

**Javier Corrales**<sup>1</sup>  
Amherst College  
United States of America

Original scientific paper  
UDC 305:342.7(862)

**Iñaki Sagarzazu**<sup>2</sup>  
University of Houston  
United States of America

## **NOT ALL 'SINS' ARE REJECTED EQUALLY: RESISTANCE TO LGBT RIGHTS ACROSS RELIGIONS IN COLOMBIA<sup>3</sup>**

### **Abstract**

Attitudes towards homosexuality and same-sex marriage in the Americas and Europe have been found to be tightly related to religion, and especially, how religion is practiced. However, religious individuals are not consistent in their rejection of homosexuality. We explore how religions and religious individuals differ among each other in attitudes towards not just homosexuality, but also other policy areas they consider sins, such as marijuana consumption, abortion, euthanasia, use of contraceptives, and pre-marital sex. Using data for Colombia, we find that Evangelicals are the most reliable opponents of LGBT rights in the country, rejecting homosexuality more deeply than other sins. They thus target homosexuality distinctively. We also find that attitudes toward homosexuality among Evangelicals seem unresponsive to education. Because of this more pronounced homophobia among Evangelicals, we conclude that countries like Colombia that are experiencing increases in the population and levels of organization of Evangelicals are likely to face increasing difficulty, even backlash, when trying to further expand LGBT rights.

**Keywords:** Latin America, LGBT Rights, backlash, evangelicals, Catholics, homophobia, abortion

This paper seeks to expand our theoretical and empirical understanding of the veto side of the politics of LGBT rights in the Americas. Scholars studying LGBT rights recognize that expansion of rights depends on both push and re-

- 1 Javier Corrales is the Dwight W. Morrow 1895 Professor and Chair of Political Science at Amherst College, in Amherst, MA. He obtained his Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University (1996). He is the author most recently of *Fixing Democracy: Why Constitutional Change Often Fails to Enhance Democracy in Latin America* (Oxford University Press 2018). Contact E-mail: jcorrales@amherst.edu
- 2 Iñaki Sagarzazu is a Research Associate at the Hobby School for Public Affairs at the University of Houston. Before that he was an Assistant Professor at Texas Tech University. He obtained his Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of Houston (2010). His research interests focus on Comparative Politics and Quantitative Methods broadly speaking. His work has been published in *American Journal of Political Science*, *The Journal of Politics*, *British Journal of Political Science*, *Latin American Politics and Society*, among others. Contact E-mail: isagarzazu@uh.edu
- 3 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA, September 2018.

sistance factors: the former must prevail over the latter. Most scholarship so far has focused on the push side, the circumstances that lead seemingly weak and marginalized actors to overcome resistance and change state policy and laws. Less attention has been devoted to the resistance.

The most common theoretical argument about resistance politics in the Western Hemisphere emphasizes two general elements: the prevalence of *machista* and homo/trans-phobic attitudes across the public at large,<sup>4</sup> and the power of religious actors. We take these findings further by showing that, in fact, religion contributes enormously to the spread of homo and transphobic attitudes, with one caveat: not all religions and religion-identifying individuals play this role equally forcefully.

In particular, we show that Evangelicals have a greater capacity to act as veto players because both their clergy and members have more disapproving attitudes than other religious groups. Evangelical denominations have made opposition to LGBT issues one of their most salient political causes, possibly at the top of their rejected sins. This suggests some arbitrariness in how religions implement biblical interpretations. Furthermore, Evangelical clergy have a superior ability to propagate homophobia across church members relative to Catholics given the extent to which the Evangelical laity often adopt their clergy's stands and the extent to which these churches act as unrivaled non-governmental organizations (NGOs). We also find that education does not seem to lessen homophobia among Evangelicals as it does among other religious and irreligious people.

We thus conclude that in countries where Evangelical churches are growing, as in Colombia, resistance to LGBT rights should be expected to be strong and rising. While the expansion of LGBT rights in these countries is driven by, and generating new, queer allies, it is also leading to renewed counter-resistance, increasingly led by expanding Evangelical groups.

### **The Push and Resist Sides of LGBT rights**

Scholars studying LGBT rights tend to agree that the politics of expanding LGBT rights are stacked against success due to simple socioeconomic and institutional disadvantages: The LGBT community is small everywhere (representing a tiny fraction of the politically active population), often able to hide (i.e., staying in the closet), and frequently short of economic resources.<sup>5</sup> Scholarship on the expansion of LGBT rights has thus focused on trying to understand the factors

4 Pew Research Center, "Religion in Latin America: Widespread Change in a Historically Catholic Region," <https://www.compassion.com/multimedia/religion-in-latin-america-pew-research.pdf>, (accessed 03.31.2019).

5 For the United States, see M.V. Lee Badgett, *Money, Myths, and Change: The Economic Lives of Lesbians and Gay Men*, University of Chicago Press, 2001; Javier Corrales, Mario Pecheny, "Introduction", in: *The Politics of Sexuality in Latin America*, Javier Corrales, Mario Pecheny (eds.), Pittsburgh University Press, 2010; Phillip M. Ayoub, *When States Come Out: Europe's Sexual Minorities and the Politics of Visibility*, Cambridge University Press, 2016.

that help these groups overcome these starting disadvantages.

The literature among Latin Americanists has been enormously fruitful in producing theoretical insights on the mechanisms through which push-side groups can become empowered. Mechanisms include: 1) forming alliances with other, larger social movements;<sup>6</sup> 2) working together with compatible political parties;<sup>7</sup> 3) collaborating with different parts of the bureaucracy (that is, the state) to design programs, policies, or regulations;<sup>8</sup> 4) using discourse to frame their cause in ways that resonate with the public at large;<sup>9</sup> 5) taking advantage of party competition or liberal openings in the legislature, the courts, and sub-national governments<sup>10</sup> 6) electing openly out LGBT representatives;<sup>11</sup> 7) cultivating ties with transnational actors and trends;<sup>12</sup> and 8) making clever use of social media.<sup>13</sup>

Although there is a rich debate about which of these factors is more effective or principled, the key point is that today we know enough to be able to say that micro-size and visibility problems are not insurmountable challenges.

Having said that, expanding LGBT rights, as is true of any struggle to change the status quo in favor of more rights for minorities, depends not just on the strength of push factors, but also, on the strength of the resistance. Homophobic attitudes can be pervasive, even majoritarian, in most societies, but they become politicized differently. Homophobic attitudes can remain passive and disorganized in some cases, or they can become activated, that is, capable of energizing protests, and even capturing the state.<sup>14</sup>

In Latin America, evangelical churches in particular enjoy a special advantage in determining whether prevailing homophobic attitudes remain passive

- 6 Jordi Diez, *The Politics of Gay Marriage in Latin America: Argentina, Chile, and Mexico*, Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- 7 Rafael de la Dehesa, *Queering the Public Sphere in Mexico and Brazil: Sexual Rights Movements in Emerging Democracies*, Duke University Press, 2010.
- 8 Eduardo J. Gomez, Friendly Government, Cruel Society: AIDS and the Politics of Homosexual Strategic Mobilization in Brazil, in: *The Politics of Sexuality in Latin America*, Javier Corrales and Mario Pecheny (eds.), Pittsburgh University Press, 2010; Elisabeth Jay Friedman and Constanza Tabush, Introduction, in: *Seeking Rights from the Left: Gender, Sexuality and the Latin American Pink Tide*, E. J. Friedman (ed.), Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 2019; Marlise Matos, Gender and Sexuality in Brazilian Public Policy: Progress and Regression in Depatriarchalizing and Deheteronormalizing the State in, *Seeking Rights from the Left: Gender, Sexuality and the Latin American Pink Tide*. E. J. Friedman (ed.). Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 2019.
- 9 Omar G. Encarnación, *Out in the Periphery*, Oxford University Press, 2015.
- 10 Shawn Shulenberg, The Lavender Tide? LGBT Rights and the Latin American Left Today, in: *Same-Sex Relationship Recognition in Latin America: Promise and Resistance*, J. P. Pierceson, A. Crocker and S. Schulenberg (eds.), Lanham, MD, Lexington Books, 2013; Javier Corrales, LGBT Rights and Representation in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Influence of Structure, Movements, Institutions, and Culture, LGBT Representation and Rights, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, 2015; Kelly Kollman, Iñaki Sagarzazu, LGBTI Rights Expansion in the Global South: Explaining the Diffusion of Same-sex Unions Policy in Latin America. Paper presented at the MPSA meeting, 2017.
- 11 Andrew Reynolds, *The Children of Harvey Milk: How LGBTQ Politicians Changed the World*, Oxford University Press, 2018.
- 12 Elisabeth Jay Friedman, Constructing "The Same Rights With the Same Names": The Impact of Spanish Norm Diffusion on Marriage Equality in Argentina, *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2012, pp. 29-59.
- 13 Elisabeth Jay Friedman, *Interpreting the Internet: Feminist and Queer Counterpublics in Latin America*, University of California Press, 2017.
- 14 Mala Htun, Laurel S. Weldon, Religious Power, the State, Women's Rights, and Family Law, *Politics & Gender*, Vol. 11, 2015.

or become politically mobilized. They are the fastest-growing religion in the region,<sup>15</sup> growing from 4 percent to 19 percent between 1970 and 2014.<sup>16</sup> They are also, arguably, more than just faith-based communities: they are NGOs with deep ties within the communities where they operate, and are present across all spectrum of society.<sup>17</sup> Evangelical churches in Latin America hold frequent and long meetings with constituents (church services at least once a week), raise and mobilize financial resources like few other organizations in their communities, and provide useful social services (so-called “club goods”), including entertainment options.<sup>18</sup> As NGOs, Evangelical churches have no match in terms of organizational capacity, outreach, and interaction with their constituents. Thus, Evangelical clergy can influence their constituency to a far greater degree than other religions, and maybe even community leaders, whose ties with their respective constituents are usually looser.

If our argument is correct—that Evangelical churches have a distinct advantage over other religions in terms of activating homophobia—we should confirm the following hypothesis:

*H1: Evangelicals display greater rejection of LGBT rights than other religions and non-religious groups.*

*H2: Evangelicals exhibit greater rejection of LGBT rights than other sins.*

H1 captures the extent to which Evangelicalism leads the way, among different religious groups, in terms of homophobic attitudes, while H2 captures the extent to which it focuses on LGBT issues to a higher degree than other moral themes.

We also test the argument that rising levels of modernization induces more tolerance for diversity and non-traditional behaviors. Recent work tries to link modernization variables (e.g., income, urbanization, education) to post-materialist variables, which in turn, have been linked to more progressive values and tolerance.<sup>19</sup> Our models thus include variables designed to test the influence

15 Nicolás M. Somma, et al., Mapping Religious Change in Latin America, *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 59, No. 1, 2017, pp. 117-142.

16 Pew Research Center, Religion in Latin America: Widespread Change in a Historically Catholic Region, 2014, <https://www.compassion.com/multimedia/religion-in-latin-america-pew-research.pdf> (accessed 03.31.2019).

17 Javier Corrales, The Expansion of LGBT Rights in Latin America... and the Backlash, *The Oxford Handbook of Global LGBT and Sexual Diversity Politics*, 2019.

18 On the concept of club goods in religions, see: Fernando A. Lozano, The Rise of Secularism and Its Economic Consequences, IZA World of Labor, 2017. On the advantage of Evangelicals as NGOs, see: Amy Erica Smith, *Religion and Brazilian Democracy: Mobilizing the People of God*, Cambridge University Press, 2019.

19 Ronald Inglehart, Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005; Robert Andersen, Tina Fetner, Economic Inequality and Intolerance: Attitudes toward Homosexuality in 35 Democracies, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 52, No. 4, 2008, pp. 942-958; Tom W. Smith, et al., *Public Attitudes toward Homosexuality and Gay Rights across Time and Countries*. Chicago and Los Angeles, NORC at the University of Chicago

of modernization-related variables across different religions. We thus argue that modernization, and especially, education levels, will lessen rejection of LGBT rights, with the exception of Evangelicals. In particular, we posit:

*H3: More education is related to greater acceptance of LGBT rights, except for self-identified Evangelicals and Protestants.*

## The Colombian Case

To test these hypotheses, we choose the Colombian case because it is a democracy that has achieved enormous legal and policy success in terms of expanding LGBT rights, but has also experienced some recent push back.

Legally, progress on LGBT rights in Colombia has been extensive. The courts have produced more than 140 LGBT friendly rulings, including same-sex marriage, an LGBT-inclusive anti-discrimination law, and adoption rights for LGBT families. Under the administration of Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018), the Colombian state also established a number of LGBT-friendly policies and initiatives, including the first peace agreement in history between a state and guerrillas that mentions reparations for violations on LGBT rights committed during the war, the establishment of an easier process for individuals to change their gender identity in national IDs, launching an initiative to combat bullying in schools and to defend LGBT rights among incarcerated populations, etc. By 2016, Colombia ranked among the most LGBT-friendly countries in the Americas.<sup>20</sup>

Despite this progress, Colombia has experienced important setbacks. Very few pro-LGBT initiatives have been approved by the legislature; most have been either court rulings or ministerial regulations. In 2016, pressure from conservative groups through street protests succeeded in killing a campaign by the Ministry of Education against bullying and intolerance toward LGBT issues at schools.<sup>21</sup> Homophobic groups were able to mobilize a successful no-vote campaign against the peace agreement, in part because of the agreement's inclusion of gender and LGBT issues.<sup>22</sup> They came close to getting congress to approve a referendum on adoption rights for non-heterosexual couples.<sup>23</sup> In the

---

and The Williams Institute at the UCLA School of Law, 2014; Victor Asal, Sommer Udi, *Legal Path Dependence and the Long Arm of the Religious State: Sodomy Provisions and Gay Rights across Nations and over Time*, Albany, NY, SUNY Press, 2016; Amy Armenia, Troia Bailey Troia, *Evolving Opinions: Evidence on Marriage Equality Attitudes from Panel Data*, *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 98, No. 1, 2017.

20 Americas Quarterly, The AQ Social Inclusion Index, *Americas Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2016; Global Americans, LGBTI Norms, Rights, Jurisprudence, and Practice in the Hemisphere *Global Americans*, 2016; Juan Manuel Vargas, Los avances y lo que queda pendiente frente a los derechos LGBTI, *RCN Radio*, July 1, 2018.

21 Paola Fajardo-Heyward, Comprehensive Sexual Education in Latin America, in: *The Global and the Local: Diverse Perspectives in Comparative Education*, M.F. Astiz, M. Akiba (eds), SensePublishers, Rotterdam, pp. 31-52.

22 ¿Cómo son las iglesias cristianas en Colombia?, *El Tiempo*, 2017.

23 Virginia M. Bouvier, Gender and the Role of Women in Colombia's Peace Process, New York, UN Women, 2016; Ana Marcos, El voto evangélico, clave en la victoria del 'no' en el plebiscito de Colombia, *El País*, October 12, 2016; Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli, Debunking

2018 presidential election, they compelled all candidates to court their vote, and helped a conservative coalition led by Iván Duque defeat in the first round a progressive coalition led by a moderate pro-LGBT leaders, Sergio Fajardo, , whose running mate was an openly out lesbian, Claudia López.

Colombia therefore is a mixed case of LGBT rights expansion. Pro-LGBT forces have made enormous strides, but the country has experienced a conservative backlash.

Understanding the origins of this backlash is crucial for understanding whether existing and forthcoming LGBT rights are secure or not. Our argument is that Colombia's societal backlash against LGBT rights can be explained partly be the growing number and organization of Evangelicals in the country. By some estimate, protestants in Colombia now represent near 20 percent of the population.<sup>24</sup> We provide statistical evidence that Evangelicals exhibit the highest degree of homophobia among Colombians **Data**.

In order to test the effects of religion and in particular evangelicalism on attitudes towards LGBT rights and other contentious issues for Colombia we use data from the Latin American Public Opinion Poll (LAPOP) from Vanderbilt University. This poll has been carried out bi-yearly since 2004, with an approximate sample size of 1,500 respondents. We draw from four surveys: 2010 ( $N=1,506$ ), 2012 ( $N=1,512$ ), 2014 ( $N=1,496$ ), and 2016 ( $N=1,563$ ).<sup>25</sup> This period covers the approval of the right for adoption by same sex couples (2015) and ends with the approval of same-sex marriage by the Colombian Supreme Court in 2016.<sup>26</sup> It is a period, therefore, where LGBT issues were widely debated in public fora.

## Dependent variables

The dependent variables are each of the respondent's answers to a battery of questions that include strength of approval regarding the following controversial topics (sins): (1) pre-marital sex, (2) smoking marihuana, (3) divorce, (4) euthanasia, (5) homosexuality, (6) same-sex marriage, and (7) abortion.<sup>27</sup> These are all what Htun and Weldon would describe as "doctrinal policies," i.e., issues that challenge religious doctrines or codified traditions of major cultural groups.<sup>28</sup> The responses ranged from firmly disapprove (1) to firmly approve (10). Figure 1

---

the myths about "Gender Ideology" in Colombia, from <https://www.wola.org/analysis/debunking-myths-gender-ideology-colombia/>, 2016 (accessed 03.31.2019).

24 ¿Cómo son las iglesias cristianas en Colombia?, *El Tiempo*, 2017.

25 Colombia Reports, Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2010-2016, Vanderbilt University, [www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/colombia.php](http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/colombia.php), (accessed 03.31.2019.)


26 A. Carroll, L. Mendos, *State-sponsored Homophobia: A World Survey of Sexual Orientation Laws: Criminalisation, Protection and Recognition* (12th edition), Brussels, International Lesbian, Gay, Sexual, Trans and Intersex Association, 2017.

27 Questions on Abortion were omitted in some of the waves analyzed.

28 Mala Htun, S. Laurel Weldon, When Do Governments Promote Women's Rights? A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Sex Equality Policy, *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2010, pp. 207-216.

shows the distribution of responses to these six sins. In terms of attitudes toward Homosexuality and Same-Sex Marriage (SSM), the category “no-religious” is the most accepting, followed by Catholics. In contrast, Protestants Non-Evangelicals (from here on Protestants) and Evangelicals -a group which includes Evangelical Protestants- (from here on Evangelicals) quite strongly disapprove and in greater numbers. There is significant variation across the other sins, with more acceptance of pre—marital sex and divorce in all groups, and with Catholics and non-religious respondents being the more accepting groups.

**Figure 1. Distribution of Strength of Policy Approval by Religion**




Source: Authors based on LAPOP.

### Independent variables

Our main independent variable is the religious affiliation of the respondent. LAPOP asks respondents specifically “What is your religion, if any?” and 96% of the responses are: Catholic (75%), no religion (8%), Protestants (7%), and Evangelicals (6%). The 3% remaining includes five categories with 1% or less of respondents per category; as such we will limit our analysis to the four predominant groups.<sup>29</sup> Figure 2 shows the distribution of responses for the four years in our analysis. With these responses we create four dummy variables (one for each option).

<sup>29</sup> Colombia Reports LAPOP, Vanderbilt University, 2010- 2016, [www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/colombia.php](http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/colombia.php), (accessed 03.31.2019).

**Figure 2. Self-Identification by Religion in Colombia, by year**

Source: Authors based on LAPOP.

For our model we build on existing work,<sup>30</sup> specifically Dion and Díez,<sup>31</sup> adopting a similar design, using the same survey, and including several individual determinants of attitudes. The independent variables included in our analysis can be grouped into five categories: a) demographics; b) civil status; c) religious conviction strength; d) social connectivity; and e) opinions on politics and the economy. For demographic variables we include controls for age, gender, education, race (skin color), region (urban/rural), and number of children in household. Variable descriptions and summary statistics can be found in Appendix Tables 1 and 2 respectively.

The response to the survey question on civil status was separated into five

30 Laura Olson, et al., Religion and Public Opinion about Same-Sex Marriage, *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 87, No. 2, 2006, pp. 340-360; Robert Andersen, Tina Fetner, Economic Inequality and Intolerance: Attitudes toward Homosexuality in 35 Democracies, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 52, No. 4, 2008, pp. 942-958; Omar G. Encarnación, Latin America's Gay Rights Revolution, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2011, pp. 104-118; Jordi Díez, *The Politics of Gay Marriage in Latin America: Argentina, Chile, and Mexico*, Cambridge University Press, 2015; Omar G. Encarnación, *Out in the Periphery*, Oxford University Press, 2015.

31 Michelle L. Dion, Jordi Díez, Democratic Values, Religiosity, and Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Latin America, *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 59, No. 4, 2017, pp. 75-98. See also: Jordi Díez, Michelle L. Dion, New Media and Support for Same-Sex Marriage, *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 53, No. 3, 2018, pp. 466-484.



categories: single, married, living together, separated, and widowed. It can be expected that those married or widowed will have more conservative views on social topics than those single, living together, or divorced.

We control for two alternative measures of strength of religious convictions, namely the importance of religion in a respondent's life and the regularity of church attendance. We expect those for whom religion is more important and who attend church more will have more conservative views on social issues.

In terms of social connectivity, we control for having a computer in the home, reading newspapers, and using the internet overall. We expect all of these to positively affect acceptance of the different sins.

Finally, regarding political and economic opinions we control for left-right ideology, for the degree to which respondent thinks democracy is the best form of government, and the national, household, and personal perceptions of the state of the economy. We expect those who are to the left of the ideological spectrum, those with more democratic views, and those with a better economic perception to be more accepting of different social issues.

## Analysis

The dataset we constructed from the four waves of the LAPOP survey has a hierarchical structure where each respondent is grouped within a year. To account for this characteristic of the data we use a multi-level regression with individual respondents at the first level and years at the second. For each of the six policies we ran a regression using the predictors described before. Results appear in Table 1 and graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Below we analyze the results that are more relevant to our hypotheses, organized by religion and by type of policy.<sup>32</sup>

**Analysis by Religion.** Table 1 shows remarkable heterogeneity in attitudes toward policy issues across religious groups. Evangelicals and Protestants are more likely than Catholics to disapprove all policy areas—except the legalization of marihuana and abortion, about which there is no significant difference

---

32 Our models also permit an analysis by control variables. In terms of our demographic control variables, younger people are more approving than older people of same-sex marriage, homosexuality, legalization of marihuana, and pre-marital sex; for divorce and euthanasia there is no significant difference among ages. Women are more approving than men of same-sex marriage, homosexuality, euthanasia, and divorce, but are less so regarding legalization of marihuana, abortion, and pre-marital sex. Urban dwellers differ from rural dwellers only regarding the legalization of marihuana. Married respondents are on average more disapproving than singles of all topics except abortion. Divorced respondents are not statistically different than single people regarding approval/disapproval of these topics. Respondents living with someone are more disapproving than singles of homosexuality, same-sex marriage, abortion, and legalization of marihuana. Widows are also more disapproving than singles of homosexuality and same-sex marriage, just like those living together. However they show no difference in terms of legalization of marihuana and abortion, and are more in disagreement than singles as it regards divorce and pre-marital sex. Finally, regarding political and economic opinions, stronger support for democracy is associated with stronger approval of all policies except legalization of marihuana and abortion. The status of the economy, however, has mixed effects: Those with a better family situation are positively associated with stronger approval of same-sex marriage, homosexuality, legalization of marihuana, abortion, and pre-marital sex. Those with a stronger personal economy, in contrast, are associated with stronger disapproval of divorce, euthanasia, abortion, and pre-marital sex. The national economy seems to not alter views on these issues *ceteris paribus*.

among these three religious denominations. With regards to euthanasia, Evangelicals disapprove much more than Catholics, Protestants, and those without religion. Similarly, we find that Catholics have similar levels of disapproval as those without religious denomination with regards to same-sex marriage, euthanasia, divorce, and pre-marital sex. At the same time this group is on average more in favor of the legalization of marihuana and more in disagreement with homosexuality, making it a bit of a mixed group. The two variables that measure the strength of religious convictions (attendance and importance) are significant and negative, implying that those who attend church more often and those who consider religion as more important in their lives disapprove more of all six policies than those who do not attend religious services or do not consider religion important, respectively.

Analysis by type of policy. Our analysis<sup>33</sup> found three clusters of policies in terms of levels of rejection. The first cluster is abortion and marihuana. These are the topics that produce the most convergence across religious groups: all cohorts have similar levels of low approval. Regarding marihuana, people for whom religion is of “low importance” are more tolerant on this issue than on abortion. The second cluster involves divorce, euthanasia, homosexuality, and to some extent, same-sex marriage. These policies are mostly troublesome for Evangelicals and Protestants. Same-sex marriage is somewhat troublesome for Catholics for whom religion is very important and Protestants. The last cluster of topics is pre-marital sex. This is only troublesome for Evangelicals for whom religion is very important.

Figure 3 plots the predicted effects of our four religious groups (Catholic, Protestant, Evangelical, and None) on the policy areas. Overall this figure shows significant heterogeneity across areas and religions, with some areas like divorce or pre-marital sex seeing stronger approval and others like same-sex marriage and legalization of marihuana obtaining stronger disapproval.

**Table 1. Determinants of strength of approval of social policies**

	SSM	Homo- sexuality	Euthana- sia	Divorce	Mari- huana	Pre-mari- tal sex	Abortion
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Protestant	-0.846*** (0.178)	-1.171*** (0.178)	-0.309 (0.200)	-1.110*** (0.183)	-0.032 (0.134)	-0.922*** (0.180)	-0.181 (0.179)
Evangelical	-1.114*** (0.185)	-1.596*** (0.184)	-0.996*** (0.213)	-1.847*** (0.190)	-0.134 (0.139)	-1.858*** (0.186)	0.240 (0.205)
None	-0.100 (0.176)	-0.304* (0.175)	0.268 (0.196)	-0.294 (0.180)	0.407*** (0.132)	-0.106 (0.176)	-0.200 (0.226)
Relig attendance	-0.324*** (0.044)	-0.325*** (0.044)	-0.319*** (0.049)	-0.334*** (0.045)	-0.126*** (0.033)	-0.435*** (0.044)	-0.254*** (0.053)
Relig impor- tance	-0.292*** (0.069)	-0.282*** (0.069)	-0.314*** (0.077)	-0.316*** (0.071)	-0.446*** (0.052)	-0.233*** (0.069)	-0.238*** (0.082)

33 See Table A. 3.


Age	-0.019***	-0.018***	0.004	0.0005	-0.009***	-0.012***	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Female	0.829***	0.919***	0.184*	0.412***	-0.395***	-0.388***	-0.158
	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.104)	(0.095)	(0.070)	(0.093)	(0.106)
Education	0.029**	0.070***	0.088***	0.083***	0.002	0.066***	0.072***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Race	-0.111***	-0.052**	-0.169***	0.009	-0.060***	-0.015	0.031
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.031)
Rural	0.115	-0.054	0.069	0.044	-0.284***	0.072	0.155
	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.131)	(0.118)	(0.086)	(0.116)	(0.128)
Married	-0.619***	-0.496***	-0.259*	-0.529***	-0.257***	-0.572***	-0.186
	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.147)	(0.135)	(0.099)	(0.132)	(0.152)
Divorced	-0.209	0.034	0.457**	0.361*	-0.199	0.165	-0.023
	(0.204)	(0.203)	(0.227)	(0.209)	(0.153)	(0.205)	(0.229)
Living Together	-0.549***	-0.424***	0.165	0.052	-0.229***	0.079	-0.251*
	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.128)	(0.117)	(0.086)	(0.115)	(0.133)
Widowed	-0.585**	-0.545*	0.132	-0.617**	-0.054	-0.722**	-0.170
	(0.286)	(0.285)	(0.328)	(0.292)	(0.214)	(0.286)	(0.337)
Ideology	-0.090***	-0.085***	-0.061***	-0.050***	-0.052***	-0.026	-0.021
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.022)
Democracy	0.071**	0.140***	0.167***	0.226***	0.008	0.172***	0.052
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.034)
Internet Use	0.185***	0.215***	0.212***	0.113***	0.130***	0.125***	0.175***
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.040)	(0.047)
News Consumption	0.137***	0.147***	0.142**	0.079	-0.035	0.113**	0.037
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.054)	(0.040)	(0.053)	(0.068)
Computer in Home	0.408***	0.290***	0.347***	0.372***	0.174**	0.227**	0.025
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.126)	(0.116)	(0.085)	(0.113)	(0.132)
Personal Economy	-0.043	-0.072	-0.285***	-0.223***	0.080	-0.139**	-0.172**
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.073)	(0.067)	(0.049)	(0.065)	(0.075)
Family Economy	0.186***	0.141**	-0.054	0.076	0.117***	0.125**	0.187***
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.066)	(0.060)	(0.044)	(0.059)	(0.068)
National Economy	0.019	0.053	0.023	-0.005	0.060	0.056	0.048
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.075)	(0.069)	(0.050)	(0.067)	(0.072)
Constant	5.162***	4.672***	4.496***	5.567***	4.425***	6.571***	2.019***
	(0.383)	(0.408)	(0.432)	(0.404)	(0.337)	(0.378)	(0.482)
N	4,322	4,310	4,029	4,343	4,355	4,323	2,083
Log Likelihood	-10,776	-10,733	-10,366	-10,947	-9,635	-10,805	-4,716
AIC	21,602	21,516	20,783	21,944	19,321	21,660	9,482
BIC	21,761	21,675	20,941	22,104	19,480	21,819	9,623

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Source: Authors based on LAPOP'

A grey rectangle has been drawn across each area for ease of comparison with Evangelicals. Evangelicals and Protestants are fairly similar across the board, with overlapping confidence intervals for all areas except pre-marital-sex.<sup>34</sup> Evangelicals and Catholics, or Evangelicals and those without religion, only agree on their positions towards the legalization of marihuana and abortion; on everything else, Evangelicals are more disapproving than the other two categories of respondents.

**Figure 3. Predicted Strength of Approval from Models in Table 1**



Source: Authors based on LAPOP.

Figure 4 plots the predictions only for Evangelicals and shows a rectangle across for comparison between same-sex marriage and all other policies. Approval of homosexuality and same-sex marriage among Evangelicals is among the lowest of all policy areas, with numbers closer to level one, the strongly disapprove score. Only views towards the legalization of marihuana and abortion have a lower average approval. However, as seen in figure 3, this low approval of marihuana and abortion is fairly consistent across religious groups in Colombia; in the case of marihuana this overall rejection might be related to the country's complex relationship with drugs and their strong connection to overall crime, urban terrorism, and civil war.


Overall these results confirm our first hypothesis that *ceteris paribus*

34 This confirms research in Brazil showing that, in terms of beliefs, there are little, barely distinguishable differences between main-line Protestants and Evangelicals. See: Amy Erica Smith, *Religion and Brazilian Democracy: Mobilizing the People of God*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2019.

Evangelicals are more intolerant towards LGBT rights than other religions, and of course, nonreligious cohorts. Evangelicals and Protestants are not as distinct in terms of levels of rejection of homosexuality and same-sex marriage. Also in support for our hypothesis, we find Evangelicals to be very distinct in comparison to Catholics and nonreligious people, with these two latter groups having more respondents approving LGBT rights.

With regards to our second hypothesis, except for the topic of legalization of marihuana, which is consistently rejected across Colombian society, Evangelicals disapprove more of LGBT issues than other topics such as pre-marital sex, euthanasia, and divorce.

**Figure 4. Predicted Strength of Approval of Social Policies for Evangelicals**



Source: Authors based on LAPOP.

### **Evangelicals and the Modernization Exception**

In terms of standard modernization variables, we find predictable results: greater degrees of income, urbanization, education, and news consumption are associated with more tolerance. One measure of modernization that in Colombia is very predictive is social connectivity: having a computer at home is associated with stronger approval of all areas, except abortion, in comparison to those who don't have computers at home; using internet frequently is associated with stronger approval in all. News consumption is also positively associated with more approval of homosexuality, same-sex marriage, euthanasia and pre-marital

sex; however, frequency of news consumption is not necessarily associated more positively with more approval of divorce, abortion, or legalization of marihuana.

However, we find an important exception among Evangelicals when it comes to an important marker of modernization—education. In our regression analysis<sup>35</sup> we find that indeed more highly educated individuals exhibit more approving attitudes towards the different policies. But we wanted to probe further whether education lessens homophobia among Evangelicals (hypotheses 3). To do this test, we added an interactive term between education and religious preference. While the interactive model<sup>36</sup> shows that the impact of education is significant in making citizens more accepting of LGBT rights, there is a notable exception: Evangelicals and Protestants. More highly educated Evangelicals and Protestants are not necessarily more tolerant.

At the theoretical level, this modernization exception among Evangelicals and Protestants is both surprising and not surprising. It is surprising because many studies show that education tends to be related to more progressive views on social issues,<sup>37</sup> less literalist interpretations of sacred texts,<sup>38</sup> and lower religious beliefs, even if education does not necessarily produce secularization<sup>39</sup> or decreases in church attendance.<sup>40</sup> However, the Evangelical and Protestant exception in Colombia is not surprising in that there is research showing that the impact of modernization is seldom uniform, typically varying according to different cohorts.<sup>41</sup> In the case of religion and homosexuality in Colombia, more education increases tolerance across most Colombians, except among Evangelicals and Protestants. Another reason it is not surprising may have to do with a sorting effect. When religion competition increases in a country (typically as a result of an expansion in denominations), denominations begin to compete with each other by offering distinctive religious experiences to cater to different parts (or “consumers”) of the religious market.<sup>42</sup> Evangelicals and Protestants might be offering a church experience or message that is more conservative and restrictive. This religion therefore caters to the religious consumer that is highly educated, anti-secular, and non-pluralistic, producing a sorting effect, with the former gravitating toward Evangelical and Protestant churches, and the rest, avoiding those churches.

35 See Table 1.

36 See Table 2 and Figure 5.

37 Julianne Ohlander, et al., Explaining Educational Influences on Attitudes Toward Homosexual Relations, *Social Science Research*, Vol. 34, No. 4, 2005, pp. 781-799; Colin Campbell, Jonathan Horowitz, Does College Influence Sociopolitical Attitudes?, *Sociology of Education*, Vol. 89, No. 1, 2015, pp. 40-58.

38 Robert L. Bertrand, The Limits Of Secularization Through Education, *Journal of Religion & Society*, Vol. 17, 2016, pp. 1-43.

39 Damian J. Ruck, et al., Religious Change Preceded Economic Change in the 20Th Century, *Science Advances*, Vol. 4, No. 7, 2018.

40 Edward L. Glaeser, Bruce I. Sacerdote, Education and Religion, *Journal of Human Capital*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2008, pp. 188-215.

41 Robert Andersen, Tina Fetner, Economic Inequality and Intolerance: Attitudes toward Homosexuality in 35 Democracies, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 52, No. 4, 2008, pp. 942-958.

42 Ronen Bar-Eel, et al., The Evolution of Secularization: Cultural Transmission, Religion and Fertility Theory, Simulations and Evidence, *IZA Institute for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper No 4980*, Bonn, Germany, IZA Institute for the Study of Labor, 2010.

**Table 2. Determinants of strength of approval of social policies, with Education and Religion interactions**


	SSM	Homosexuality	Euthanasia	Divorce	Marihuana	Pre-marital sex	Abortion
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Protestant	0.274 (0.512)	0.303 (0.517)	0.786 (0.604)	0.040 (0.527)	0.158 (0.384)	0.346 (0.517)	0.345 (0.522)
None	-1.456*** (0.466)	-0.924** (0.461)	0.219 (0.545)	-1.475*** (0.475)	-0.945*** (0.349)	-1.086** (0.467)	-1.691*** (0.525)
Evangelical	0.037 (0.424)	-0.239 (0.421)	0.060 (0.503)	-0.980** (0.434)	0.378 (0.318)	-0.693 (0.425)	-0.138 (0.521)
Education	0.035** (0.016)	0.085*** (0.016)	0.102*** (0.018)	0.087*** (0.016)	-0.002 (0.012)	0.075*** (0.016)	0.063*** (0.017)
Religious Attendance	-0.324*** (0.044)	-0.324*** (0.044)	-0.317*** (0.049)	-0.334*** (0.045)	-0.127*** (0.033)	-0.434*** (0.044)	-0.263*** (0.053)
Religious Importance	-0.280*** (0.069)	-0.272*** (0.069)	-0.311*** (0.077)	-0.305*** (0.071)	-0.437*** (0.052)	-0.223*** (0.069)	-0.218*** (0.081)
Age	-0.021*** (0.004)	-0.019*** (0.004)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.013*** (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)
Female	0.830*** (0.092)	0.922*** (0.092)	0.185* (0.104)	0.412*** (0.095)	-0.398*** (0.069)	-0.386*** (0.093)	-0.161 (0.106)
Race	-0.109*** (0.026)	-0.051** (0.026)	-0.168*** (0.029)	0.011 (0.026)	-0.057*** (0.019)	-0.013 (0.026)	0.035 (0.031)
Rural	0.093 (0.115)	-0.073 (0.114)	0.060 (0.131)	0.026 (0.118)	-0.296*** (0.086)	0.053 (0.116)	0.120 (0.128)
Married	-0.625*** (0.131)	-0.507*** (0.131)	-0.270* (0.147)	-0.534*** (0.134)	-0.258*** (0.098)	-0.579*** (0.132)	-0.197 (0.151)
Divorced	-0.217 (0.204)	0.016 (0.203)	0.438* (0.227)	0.357* (0.209)	-0.195 (0.153)	0.153 (0.205)	-0.016 (0.228)
Living Together	-0.562*** (0.114)	-0.442*** (0.114)	0.151 (0.128)	0.040 (0.117)	-0.231*** (0.085)	0.065 (0.115)	-0.260** (0.132)
Widowed	-0.610** (0.285)	-0.572** (0.284)	0.125 (0.328)	-0.634** (0.292)	-0.066 (0.213)	-0.745*** (0.285)	-0.212 (0.336)
Ideology	-0.088*** (0.018)	-0.084*** (0.018)	-0.060*** (0.021)	-0.048** (0.019)	-0.050*** (0.014)	-0.024 (0.018)	-0.019 (0.022)
Democracy	0.073*** (0.028)	0.141*** (0.028)	0.167*** (0.032)	0.227*** (0.029)	0.009 (0.021)	0.174*** (0.029)	0.054 (0.034)
Internet Use	0.179*** (0.040)	0.209*** (0.040)	0.208*** (0.045)	0.109*** (0.041)	0.126*** (0.030)	0.120*** (0.040)	0.168*** (0.046)
News Consumption	0.133** (0.053)	0.141*** (0.053)	0.140** (0.061)	0.076 (0.054)	-0.037 (0.040)	0.108** (0.053)	0.037 (0.068)
Computer in Home	0.397*** (0.112)	0.278** (0.112)	0.342*** (0.126)	0.361*** (0.116)	0.168** (0.085)	0.215* (0.113)	0.019 (0.132)

Personal Economy	-0.036	-0.067	-0.283***	-0.218***	0.084*	-0.133**	-0.167**
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.073)	(0.067)	(0.049)	(0.065)	(0.075)
Family Economy	0.176***	0.133**	-0.057	0.068	0.110**	0.117**	0.176***
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.066)	(0.060)	(0.044)	(0.059)	(0.068)
National Economy	0.021	0.054	0.021	-0.003	0.061	0.057	0.058
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.075)	(0.069)	(0.050)	(0.067)	(0.072)
Protestant x Education	-0.110**	-0.144***	-0.105*	-0.112**	-0.019	-0.124***	-0.050
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.035)	(0.047)	(0.048)
None x Education	0.123***	0.055	0.003	0.107***	0.123***	0.088**	0.182***
	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.030)	(0.040)	(0.046)
Evangelical x Education	-0.130***	-0.153***	-0.116**	-0.099**	-0.059*	-0.131***	-0.008
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.051)
Constant	5.135***	4.568***	4.381***	5.544***	4.484***	6.512***	2.110***
	(0.385)	(0.409)	(0.435)	(0.406)	(0.338)	(0.380)	(0.483)
N	4,322	4,310	4,029	4,343	4,355	4,323	2,083
Log Likelihood	-10,769.740	-10,727.830	-10,368.900	-10,944.480	-9,631.900	-10,800.790	-4,713.638
Akaike Inf. Crit.	21,595.490	21,511.650	20,793.800	21,944.950	19,319.800	21,657.570	9,483.276
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	21,773.890	21,689.970	20,970.230	22,123.490	19,498.410	21,835.980	9,641.239

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Source: Authors based on LAPOP.

**Figure 5. Predicted Strength of Approval from Models in Table 2**



Source: Authors based on LAPOP.



## **Conclusion**

We have found a clear divide between Evangelicals and other groups in Colombia regarding a number of policies that religions treat as sins. Evangelicals have the most disapproving attitudes toward homosexuality and same-sex marriage in comparison to both other religious groups and in comparison to other sins. Catholics, in contrast, tend to be more approving of homosexual rights and same-sex marriage than Evangelicals. Catholics are as accepting, on average, as those professing no religion.

We also found that more education makes Catholics more tolerant. In fact, more education makes all Colombians more tolerant. The one exception is Evangelicals. More educated Evangelicals are not necessarily less homophobic.

The finding that Evangelicals have the highest degree of disapproval of LGBT rights may help explain the uneven progress of LGBT rights in Colombia and possibly Latin America as a whole. The region is predominantly populated by Catholics, which we found, are not necessarily consistent veto actors of LGBT rights. Where Catholics predominate, therefore, opportunities for the expansion of LGBT rights exist since levels of tolerance can be larger. But where Evangelicals are large or expanding, resistance to LGBT rights is significant or likely to expand. This religious group is reliably and intensely opposed to LGBT rights.

Our findings help explain why Colombia has experienced recent push-backs against LGBT rights. Evangelicals in Colombia are expanding. In addition, they are aligning with, rather than rejecting, conservative sectors of Catholicism. They are also forming close ties with conservative politicians. They might even be compelling progressive politicians to be more reluctant to embrace a strong LGBT agenda in fear of alienating this growing sector of the electorate. The lessons for the rest of Latin America is that, insofar as Evangelicals continue to grow and become more politically organized, they are likely to become the lead veto players in the politics of expanding LGBT rights.

**Appendix****Table A.1: Variable definitions and hypotheses**

<b><i>Dependent variable</i></b>	
Strength of approval of topic (1 = strongly disapprove, 10 = strongly approves)	
<b><i>Independent variables</i></b>	
<b>Catholic</b>	1 if respondent self-identifies as Catholic [base category]
<b>Protestant</b>	1 if respondent self-identifies Protestant, Mainline Protestant or Protestant non-Evangelical
<b>Evangelical and Protestant</b>	1 if respondent self-identifies as Evangelical and Protestant
<b>None</b>	1 if respondent self-identifies as believing in a Supreme Entity but does not belong to any religion
<b><i>Control variables</i></b>	
<b>Age</b>	Respondent's age
<b>Female</b>	1 if respondent is female; 0 if respondent is male
<b>Education</b>	Respondent's number of years of formal education
<b>Skin color</b>	Respondent's skin color (1 = very light – 11 = very dark)
<b>Number of kids</b>	Number of children
<b>Rural</b>	1 if respondent lives in rural area; 0 if respondent lives in urban area
<b>Single</b>	1 if respondent is single [base category]
<b>Married</b>	1 if respondent is married or in a civil union
<b>Living Together</b>	1 if respondent is living together with partner
<b>Divorced</b>	1 if respondent is separated or divorced
<b>Widowed</b>	1 if respondent is widowed

<b>Religious importance</b>	Importance of religion in respondent's life (0 = not at all important, 3 = very important)
<b>Religious attendance</b>	Attendance to religious services (0 = never, 4 = more than once a week)
<b>Internet use</b>	Respondent's frequency of internet usage (0 = Never – 4 = Daily)
<b>Attention to the news</b>	Respondent's frequency of attention to news (0 = Never – 4 = Daily)
<b>Computer in home</b>	1 if respondent has computer in their home
<b>Ideology</b>	Respondents self-placement on a left-right scale (1 = left – 10 = right)
<b>Democracy best</b>	Agreement that democracy is the best form of government (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)
<b>National economy</b>	Retrospective evaluation of national economy (0 = worse – 2 = better)
<b>Family's economy</b>	Retrospective evaluation of household economy (0 = not enough money – 3 = good enough and can save)
<b>Personal economy</b>	Retrospective evaluation of personal economy (0 = worse – 2 = better)

Source: Colombia Reports, Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2010-2016, Vanderbilt University, [www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/colombia.php](http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/colombia.php), (accessed 03.31.2019), data recoded by the authors.

**Table A.2. Summary Statistics of Independent Variables**

<b>Statistic</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>St. Dev.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
<b>Religious attendance</b>	6,054	2.147	1.295	0	4
<b>Religious Importance</b>	6,052	2.486	0.815	0	3
<b>Age</b>	6,010	37.927	15.165	17	89
<b>Female</b>	6,077	0.499	0.500	0	1
<b>Education</b>	5,993	9.577	4.252	0	18
<b>Skin color</b>	6,048	4.140	1.787	1	11
<b>Rural</b>	6,077	0.226	0.418	0	1
<b>Single</b>	6,069	0.355	0.478	0	1
<b>Married</b>	6,069	0.252	0.434	0	1
<b>Divorced</b>	6,069	0.062	0.241	0	1
<b>Living Together</b>	6,069	0.297	0.457	0	1
<b>Widowed</b>	6,069	0.034	0.180	0	1
<b>Ideology</b>	5,129	5.920	2.579	1	10
<b>Democracy</b>	5,779	5.070	1.673	1	7
<b>Internet Use</b>	6,056	1.907	1.707	0	4
<b>News Consumption</b>	6,044	3.506	0.920	0	4
<b>Computer in Home</b>	6,064	0.433	0.495	0	1
<b>Personal Economy</b>	6,053	1.040	0.736	0	2
<b>Family Economy</b>	6,011	1.356	0.866	0	3
<b>National Economy</b>	6,003	0.691	0.705	0	2

**Table A.3. Determinants of strength of approval of social policies**

	SSM	Homo- sexuality	Euthanasia	Divorce	Marihuana	Pre-mar- ital sex	Abortion
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Protestant	1.494*	1.757**	1.416	0.846	1.503**	1.632*	0.279
	(0.881)	(0.878)	(0.98)	(0.906)	(0.664)	(0.887)	(0.833)
None	0.421	0.171	0.289	-0.278	0.446*	0.093	-0.129
	(0.317)	(0.314)	(0.352)	(0.324)	(0.238)	(0.317)	(0.358)
Evangelical	-1.913**	-3.055***	-2.771***	-2.817***	-1.316**	-3.363***	-1.622
	(0.842)	(0.836)	(0.964)	(0.866)	(0.633)	(0.848)	(1.32)
Religious Attendance	-0.203**	-0.202**	-0.318***	-0.307***	-0.442***	-0.199**	-0.300***
	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.092)	(0.085)	(0.062)	(0.083)	(0.098)
Religious Importance	-0.326***	-0.324***	-0.312***	-0.329***	-0.121***	-0.430***	-0.242***
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.033)	(0.044)	(0.054)
Age	-0.020***	-0.019***	0.004	0.001	-0.009***	-0.012***	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Female	0.828***	0.918***	0.185*	0.412***	-0.394***	-0.388***	-0.155
	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.104)	(0.095)	(0.069)	(0.093)	(0.106)
Education	0.029**	0.070***	0.088***	0.082***	0.002	0.065***	0.072***
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Race	-0.109***	-0.050*	-0.169***	0.01	-0.059***	-0.013	0.03
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.031)
Rural	0.112	-0.058	0.072	0.042	-0.285***	0.07	0.154
	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.131)	(0.118)	(0.086)	(0.116)	(0.128)
Married	-0.605***	-0.475***	-0.241	-0.517***	-0.245**	-0.554***	-0.175
	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.147)	(0.135)	(0.099)	(0.132)	(0.152)
Divorced	-0.202	0.049	0.474**	0.370*	-0.188	0.178	-0.016
	(0.204)	(0.203)	(0.227)	(0.209)	(0.153)	(0.205)	(0.229)
Living To- gether	-0.533***	-0.406***	0.175	0.06	-0.222***	0.092	-0.246*
	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.128)	(0.117)	(0.086)	(0.115)	(0.133)
Widowed	-0.568**	-0.515*	0.154	-0.597**	-0.032	-0.693**	-0.148
	(0.286)	(0.285)	(0.328)	(0.293)	(0.214)	(0.286)	(0.337)
Ideology	-0.090***	-0.085***	-0.062***	-0.051***	-0.053***	-0.027	-0.021
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.022)

Democracy	0.072**	0.141***	0.169***	0.227***	0.009	0.174***	0.053
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.034)
Internet Use	0.185***	0.216***	0.214***	0.115***	0.131***	0.127***	0.175***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.047)
News Con- sumption	0.128**	0.135**	0.135**	0.073	-0.041	0.104*	0.033
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.054)	(0.04)	(0.053)	(0.069)
Computer in Home	0.408***	0.288**	0.340***	0.370***	0.171**	0.224**	0.022
	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.126)	(0.116)	(0.085)	(0.113)	(0.132)
Personal Economy	-0.046	-0.076	-0.286***	-0.225***	0.078	-0.141**	-0.171**
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.073)	(0.067)	(0.049)	(0.065)	(0.075)
Family Economy	0.194***	0.151**	-0.047	0.083	0.122***	0.133**	0.190***
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.066)	(0.06)	(0.044)	(0.059)	(0.068)
National Economy	0.021	0.054	0.021	-0.005	0.059	0.054	0.048
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.075)	(0.069)	(0.05)	(0.067)	(0.072)
Protestant x Religious Importance	-0.858***	-1.074***	-0.630*	-0.716**	-0.561**	-0.935***	-0.168
	(0.316)	(0.315)	(0.351)	(0.325)	(0.238)	(0.318)	(0.3)
None x Reli- gious Impor- tance	-0.288*	-0.262*	-0.011	0.002	-0.018	-0.105	0.226
	(0.152)	(0.151)	(0.169)	(0.155)	(0.114)	(0.152)	(0.176)
Evangelical x Religious Importance	0.281	0.519*	0.639*	0.347	0.424*	0.538*	0.507
	(0.297)	(0.295)	(0.34)	(0.305)	(0.223)	(0.299)	(0.463)
Constant	4.951***	4.483***	4.499***	5.538***	4.411***	6.486***	2.152***
	(0.397)	(0.421)	(0.447)	(0.418)	(0.347)	(0.393)	(0.496)
N	4322	4310	4029	4343	4355	4323	2083
Log Likelihood	-10771.85	-10725.81	-10364.55	-10945.5	-9633.15	-10800.31	-4715.606
Akaike Inf. Crit.	21599.7	21507.62	20785.1	21947.01	19322.3	21656.62	9487.213
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	21778.1	21685.94	20961.54	22125.54	19500.91	21835.03	9645.177

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01



## References

Americas Quarterly, The AQ Social Inclusion Index, *Americas Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2016.

Andersen Robert, Tina Fetner, Economic Inequality and Intolerance: Attitudes toward Homosexuality in 35 Democracies, *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 52, No. 4, 2008.

Armenia Amy, Bailey Troia, Evolving Opinions: Evidence on Marriage Equality Attitudes from Panel Data, *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 98, No. 1, 2017.

Asal Victor, Udi Sommer, *Legal Path Dependence and the Long Arm of the Religious State: Sodomy Provisions and Gay Rights across Nations and over Time*, Albany, NY, SUNY Press, 2016.

Ayoub Phillip M., *When States Come Out: Europe's Sexual Minorities and the Politics of Visibility*, Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Badgett M.V. Lee, *Money, Myths, and Change: The Economic Lives of Lesbians and Gay Men*, University of Chicago Press, 2001.

Bar-Eel Ronen, et al, The Evolution of Secularization: Cultural Transmission, Religion and Fertility Theory, Simulations and Evidence. *IZA Institute for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper No 4980*, Bonn, Germany, IZA Institute for the Study of Labor, 2010.

Bertrand Robert L., The limits of secularization through education, *Journal of Religion & Society*, Vol. 17, 2015.

Bouvier Virginia M., *Gender and the Role of Women in Colombia's Peace Process*, New York, UN Women, 2016.

Campbell Colin, Jonathan Horowitz, Does College Influence Sociopolitical Attitudes?, *Sociology of Education*, Vol. 89, No. 1, 2015.

Carroll A., L. Mendos, *State-sponsored Homophobia: A World Survey of Sexual Orientation Laws: Criminalisation, Protection and Recognition (12th edition)*, Brussels, International Lesbian, Gay, Sexual, Trans and Intersex Association, 2017.

Corrales Javier, *LGBT Rights and Representation in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Influence of Structure, Movements, Institutions, and Culture*, LGBT Representation and Rights, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, 2015.

Corrales Javier, The Expansion of LGBT Rights in Latin America...and the Backlash. *The Oxford Handbook of Global LGBT and Sexual Diversity Politics*, 2019.

Corrales Javier, Mario Pecheny, Introduction, in: *The Politics of Sexuality in Latin America*, J. Corrales and M. Pecheny (eds.), Pittsburgh University Press, 2010.

de la Dehesa Rafael, *Queering the Public Sphere in Mexico and Brazil: Sexual Rights Movements in Emerging Democracies*, Duke University Press, 2010.

Diez Jordi, *The Politics of Gay Marriage in Latin America: Argentina, Chile, and Mexico*, Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Díez Jordi, Michelle L. Dion, New Media and Support for Same-Sex Marriage." *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 53, No. 3, 2018.



Dion Michelle L., Jordi Díez, Democratic Values, Religiosity, and Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Latin America, *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 59, No. 4, 2017.

Encarnación Omar G., Latin America's Gay Rights Revolution." *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2011.

Encarnación Omar G., *Out in the Periphery*, Oxford University Press, 2015.

Fajardo-Heyward Paola, *Comprehensive sexual education: the challenges of ensuring women's sexual right*, 2018.

Friedman Elisabeth Jay, Constructing "The Same Rights With the Same Names": The Impact of Spanish Norm Diffusion on Marriage Equality in Argentina, *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2012.

Friedman Elisabeth Jay, *Interpreting the Internet: Feminist and Queer Counterpublics in Latin America*, University of California Press, 2017.

Friedman Elisabeth Jay, Constanza Tabbush, Introduction, in: *Seeking Rights from the Left: Gender, Sexuality and the Latin American Pink Tide*, E. J. Friedman (ed.), Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 2019.

Glaeser Edward L., Bruce I. Sacerdote, Education and Religion, *Journal of Human Capital*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2008.

Global Americans, LGBTI Norms, Rights, Jurisprudence, and Practice in the Hemisphere, 2016.

Gomez Eduardo J., Friendly Government, Cruel Society: AIDS and the Politics of Homosexual Strategic Mobilization in Brazil, in: *The Politics of Sexuality in Latin America*, J. Corrales and M. Pecheny (eds.), Pittsburgh University Press, 2010.

Htun Mala, S. Laurel Weldon, When Do Governments Promote Women's Rights? A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Sex Equality Policy, *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2010.

Htun Mala, S. Laurel Weldon, Religious Power, the State, Women's Rights, and Family Law, *Politics & Gender*, Vol. 11, 2015.

Inglehart Ronald, Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Kollman Kelly, Iñaki Sagarzazu, LGBTI Rights Expansion in the Global South: Explaining the Diffusion of Same-sex Unions Policy in Latin America, *Paper presented at the MPSA meeting*, 2017.

Lozano Fernando A., *The Rise of Secularism and Its Economic Consequences*, IZA World of Labor, 2017.

Marcos Ana, El voto evangélico, clave en la victoria del 'no' en el plebiscito de Colombia, *El País*. October 12, 2016.

Matos Marlise, Gender and Sexuality in Brazilian Public Policy: Progress and Regression in Depatriarchalizing and Deheteronormalizing the State, in: *Seeking Rights from the Left: Gender, Sexuality and the Latin American Pink Tide*, E. J. Friedman (ed.), Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 2019.

Ohlander Julianne, et al., Explaining educational influences on attitudes toward homosexual relations, *Social Science Research*, Vol. 34, No. 4, 2005.

Olson Laura R., et al., Religion and Public Opinion about Same-Sex Marriage." *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 87, No. 2, 2006.

Pew Research Center, Religion in Latin America: Widespread Change in a Historically Catholic Region, 2014.

Reynolds Andrew, *The Children of Harvey Milk: How LGBTQ Politicians Changed the World*, Oxford University Press, 2018.

Ruck Damian J., et al., Religious change preceded economic change in the 20th century, *Science Advances*, Vol. 4, No. 7, 2018.

Sánchez-Garzoli Gimena, Debunking the myths about "Gender Ideology" in Colombia, from <https://www.wola.org/analysis/debunking-myths-gender-ideology-colombia/>, 2016.

Schnabel Landon, Gender and Homosexuality Attitudes across Religious Groups from the 1970s to 2014: Similarity, Distinction, and Adaptation, *Social Science Research*, Vol. 55, No. 1, 2016.

Shulenberg Shawn, The Lavender Tide? LGBT Rights and the Latin American Left Today, in: *Same-Sex Relationship Recognition in Latin America: Promise and Resistance*, J. P. Pierceson, A. Crocker and S. Schulenberg (eds.), Lanham, MD, Lexington Books, 2013.

Smith Amy Erica, *Religion and Brazilian Democracy: Mobilizing the People of God*, Cambridge University Press, 2019.

Smith Tom W., et al., *Public Attitudes toward Homosexuality and Gay Rights across Time and Countries*, Chicago and Los Angeles, NORC at the University of Chicago and The Williams Institute at the UCLA School of Law, 2014.

Somma Nicolás M. , et al., Mapping Religious Change in Latin America, *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 59, No. 1, 2017.

**Хавиер Коралес, Инаки Сагарзасу**

## **НИСУ СВИ 'ГРЕХОВИ' ЈЕДНАКО ОДБИЈЕНИ: РЕЛИГИЈА И ОТПОР ПРЕМА ЛГБТ ПРАВИМА У КОЛУМБИЈИ**

### **Сажетак**

Ставови према хомосексуалности и истополним браковима у Америцима и Европи су блиско повезани са религијом, а нарочито са тим како је религија практикована. Међутим, религиозне особе се разликују у односу не само према хомосексуалности већ и према другим политикама које се баве греховима, као што су употреба марихуане, абортус, еутаназија, употреба контрацептивних средстава и секс пре брака. Користећи податке за Колумбију, ми налазимо да су Евангелици најстабилнији противници ЛБГТ права у овој земљи, који одбијају хомосексуалност много више од осталих грехова. Због тога, они се посебно таргетирају хомосексуалност. Такође налазимо да су ставови Евангелика према хомосексуалности независни у односу на образовање. Због ове истакнуте хомофобије међу евангелицима, закључујемо да земље које имају пораст популације и ниво организације Евангелика, као што је Колумбија, имају веће шансе да искусе назадовање у развијању ЛБГТ права.

**Кључне речи:** Латинска Америка, ЛГБТ права, назадовање, Евангелици, Католици, хомофобија, абортус

Примљен: 8.04.2019.

Прихваћен: 8.09.2019.