings of states.⁵¹ In the West and in non-Orthodox-majority

51 Fox, 2016, op. cit.; Jonathan Fox, Yasemin Akbaba, Restrictions on the Religious Practices of Religious Minorities: A Global Survey, *Political Studies*, 2014, doi: 10.1111/1467-9248.12141. For a discussion of how and why this variation occurs in Western democracies see Jonathan Fox, Yasemin Akbaba, Securitization of Islam and Religious Discrimination: Religious Minorities in Western

former Soviet states Muslims experience the highest levels of religious discrimination. Orthodox-majority states, both in the West and in the former Soviet bloc discriminate most against Christian minorities, many of them US-based Protestant denominations. Catholic-majority states in the developing world also discriminate most against Christian minorities.

Finally, also confirming Fox⁵² nearly all of these states discriminate against at least one minority and those that do discriminate do so against some minorities more than others. Only Barbados, Canada, Lesotho, the Philippines, the Solomon Islands, Uruguay, and Vanuatu do not discriminate.⁵³ Among these states, only Canada is Western and only the Philippines and Uruguay are Catholic-majority. Only Cape Verde, Cyprus, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Luxembourg, Peru, and Portugal, engage in discrimination but do so at the same level to all minorities. Thus, 52 of 67 (77.6%) of these states engage in unequal levels of GRD against their religious minorities.

Table 2 examines levels of government support for religion in order to determine whether this varies between world regions. This table, which uses the country rather than the minority as the level of analysis because it is measuring government religion policy, looks at two aspects of support. First, RAS3 divides official government religion policies into 14 categories which I simplify into five:

- The State has an official religion
- While there is no official religion, the state in practice supports one religion more than others
- While there is no official religion, the state in practice supports multiple religions more than others
- The state treats all religions equally and has a positive or neutral attitude toward religion
- The state is at least slightly hostile to religion.

RAS3 also includes a composite variable of 52 ways a state might specifically support religion including passing religious laws as state laws, financing religion, and entanglement between religious and government intuitions, among others. Table 2 included mean levels of this variable for each of the above categories as well as in general.

Democracies, 1990 to 2008, *Comparative European Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2015, pp. 175-197; Jonathan Fox, Roger Finke, Marie A. Eisenstein, Examining the Causes of Government-Based Discrimination against Minorities in Western Democracies Societal-level Discrimination and Securitization, *Comparative European Politics*, 2018 doi: 10.1057/s41295-018-0134-1; Jonathan Fox, Civilizational Clash or Balderdash? The Causes of Religious Discrimination in Western European Christian-Majority Democracies, *Review of Faith in International Affairs*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2019, pp. 34-48.

52 Ibidem.

53 Trinidad and Tobago does not discriminate against any minority listed in RASM but engage in minor restrictions on foreign missionaries.

Table 2: Official Government Policy and Levels of Support for Religion in 1990* and 2014

Official religion policy	% of countries having specified official religion policy						Mean levels of support for religion					
	Western democ- racies			Developing Countries			Former Soviet			Developing Countries		
	1990*	2014	1990*	2014	1990*	2014	1990*	2014	1990*	2014	1990*	2014
Official religion	34.6%	30.8%	0.0%	0.0%	15.4%	7.7%	12.77	12.25	na	na	7.50	7.50
One religion preferred over others	23.1%	23.1%	40.0%	53.3%	34.6%	26.9%	8.83	8.67	7.33	10.13	6.00	6.91
Several religions preferred over others	15.4%	23.1%	53.3%	46.7%	15.4%	15.4%	8.50	8.83	8.00	10.14	6.25	7.50
Positive neutrality	23.1%	19.2%	0.0%	0.0%	26.9%	26.9%	5.50	6.40	na	na	5.86	5.86
Hostility	3.8%	3.8%	6.7%	0.0%	7.7%	7.7%	6.00	6.00	3.00	na	2.00	3.00
All cases							9.27b	9.27	7.40	10.13a	5.92c	6.46c

* 1990 or the earliest year available

a = Significance (t-test) between marked mean and other world regions < .05

b = Significance (t-test) between marked mean and other world regions < .01

c = Significance (t-test) between marked mean and other world regions < .001

The patterns of official religion policy and support for religion clearly differ across world regions. Western democracies are the most likely to have an official religion and in 2014, 53.1% either officially or unofficially supported one religion more than others. In contrast, in 2014 among developing countries, only Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic had official religions. In the former Soviet bloc, no country has an official religion but a bit over half support one religion more than others. Mean levels of support for religion are lower in developing countries both in general and at each level of official religion policy. Thus, it is possible that variations in levels of support for religion may explain the lower levels of GRD in developing countries.

Table 3 examines levels of SRD in order to determine whether it varies across world regions. Overall SRD is significantly lower in developing countries than in Western democracies and former Soviet states. However, there are some exceptions when looking at specific types of minorities. Christian minorities in the West experience less SRD than do Christian minorities in the developing world but levels are low for both regions. Also, while former Soviet “other” groups have lower levels of SRD than do minorities in the same category in the developing world, this is based on a sample of one, the Spiritists in Poland.

Overall the patterns of SRD show that while less common than GRD, it is present in a majority of countries in all categories of states examined here against at least one religious minority. However, then looking at the proportion of minorities influenced, a regional disparity emerges. 41.7% and 44.3% of minorities in Western democracies and the former Soviet bloc, respectively, experience at least one type of SRD and opposed to 22.1% in the developing world. Given all of this and the theorized connection between SRD and GRD, it is possible that SRD can provide an explanation for the lower levels of GRD in developing countries.

Tables 4a and 4b use OLS regressions to examine the potential correlates of SRD and GRD in 1990 and 2014. In addition to support for religion, SRD (in the tests for GRD), and dummy variables for (1) world region, (2) the majority Christian denomination, and (3) the minority religion, these tests include several control variables found by Fox⁵⁴ to predict GRD. Log-per-capita GDP⁵⁵ is included for this reason as well as because hypothesis 1 predicts less GRD in less developed countries. Since all of these countries are democracies, there is no control for regime but regime duration is measured by the number of years since the last change in the Polity index.⁵⁶ The tests also control for the country’s population size which can be theorized to either increase or decrease GRD⁵⁷. Finally, as violence by a minority religion might provoke a discriminatory reaction, I include a variable from RASM3 which measures societal actions taken by a minority against the majority.

54 Fox, 2016, op. cit.

55 Taken from the World Bank, <https://data.worldbank.org/>, (accessed October 10, 2019).

56 <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>, (accessed October 10, 2019).

57 Taken from the World Bank, <https://data.worldbank.org/>, (accessed October 10, 2019).

Table 3: Societal Discrimination against Religious minorities, 1990* and 2014

Region and majority religion	Mean levels of discrimination										% of Countries which discriminate against at least one minority	
	All Cases		Christian			Muslim			Jewish			
	1990*	2014	1990*	2014	1990*	2014	1990*	2014	1990*	2014	1990*	2014
Western Democracies	2.03	3.70cf	0.16d	0.13e	2.88d	6.80cf	5.15	8.46cd	0.64	0.85	69.2%	88.5%
Catholic	1.27	2.96	0.00	0.00	1.90	4.36bd	2.82	7.00a	0.62	1.00	45.5%	72.7%
Orthodox (2 countries)	5.80	7.60	1.00	1.00	6.50	9.00	7.50	9.50	na	na	100.0%	100.0%
Other Christian	2.26	3.91c	0.27	0.20	3.15	8.55cd	6.77	9.54b	0.64	0.80	84.6%	84.6%
Former Soviet	3.26d	3.11	3.00d	2.53d	1.87	1.87	5.40	5.53	0.00	0.00	93.3%	93.3%
Orthodox	3.23	3.62	3.64	4.00	1.67	2.50	3.83	3.83	na	na	83.3%	83.3%
Non-Orthodox	3.28	2.74	2.44	1.44	2.00	1.44	6.44	6.67	0.00	0.00	88.9%	88.9%
Developing Countries	0.58f	0.77af	0.60	0.79	0.43f	0.70f	2.41	3.17a	0.29	0.33	65.4%	65.4%
Catholic	0.69	0.91a	0.87	1.13	0.47	0.47	2.67	3.56	0.23	0.35	60.6%	64.7%
Other Christian	0.39	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.38	1.13a	1.67	2.00	0.39	0.30	55.6%	66.7%
All Cases	1.66	2.34c	1.22	1.16	1.77	3.45c	4.60	6.43c	0.40	0.50	73.3%	84.1%

*1990 or the earliest year available
 a = Significance (t-test) between 1990 and 2014 < .05
 b = Significance (t-test) between 1990 and 2014 < .01
 c = Significance (t-test) between 1990 and 2014 < .001
 d = Significance (t-test) between marked mean and other world regions or majority religion within same region < .05
 e = Significance (t-test) between marked mean and other world regions or majority religion within same region < .05
 f = Significance (t-test) between marked mean and other world regions or majority religion within same region < .05
 (For Western democracies we compared only Catholic and other non-Orthodox-majority states)

This variable measures five types of actions including violence, terror, harassment, vandalism, and other actions each measured on a scale of 0 to 2 for each year between 1990 and 2014. As these actions must precede the discrimination to have the predicted effect, I use this variable only for the tests predicting SRD and GRD in 2014. The variable measures the averages for 1990 to 2014.

Table 4a: OLS Regressions Predicting SRD and GRD

	Societal discrimination (SRD)				Government-based discrimination (GRD)			
	1990*		2014		1990*		2014	
	Beta	Sig	Beta	Sig	Beta	Sig	Beta	Sig
Western Democracy	-.074	.538	.047	.679	-.338	.001	-.176	.071
Former Soviet	.124	.093	.144	.078	-.091	.153	-.153	.030
Majority Catholic	-.055	.393	-.076	.254	.205	.000	.029	.617
Majority Orthodox	.064	.372	.051	.488	.465	.000	.504	.000
Minority Christian	.000	.997	.010	.882	.044	.449	.056	.334
Minority Muslim	.086	.164	.065	.309	.051	.339	.129	.019
Minority Jewish	.336	.000	.339	.000	-.145	.010	-.138	.014
Log-Country population	.264	.000	.238	.000	.082	.087	.062	.207
Log-Per Capita GDP (h1)	.188	.081	.079	.449	.234	.012	.255	.005
Regime Duration	-.083	.274	-.098	.253	.020	.756	-.100	.175
Support for Religion (h2)	.029	.612	.020	.743	.415	.000	.313	.000
Minority population %	.065	.244	.037	.519	-.075	.122	-.071	.147
Minority violence (1990-2014)	--	--	.078	.156	--	--	.016	.730
Societal discrimination (h3)	--	--	--	--	.299	.000	.242	.000
df	307		307		307		307	
Adjusted r-squared	.203		.197		.408		.407	

The results provide robust evidence supporting all three hypotheses which are designed to predict GRD but not SRD. Given this, it is interesting that log-per-capita GDP (hypothesis 1) and support for religion (hypothesis 2) are not associated with SRD at the .05 level of significance though in two of the models per-capita GDP is associated with SRD at the .1 level. The only statistically significant predictors of SRD are the country's population size and the identity of the religious minority. This establishes that SRD is mostly independent of these factors and that any influence it has on GRD is also independent of these factors.

All four models predicting GRD show that per-capita GDP (hypothesis 1), support for religion (hypothesis 2), and SRD (hypothesis 3) predict GRD at high levels of significance. Even more interesting, in table 4b, when these factors as well as the controls, are taken into account developing countries are significantly associated with more GRD and Western democracies are associated with lower levels.

Table 4b: OLS Regressions Predicting SRD and GRD

	Societal discrimination (SRD)				Government-based discrimination (GRD)			
	1990*		2014		1990*		2014	
	Beta	Sig	Beta	Sig	Beta	Sig	Beta	Sig
Developing world	-.101	.251	-.070	.415	.167	.029	.175	.030
Majority Catholic	-.059	.363	-.095	.116	.201	.000	.035	.535
Majority Orthodox	.081	.254	.076	.249	.481	.000	.495	.000
Minority Christian	.025	.702	.004	.953	.069	.226	.056	.330
Minority Muslim	.094	.127	.226	.000	.058	.277	.098	.071
Minority Jewish	.349	.000	.448	.000	-.136	.016	-.176	.003
Log-Country population	.248	.000	.298	.000	.063	.188	.046	.355
Log-Per Capita GDP (h1)	.054	.529	.149	.090	.097	.188	.217	.009
Regime Duration	-.106	.164	-.082	.271	-.001	.992	-.106	.134
Support for Religion (h2)	-.001	.986	.001	.984	.384	.000	.322	.000
Minority population %	.054	.332	.066	.230	-.087	.074	-.054	.292
Minority violence (1990-2014)	--	--	.004	.930	--	--	-.052	.275
Societal discrimination (h3)	--	--	--	--	.313	.000	.278	.000
df	307		307		307		307	
Adjusted r-squared	.195		.332		.398		.415	

This has some interesting implications. It means that liberal democracy and Western culture do encourage religious tolerance. However, this tendency to religious tolerance is sufficiently weak that other factors like economic development, government support for religion, and SRD can overshadow this tendency. Because of this, even though the correlation is present, in practice Western democracies engage in higher levels of GRD than do developing world Christian-majority democracies.

The results for the former Soviet bloc combined with Orthodox-majority countries (most of which are in the former Soviet bloc) also require some discussion. When controlling for other factors Orthodox-majority states engage in higher GRD but former-Soviet states engage in lower GRD. This is likely because among the Former-Soviet States the Orthodox-majority states engage in far more GRD than the non-Orthodox states, who engage in levels similar to those of Western democracies. Thus this is likely an interaction effect.

The Results in Comparative Context

Norway provides a good example of the extent of GRD in Western countries. Norway, is by no means the most discriminatory among Western democracies but it engages in substantial GRD against religious minorities. Ritual slaugh-

ter by Jews and Muslims is effectively banned by laws requiring the stunning of animals before slaughter. Because of this both Kosher and Halal slaughter are illegal in Norway, though Kosher and Halal meat may be imported. Norway has many Mosques but there are multiple instances where local councils delayed or denied permits to build more. Similarly, while Norway set aside cemeteries for Muslims, some Muslim religious requirements for burial, usually customs from specific regions, are not accommodated. As a result, some Muslims are buried in their country of origin. In 2013 a Parliamentary committee found that Security Police were illegally surveilling members of Muslim communities. Some Norwegian uniformed services such as the police restrict the wearing of the hijab by Muslim women. Until 2018 Norway allowed each municipality to set its own rules for religious headcoverings that also cover the face in schools. In 2018 Norway passed a law banning all clothing worn by students and teachers that partially or fully cover the face in all universities and public school,⁵⁸

Norway scores high on all three factors the quantitative analysis shows influence GRD. It is economically developed. Until 2017 it had an official religion and remains closely connected to the former national Church. There is also significant SRD against Jews and Muslims.

Norway is not unique. Each of the types of restrictions found in Norway are present in numerous in Western democracies. However, there is some variation in which types of restrictions are present and exactly how they manifest. Nevertheless among all the Western and European democracies, only Canada engaged in no GRD between 1990 and 2014. In contrast, as noted earlier, among the developing countries. Barbados, Lesotho, the Philippines, the Solomon Islands, Uruguay, and Vanuatu engage in no GRD which makes them more tolerant of religious minorities than any Western or European Christian majority democracy other than Canada. This is also not the list of countries most people have in mind when they think of the most religiously tolerant countries in the world.

Conclusions

Both government-based religious discrimination (GRD) and societal religious discrimination (SRD), are ubiquitous even in Christian-majority democracies and even in the Western democracies whose liberal values include religious freedom. Yet it varies across world region, a country's majority Christian denomination, and the minority religion. This study finds that among Christian-majority

58 Ryland, J. (17 January 2012) Committee support use of hijab in the police, *The Norway Post*; Ryland, J. (8 January 2013) Hijab will not be permitted in the police force, *The Norway Post*; Must provide burial site for all, (1 April 2011) *The Norway Post*; Solholm, R. (14 May 2009) Believers in the Norse gods get their own graveyard *The Norway Post*; Ryland, J. (25 April 2013) Muslims in Norway under illegal surveillance, *The Norway Post*; "Norway Bans Niqab in schools" *The Local*, June 8 2018, <https://www.thelocal.no/20180606/norway-bans-burqa-and-niqab-in-schools>, (accessed October 10, 2019).

democracies, despite expectations of religious freedom particularly in Western liberal democracies, the developing world has lower levels of GRD, particularly in non-Catholic-majority developing states.

I find that this can be explained by three factors which all prove to be statistically significant. First, less developed states have fewer resources to invest in GRD. Second, state support for religion, which is stronger in Western democracies, is associated with higher levels of GRD. This, I posit is because when states are more strongly associated with a religion there are ideological motivations to discriminate as well as a tendency for the dominant religion to pressure the government to preserve its religious monopoly.⁵⁹ Third, Grim & Finke,⁶⁰ among others, argue that SRD leads to GRD. I find that SRD is lower in developing countries and a strong predictor of GRD. Once all of this is taken into account developing countries are statistically associated with higher levels of GRD and Western democracies are associated with lower levels.

Thus predictions of religious freedom in Western democracies are both accurate and inaccurate depending on one's perspective. On one hand when controlling for a number of variables the predicted association exists. However, and I posit more importantly, in absolute terms, religious discrimination both SRD and GRD are common and, on average, higher in Western democracies than in the developing world. While this can be explained by other factors, these factors themselves undermine the assumptions of religious freedom and separation of religion and state in the West. The strong support for religion in the West certainly undermines assumptions of separation of religion and state. Finke⁶¹ would also argue that it undermines the concept of a level playing field for all religions. That is, when a state supports one religion but not others, that puts the non-supported religions at a disadvantage when competing for members which can have an effect similar to discrimination. The presence of SRD against at least one minority in most Western countries undermines assumptions that the values of religious freedom are shared by all of their citizens. Finally, the finding that the wealth of the West facilitates the ability of its governments to engage in GRD is certainly inconsistent with assumptions of religious freedom in the West in general and Norris and Inglehart's⁶² arguments that economic security results in a decline in the importance of religion. Given this, we need to question either whether religious freedom is truly an integral element of liberal democracy or whether those countries we consider liberal democracies truly meet this standard.

59 Gill, *op. cit.*; Sarkissian, *op. cit.*

60 Grim & Finke, *op. cit.*

61 Finke, *op. cit.*

62 Norris and Inglehart, *op. cit.*

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ВЕРСКА ДИСКРИМИНАЦИЈА У ДОМИНАНТНО ХРИШЋАНСКИМ ДЕМОКРАТИЈАМА ОД 1990. ДО 2014.

Сажетак

Овај чланак анализира обрасце друштвених и државних дискриминација на основу вере (СРД и ГРД) против 307 верских мањина у 67 доминантно хришћанским демократијама. Чланак користи податке базе Религије и државне мањине 3. Противно очекивањима да је степен верске дискриминације свих форми нижи у западним либералним демократијама, он је уствари нижи у државама у развоју. Према аутору, ову чињеницу објашњавају три фактора. Економски развијенија друштва имају више ресурса за дискриминацију. Западне демократије имају већи ниво подршке за религију него доминантно хришћанске земље у развоју и земље које имају већи степен подршке за религију имају веће шансе за дискриминацију верских мањина. На крају, ниво СРД-а је већи на Западу и може се разумети као узрок за ГРД. Емпиријски тестови подржавају ове тезе.

Кључне речи: друштвена верска дискриминација, државна верска дискриминација, демократија, хришћанство

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