

## **MILITANT AND COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONALISM AMONG AMERICAN RELIGIOUS PUBLICS**

### **Abstract**

Although there has been much speculation about the way that religion shapes American attitudes on foreign policy, there are few empirical analyses of that influence. This paper draws on a large national sample of the public in 2008 to classify religious groups on Eugene Wittkopf's (1990) classic dimensions of foreign policy attitudes, *militant internationalism* and *cooperative internationalism*. We find rather different religious constituencies for each dimension and demonstrate the influence of *ethnoreligious* and *theological* factors on both. Combining the two dimensions, we show that American religious groups occupy different locations in Wittkopf's *hardliner*, *internationalist*, *accommodationist*, and *isolationist* camps.

**Keywords:** Militant internationalism, cooperative internationalism, ethnoreligious tradition, religious traditionalism, American foreign policy.

### **Introduction**

Even though the study of religion's role in American politics has made enormous strides in recent decades, progress has been uneven. Religious factors appear in studies of voting behavior, party politics and social attitudes, but there has been much less interest in connecting religion to public opinion on foreign policy. Some analysts even deny that there is anything to study. After an extensive review of Americans' attitudes, Kohut and Stokes conclude that "with the exception of policy toward Israel, religion has little bearing on how they think about international affairs" (2006, 94). Few scholars have taken seriously J. Bryan Hehir's claim that "religious convictions and concerns" have permeated U.S. for-

---

1 James L. Guth is William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Political Science at Furman University, where he has taught since 1973. He received the B.S. degree in political science from the University of Wisconsin-Madison and the Ph.D. in government from Harvard University. A specialist in American politics, he has written four books and dozens of articles for both scholarly and public audiences. In 2008 his work on religious influences on Congressional voting received the Paul J. Weber Award for the best paper on religion and politics presented at the previous annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. E-Mail: jim.guth@furman.edu

eign policy since World War II (2001, 36).

The neglect of religion by political scientists has been highlighted by mounting interest from journalists (Phillips 2006), historians (Boyer 2005; Preston 2012), diplomats (Albright 2006), religion scholars (Northcott 2004; Urban 2007; Marsh 2007), sociologists (Martin 1999; Derber and Magrass 2008), philosophers (Singer 2004) and even communications analysts (Domke 2004). These authors have made strong claims both for the influence of religion on the public's attitudes and, as a result, on political leaders. Such assertions are very common abroad: no one reading European journals of opinion would doubt that many intellectuals there believe that American policy reflects religious influences, or that this notion has widespread appeal among ordinary citizens (Kohut and Stokes 2006). As French author Susan George argues, in America religious beliefs "have foreign policy consequences" (2008, 146).

There are two competing themes in this massive body of work. Most studies emphasize religious support for "hegemonic" American policies, contributing to militarism, unilateralism, moralism, nationalistic assertiveness, and apocalyptic attachment to Israel. This genre usually focuses on Evangelicals, whose "fundamentalist," "premillennialist," "dispensationalist," "literalist," or "messianic" religious beliefs are often connected to earlier themes in American history such as Manifest Destiny or Special Providence (McCartney 2004; Judis 2005). Such believers, in this view, were especially influential during the George W. Bush administration.

A "minority" or contrasting theme has also appeared, stressing what Robert Wuthnow (2009) has called "altruistic" foreign policy. Some journalists have recounted the activity of religious groups fighting for human rights, protecting the global environment, expanding international relief and rescue operations, combating AIDS in Africa, and fostering economic development. Ironically, Evangelicals are often credited for these initiatives as well. Nicolas Kristof, a *New York Times* columnist not known for fundamentalist sympathies, famously labeled Evangelicals "the new internationalists" (Kristof 2002) and some academics have also found redeeming traits in the "new" policy concerns of conservative Christians (Hertzke 2004; Mead 2004, 2006; den Dulk 2007; Farr 2008; Croft 2009; Wuthnow 2009; McCleary 2009). Some have even claimed that these initiatives are creating new alliances between religious conservatives and liberals, obliterating old divisions (Weyl 2009).

Unfortunately, studies elaborating on both "hegemonic" and "altruistic" themes usually suffer from simplistic religious analyses. Many look primarily at religious leaders, paying little attention to those in the pews, who often have very different views. Others create an analytic dualism that arrays Evangelicals against presumably "secular" opinion (the other seventy-five percent of the public), ignoring the fact that other religious groups, such as Catholics, Mainline

Protestants or Jews may also have distinctive attitudes toward foreign policy (Hero 1973; Hanson 1987; Rock 2011). Nor does this analytic dualism admit the possibility that the growing numbers of the religiously “unaffiliated” public may have distinctive preferences as well (Hout and Fischer 2002).

We present a broader picture of religious influences on foreign policy attitudes. First we describe two theoretical orientations that dominate the literature on religion’s political role, the *ethnoreligious* and *religious restructuring* theories, suggesting ways that each may help account for foreign policy attitudes. Then we consider the distribution of religious opinion on foreign policy, using the classic “Wittkopf-Holsti-Rosenau” dimensions of *militant internationalism* and *cooperative internationalism*. Although these two dimensions do not subsume every issue, they capture basic orientations toward American policy that have proved remarkably persistent, despite changing national agendas (Holsti 2004). As *militant internationalism* corresponds quite closely to the “hegemonic” theme noted above, and *cooperative internationalism* captures the “altruistic” one, the typology is especially useful for our purposes.

### **Religious Groups in American Politics**

There are two major competing interpretations of religious alignments in American politics. *Ethnoreligious theory* emphasizes European religious groups that migrated to America and often multiplied upon reaching her shores. Nineteenth-century politics consisted largely of assembling winning coalitions of contending ethnoreligious groups. Well into the twentieth century, the GOP represented historically dominant Mainline Protestant churches, such as Episcopalians, Presbyterians and Methodists, while Democrats spoke for religious minorities: Catholics, Jews, and southern Evangelical Protestants. By the 1980s Mainline Protestants had dwindled in number, Evangelicals had moved toward the GOP, the ancient Catholic—Democratic alliance had frayed, and black Protestants had become a critical Democratic bloc. Growing religious diversity added Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and others to the equation, usually on the Democratic side. Even today many analysts think in ethnoreligious terms, referring to the “Evangelical,” “Catholic,” “Jewish” or “Muslim” vote. Although the assumptions underlying this framework are often incompletely articulated and involve differing assessments about the relative importance of “ethnicity” and “religion,” historians have agreed that ethnoreligious groups held differing worldviews, cultural preferences, and negative reference groups—all shaping their views on foreign affairs (Swierenga 2009).

A few historical examples illustrate the relevance of ethnoreligious traditions. The hostility of Irish Catholics toward any American alliance with Great Britain and the isolationism of German Lutherans and Catholics during World

War I certainly reflected ethnoreligious influence. Catholic anticommunism in the Cold War era was shaped not only by doctrinal suspicions of any “Godless” system, but also by ethnic solidarity with Eastern European relatives under Soviet domination. The persistent support of American Jews for Israel and the more recent interest of black Protestants in Africa are just two examples of the concerns of a host of American “ethnoreligious fragments” (Uslaner 2007). Indeed, the late Samuel P. Huntington feared that American policy might be unduly influenced by such “diasporas” (2004, 285-291). Others see such developments more positively, arguing that the growing influence of such minorities might encourage a new cooperative internationalism: as America comes to resemble a “United Nations” religiously, it might well look more favorably on multilateral institutions.

An alternative approach is the *religious restructuring* or *culture wars* theory, introduced first by Robert Wuthnow (1988) to explain growing divisions in American faith traditions and brought into common political parlance by James D. Hunter’s *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America* (1991). Hunter saw new religious battles emerging *within* the old traditions, based on theological differences: “Orthodox” believers accepted “an external, definable, and transcendent authority,” and clung to traditional doctrines, while “progressives” replaced old religious tenets with new ones based on experience or scientific rationality (Hunter 1991, 44). Religious progressives were often joined by the growing ranks of secular Americans who reject religion entirely but see morality in a similar vein (Hout and Fischer 2002).

These religious divisions quickly congealed around issues such as abortion, feminism, and gay rights, but soon began to infuse foreign policy as well. Some conflicts are extensions of domestic politics, as when Catholic and Evangelical traditionalists fight population control policies of American aid agencies, or insist on “abstinence only” for fighting AIDs in Africa. More significant, perhaps, are the less obvious connections, by which religious traditionalists may identify American foreign objectives with divine goals (Guth 2012), or infuse U.S. military action with divine purpose. And although the impact of progressive theologies has been less discussed, the communitarian social theology of many Mainline Protestants and liberal Catholics should conduce to a more cooperative foreign policy, focused on social welfare, economic development, and the natural environment (Kurtz and Fulton 2002).

Although Hunter’s thesis captivated some scholars and pundits, most analysts concluded that his dualist model was too simplistic, that moral battle lines shifted from issue to issue, and that many citizens were noncombatants (Williams 1997). Some scholars have confirmed, in part, the political cleavages Hunter envisioned, but old markers of ethnoreligious tradition still influence public attitudes. Indeed, the combination of ethnoreligious tradition and theological factionalism increasingly structure American electoral politics (Layman 2001; Kellstedt and

Guth 2013). Thus, any analysis of the religious politics of foreign policy attitudes requires both ethnoreligious and restructuring perspectives (as well as an assessment of nonreligious influences). Here we consider both ethnoreligious traditions, such as Evangelical and Mainline Protestants, white Catholics, Jews, Latino Catholics and Protestants and others, and the new “culture war” divisions within the larger traditions, based on differences in theology and religious behavior. For the latter purpose, however, we jettison the dichotomies favored by Wuthnow (1988) and Hunter (1991) for a more realistic three-part theological division of “*traditionalists*,” “*centrists*,” and “*modernists*.”<sup>2</sup>

### **Militant and Cooperative Internationalisms among Religious Groups**

Although religion has distinct influences over specific issues, such as attitudes toward Israel, we focus on the way it undergirds broader policy orientations. Most scholars now agree that Americans hold overarching predispositions that shape their reaction to specific issues (Peffley and Hurwitz 1993). As three experienced analysts have noted, the “most widely used structure for American foreign policy beliefs is the Wittkopf-Holsti-Rosenau model” (Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis 1995, 313). Wittkopf (1990) proposed that ever since the Vietnam War public attitudes have been subsumed by two basic dimensions, *militant internationalism (MI)* and *cooperative internationalism (CI)*.

Although the precise components vary with the era and available survey items, *MI* historically focused on the dangers presented by the USSR, the need for a strong military, willingness to use force to protect American interests, and a zero-sum interpretation of international conflict. With the USSR’s demise, other enemies arguably provided a substitute focus, such as Islamic terrorists (Smidt 2005; Kidd, 2009). *CI*, on the other hand, stressed international cooperation and reliance on multilateral institutions, such as the UN, and emphasized “North-South” issues such as hunger and economic development (Holsti 2004). Wittkopf combined *MI* and *CI* to produce a four-fold typology of attitudes among both national elites and the mass public: *hardliners* (high on *MI* and low on *CI*), *internationalists* (high on both), *accommodationists* (low on *MI*, high on *CI*), and *isolationists* (low on both scales). Scholars have confirmed that these groups react in predictable ways when confronted with policy choices and Wittkopf’s model has been widely used, especially for heuristic purposes.<sup>3</sup>

2 These categories are based on a secondary factor analysis of two separate theological traditionalism and religious activity scores described in the Appendix. We collapse the resulting score into three categories for illustrative purposes in Tables 1, 2 and 4 below. *Traditionalists* are orthodox in belief and usually quite active in conventional religious activities, while *modernists* are more heterodox and tend to prefer less conventional religious expression and engagement. *Centrists*, naturally, fall between the other two camps on both dimensions of belief and behavior. For the distribution of the ethnoreligious groups and

3 There is an expansive literature on how to conceptualize foreign policy attitudes among political leaders and the mass public (Peffley and Hurwitz 1993; Page and Bouton 2006). Some critics of the Wittkopf framework argue for at least one additional

To map out the religious dimensions of foreign policy attitudes we use the 2008 National Survey of Religion and Politics (NSRP), administered by the University of Akron. Conducted in theological factions in the public, see Table A1 in the Appendix. We incorporate the traditional belief and the religious activity scores separately in Table 3's multivariate analysis to test their respective effects. every presidential election year since 1992, the NSRP has a large national sample and detailed questions on religious affiliations, beliefs and behavior, permitting us to characterize with some confidence the posture of both the major ethnoreligious groups and the restructuring factions within the three largest traditions, Evangelical and Mainline Protestantism and European-origin Catholicism (Green 2009). The 2008 NSRP included fifteen foreign policy items. A principal components analysis confirmed that most fell into the two familiar dimensions, with eight items constituting a *MI* scale, and four others, a *CI* scale.<sup>4</sup> We first present the location of religious groups on the individual items constituting the *MI* and *CI* scales, then run multivariate analyses on the influence of religious factors on each dimension, next portray the distribution of religious groups within Wittkopf's fourfold typology, and finally consider some of the implications for American foreign policy.

### Militant Internationalism

As we have noted, much of speculative literature on religious influence focuses on the *MI* or "hegemonic" dimension, supposedly characteristic of Evangelicals. And some empirical work has confirmed the speculation: Barker, Hurwitz and Nelson (2008) investigated Evangelical "messianic militarism"; Froese and Mencken (2009) considered the way "sacralization ideology" encouraged a "neoconservative foreign policy ideology"; and Baumgartner, Francia and Morris (2008) found Evangelicals quite hawkish on the Middle East. But these studies neglected the possibility that other religious groups might have distinctive attitudes as well. After all, Mainline Protestant denominations and the Catholic Church have often criticized the use of American military power, most recently in the Iraq war (Wald 1992; Tipton 2007) and other ethnoreligious groups have also been critical of U.S. military policy.

---

dimension, usually involving international issues with domestic implications, such as trade and immigration policies (Chittick, Billingsley and Travis 1995). We also found such a "third" dimension consisting of trade, immigration and jobs items. Nevertheless, almost any empirical exploration of an extensive range of foreign policy items produces two major dimensions that can be interpreted as militant and cooperative internationalisms. For an analysis based on a more extensive battery of foreign policy items, see Guth 2013.

- 4 See the Appendix for the specific question wording and the bottom of Tables 1 and 2 for the factor loadings of each item. Although we would like more items for the *CI* scale, the strong face validity of the questions and the high loadings these items have demonstrated in the past on this dimension even when more items were available reassures us that we have a valid measure.

**Table 1. Religious Group Support for Militant Internationalism (MI) in 2008 (in percent)**

	<i>U.S. Must Take Active Part</i>	<i>Special US Role in World Politics</i>	<i>Fighting Terrorism Very High Priority</i>	<i>U.S. Should Support Israel Over Arabs</i>	<i>Strong Military Very High Priority</i>	<i>Approve Pre-emptive U.S. Attack</i>	<i>U.S. Should Stay in Iraq</i>	<i>Iraq War Was Justified</i>	<i>Proportion in Top Half of MI Scale</i>
<b>Entire Sample</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>Evangelical</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>66</b>
Traditionalists	59	67	80	68	65	80	64	72	76
Centrists	37	48	73	37	53	75	46	48	52
Modernists	40	53	72	36	48	74	50	47	49
<b>Mainline Protestant</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>53</b>
Traditionalists	51	57	78	54	55	72	62	61	65
Centrists	50	52	75	38	48	60	50	49	54
Modernists	46	46	69	35	40	61	49	39	44
<b>Catholic</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>53</b>
Traditionalists	53	51	82	44	54	66	58	46	57
Centrists	54	59	80	37	57	74	53	53	57
Modernists	42	42	68	32	48	66	41	44	44
<b>Smaller Traditions</b>									
Latter-day Saints	60	72	79	41	69	67	72	77	69
Jewish	57	58	75	77	42	72	42	31	54
Latino Protestant	30	59	75	43	46	74	40	47	49
Latino Catholic	23	47	73	29	48	64	30	32	38
Unitarian/Liberal	35	46	48	33	23	38	34	19	20
Other Christian	31	29	58	27	32	34	21	24	24
Black Protestants	34	42	68	27	55	65	21	13	34
Other Non-Christian	23	41	46	14	38	41	25	11	26
<b>Unaffiliated</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>33</b>
Believers	25	52	62	42	48	58	37	47	50
Secular	43	41	55	27	37	45	39	29	30
Agnostic/Atheists	34	31	33	20	30	27	25	11	13
<b>MI Factor Loading</b>	<b>.54</b>	<b>.55</b>	<b>.57</b>	<b>.58</b>	<b>.61</b>	<b>.61</b>	<b>.65</b>	<b>.69</b>	

Source: Fifth National Survey of Religion and Politics, University of Akron, 2008. (N=4000). The *Militant Internationalism (MI)* score analyzed in Table 3 is the factor score on the first component of a principal components analysis of these eight items (*theta* reliability=.75). Factor loadings noted in Table 1 above.



As a first cut, Table 1 reports the proportion in each religious group reporting “militant” responses to *MI* scale items, as well as the percentage falling in the top half of that scale. As the sample scores show, in 2008 Americans expressed varying support for militant policies. A strong majority gave “very high” priority to fighting terrorism, with slightly fewer approving pre-emptive military action to protect American interests. Just over half put highest priority on a strong military and saw the United States as having a special role in world politics. Smaller numbers (but still pluralities when “undecideds” are included) thought the U.S. should stay in Iraq until the situation was stabilized, concluded that the Iraq war was justified, believed that the U.S. must take an active role in the world, and sided with Israel.<sup>5</sup>

Fairly consistent religious patterns emerge. As expected, Evangelicals were most supportive of *MI*, with solid and sometimes large majorities taking a militant stance on each issue. Indeed, two-thirds of Evangelicals fell in the top half of the scale. Mainline Protestants, in comparison, were less militant on each issue. White Roman Catholics resembled Mainliners on most issues, but were slightly less prone to back Israel and somewhat *more* likely to approve American military action (despite the contrary position of their bishops!). In the summary assessment, very small majorities of Mainliners and Roman Catholics fell into the upper half of the *MI* scale, confirming diversity of opinion in each tradition.

Theological divisions are clearly one source of that diversity, as in each major ethnoreligious group traditionalists are more likely than modernists to take a militant stance. The gap between theological factions widens on items explicitly tapping military action, whether in pre-emptive response to threats or the war in Iraq, suggesting that opinion may be more strongly connected to traditionalist religious beliefs than to affiliation. Nevertheless, there is some interaction between ethnoreligious tradition and beliefs: Evangelical traditionalists score highest on the *MI* scale, with 77 percent falling into the top half, followed by Mainline traditionalists at 65 percent, and Catholic traditionalists at 57 percent. Among modernists, on the other hand, the comparable proportions are only 50, 46 and 44 percent, respectively

The smaller ethnoreligious traditions exhibit considerable variation on individual items, but usually score fairly low on the *MI* scale. The three exceptions are Latter-day Saints, who surpass Evangelicals in militant responses, Jews (who give very strong support to Israel but much less to the Iraq war), and Latino Protestants, who hug the national mean on most items and split almost evenly on the *MI* scale. On the other hand, Latino Catholics, Unitarians and other liberal sects, small Christian groups, black Protestants, and non-Christian faiths (such as Muslims,

5 We point out that the Israel item “loads” with other militant internationalism items, unlike an earlier era when such attitudes were “orphans” to the *MI/CI* scheme. See Holsti (2004, 187-88) for speculation on this development. For religious influences on American attitudes toward Israel, see Mayer 2004, and Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris, 2008.



Hindus, and Buddhists), score low on most *MI* questions and place only small proportions in the “militant” half of the *MI* scale. The religiously unaffiliated are also distinctive: less likely to want the U.S. to take an active part in world affairs, to see U.S. having a special role, to be preoccupied with terrorism, to support Israel, to emphasize a strong military, to approve pre-emptive attacks, or to favor the Iraq war. Indeed, only a third of the unaffiliated fall into the pro-*MI* half of the scale.

Still, the religiously unaffiliated are hardly monolithic (Green et al. 2007). Many have religious beliefs and even engage in religious activities (“believers”); others are simply indifferent to religion and exhibit no conventional religious beliefs or regular practices (“seculars”); and yet others are explicitly non- or even anti-religious (“atheists” or “agnostics”). As Table 1 shows, unaffiliated believers mimic the sample as a whole and are evenly divided on the *MI* scale. Seculars are much less supportive of militant internationalism, while agnostics and atheists are least likely of all to be militant internationalists: only a small minority responds positively to any item and only 13 percent fall in the top half of the *MI* scale.

This reconnaissance suggests that both ethnoreligious and restructuring theories have some predictive power. The larger ethnoreligious traditions, especially Evangelicals, supply the bulwark for militant internationalism. On the other hand, smaller traditions, especially those based on distinctive ethnic identities, are much less supportive. There are restructuring factors involved as well: the larger Christian groups are divided between traditionalists, more supportive of militant policies, and modernists, much less so.<sup>6</sup> Restructuring differences may explain even variation among the unaffiliated, where believers, seculars and agnostics/atheists are progressively less “militant” as distance from traditional belief increases. Indeed, those who are most “restructured” religiously, i.e. agnostics and atheists, are at the antimilitarist pole.

### **Cooperative Internationalism**

What about Cooperative Internationalism (CI)? Although Mainline Protestant denominations (Kurtz and Fulton 2002) and the Catholic Church (Hanson 1987) have long advocated multilateral cooperation to fight hunger and poverty around the world, neither the critical nor the empirical literature has focused on these issues. Press reports suggest that religious factors may operate quite differently on “altruistic” foreign policy issues, such as human rights, Third-World poverty, economic development, and global climate change. Although

---

6 Wuthnow's (1988) restructuring theory stresses divisions that are most evident among Evangelical, Mainline and white Catholic Christians in the U.S., but which may have some influence over smaller ethnoreligious traditions as well. Obviously, the Jewish community has distinct theological differences, ranging from Ultra-orthodox to Reform, and even among politically monolithic African-American Protestants, theological traditionalism moves members in a “militant” direction (data not shown). Given the small numbers in these ethnoreligious groups, we have not divided these groups for purposes of illustration in the Tables 1, 2 and 4.

such conclusions are often based on pronouncements by religious elites or activities of religious interest groups (Hertzke 2004; Farr 2008), the evidence for religious influence on public attitudes is mixed. This may reflect the “newness” of such issues or as Wuthnow (2009) argues, the lack of pervasive engagement strategies by leadership at the congregational level. And these may also be “hard issues,” too complex to assimilate quickly into an overarching religious perspective (cf. Maggiotto and Wittkopf 1981)

**Table 2. Religious Group Support for Cooperative Internationalism (CI) in 2008 (in percent)**

	Improving Global Environment High Priority	Combating World Hunger High Priority	Favor Strong Environment Protection	Strength of UN High Priority	Proportion of Group in Top Half of CI Scale
<b>Entire Sample</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>57</b>
<b>Evangelical Protestant</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>44</b>
Traditionalists	43	52	41	31	36
Centrists	64	54	53	47	59
Modernists	48	50	47	47	49
<b>Mainline Protestant</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>57</b>
Traditionalists	56	54	60	37	53
Centrists	61	55	55	43	57
Modernists	66	50	65	47	61
<b>Catholic</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>55</b>
Traditionalists	54	65	60	45	54
Centrists	55	55	54	44	52
Modernists	63	50	64	44	59
<b>Smaller Traditions</b>					
Latter-day Saints	49	58	50	46	48
Jewish	62	64	65	56	61
Latino Protestant	73	75	55	63	69
Latino Catholic	84	74	65	64	79
Unitarians	77	63	73	54	69
Other Christian	78	71	51	51	71
Black Protestants	71	73	43	55	66
Other Non-Christian	84	84	84	72	85
<b>Unaffiliated</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>58</b>
Believers	62	59	46	48	57
Secular	69	52	68	43	59
Agnostic/Atheists	72	45	62	44	59
<b>CI Factor Loading</b>	<b>.78</b>	<b>.63</b>	<b>.67</b>	<b>.68</b>	

Source: Fifth National Survey of Religion and Politics, University of Akron, 2008. (N=4000). Cooperative Internationalism (CI) is the score on the first component of a principal components analysis of these four items, with a *theta* reliability score of .65. Factor loadings noted in Table 2 above.

How do the religious respond to cooperative internationalism? Although our *CI* scale has fewer items than the *MI* scale, the four available not only address old issues at the core of cooperative internationalism, e.g. support for the UN (see Chittick, Billingsley and Travis 1995, 318), but also recent concerns about global warming and environmental degradation. Table 2 shows that Americans are quite supportive of *CI*, with solid majorities putting a “very high” priority on improving the global environment and fighting world hunger, as well as protecting the environment generally. Only on strengthening the UN does the majority fall to a narrow plurality. Although these questions no doubt suffer from a positivity bias, other studies have also shown that Americans favor cooperative internationalism (Page and Bouton 2006).

The global figures hide substantial religious differences, however. Evangelicals fall below sample means on each item. (As Evangelicals constitute one quarter of the public, the gap with “all others” is larger: 17 points on the global environment, 8 on hunger, 13 on environmental protection, and 11 on the UN.) As a result, only 44 percent fall into the top half of the *CI* scale, as compared to 61 percent of other Americans. Mainline Protestants and white Catholics, on the other hand, are closer to national averages, varying by no more than a few percentage points either way. On the *CI* scale Mainliners are slightly more “cooperative” than white Catholics, but differences are minimal.

As some scholars have argued, theological differences here are not as evident as on the *MI* scale. Although traditionalists tend to be less “cooperative” than the other factions, the differences are usually small and centrists sometimes score higher than modernists do. On world hunger, traditionalists and centrists both outscore modernists, perhaps reflecting historic religious concern with feeding the hungry. Among both Evangelicals and Mainliners, however, traditionalism is associated with less support for the UN. Surprisingly, this pattern does not appear among Catholics: the Vatican’s battles with the UN over population policies do not undermine Catholic internationalism. Still, the patterns of support are quite mixed.

The rest of Table 2 presents a clearer picture. Except for Latter-day Saints, *all* the smaller ethnoreligious traditions show above-average *CI* support, although black Protestants lag on environmental protection. As both the individual items and summary score suggest, the most “cooperative” religious groups are the non-Christian world religions, where well over four-fifths fall into the top half of the *CI* scale. Jews also show substantial support (cf. Greenberg and Wald 2001). In most other categories as well, almost two-thirds are cooperative internationalists. Even Latino Protestants, sometimes seen as more conservative, contribute a substantial majority. Fittingly, ethnoreligious groups that represent the diversity of world religion are most prone to support international cooperation, suggesting that as American ethnoreligious diversity increases, cooperative internationalism should prosper.

What about the religiously unaffiliated? Once again, we find substantial differences within this group. “Believers” mimic the national sample, just as they did on the *MI* scale, but seculars and agnostics/atheists show some peculiar patterns: both are much more supportive of the two environmental causes than the public as a whole, but *less* favorable toward combatting world hunger and strengthening the UN. Thus, both differ quite starkly from the “new” ethnoreligious groups’ enthusiastic embrace of those priorities. This suggests that although the unaffiliated may provide additional support for international environmental efforts, such enthusiasm may not extend to other *CI* causes.

### **Religious Sources of Militant and Cooperative Internationalisms**

These patterns strongly hint that both militant and cooperative internationalisms are influenced by religion. In Table 3 we test religious, political and demographic variables for influence on militant and cooperative internationalism. Model 1 represents a comprehensive “religious” explanation. First, to test the impact of ethnoreligious membership, we include dummies for each group, with unaffiliated “believers” as the reference category. (This group is close to the mean on almost all the component items.) We expect that Evangelical (and Latter-day Saint) affiliation should predict greater *MI* support and less *CI* backing. Affiliation with the smaller ethnoreligious traditions, as well as in the secular and agnostic/atheist camps should have the opposite effect. Mainline and Catholic identities might well wash out, given the greater internal diversity within these traditions.

**Table 3. Religious Influences on Militant and Cooperative Internationalisms (OLS regression)**

	<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>	
	<i>Ethnoreligious Traditions + Religious Orientations</i>		<i>Religions Factors + Political Orientations + Demography</i>	
	<i>MI</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>MI</i>	<i>CI</i>
<b>Religious Tradition</b>				
Evangelical	.132**	-.100**	.090**	-.054
Latter-day Saints	.086**	-.042*	.047**	-.008
Catholic	.135**	-.070*	.102**	-.037
Mainline	.103**	-.049	.069	-.015
Jewish	.087**	.018	.081**	-.016
Unaffiliated Believers	---	---	---	---
Latino Protestant	.022	.031	.023	.036*
Latino Catholic	-.002	.086**	.028	.062**
Black Protestant	-.070**	.046*	.003	-.014
Unitarian/Liberal	-.009	.005	-.014	.004
Other Non-Christians	-.022	.043*	-.013	.028
Secular	.040	-.026	.024	-.016
Agnostic/Atheist	-.041*	-.023	-.044**	-.028
<b>Religious Orientations</b>				
Traditionalism	.068**	-.059**	.064**	-.055*
Religious Activity	-.042*	.082**	-.037	.080**
Moralism	.076**	.006	.066**	.020
Pluralism	-.095**	.157**	-.050**	.107**
Civil Religion	.206**	-.040*	.158**	-.012
Dispensationalism	.043*	-.004	.037*	-.002
Close Religious Left	-.151**	.186**	-.067**	.097**
Close Religious Right	.122**	-.145**	.077**	-.085**
<b>Ideological Factors</b>				
Conservative Ideology			.097**	-.164**
Republican Partisanship			.248**	-.208**
<b>Demographic Controls</b>				
Education			.059**	-.040*
Female			-.086**	.119**
Income			.077**	-.046**
Age			.022	-.069**
<b>Adj. R squared=</b>	<b>.239</b>	<b>.136</b>	<b>.333</b>	<b>.238</b>

Source: Fifth National Survey of Religion and Politics, University of Akron, 2008. (N=4000).

\*omitted reference category

\*\*p&lt;.01, \*p&lt;

We also include items that tap the arguments of the religious restructuring theory, namely *theological traditionalism* (Barker, Hurwitz and Nelson 2008; Smidt, Kellstedt and Guth 2009) and *religious activity* (Wuthnow 2009; Smidt, Kellstedt and Guth 2009). We anticipate that traditionalism in belief should have a powerful impact, with the effects of high religious activity less important. In addition, we include other religious measures identified by some scholars as influencing foreign policy attitudes: *moralism*, *religious pluralism*, *civil religion* (Froese and Mencken 2009), *dispensationalism* (Baumgartner, Francia and Morris 2008), and proximity to *religious left* and *religious right organizations* (see the Appendix for details). These variables are related to traditionalism in belief, but represent distinct conceptual and empirical measures.<sup>7</sup> Traditionalism, moralism, civil religion, dispensationalism and proximity to the religious right should enhance *MI* support, while religious modernism, religious activity, belief in religious pluralism, and closeness to the religious left should bolster *CI* scores.

As Model 1 shows, religious variables are significant influences over both dimensions but especially *MI*. Evangelical, Mainline, Catholic and even Jewish affiliation predicts stronger support for militant internationalism, while only black Protestant and agnostic/atheist identification work in the other direction. Religious belief variables have a greater impact than affiliation (in separate analyses, they explain almost twice as much variance), with support for civil religion by far the most powerful force behind militant internationalism. Proximity to the religious right, moralism, traditionalism and, to a lesser extent, dispensationalism, produces higher *MI* scores independently of ethnoreligious tradition. On the other side, proximity to the religious left, belief in religious pluralism and religious involvement work against militant internationalism.<sup>8</sup> Religious factors alone account for almost one-quarter of the variance in the *MI* score, an impressive showing.

Although the *MI* and *CI* scales have only a modest negative correlation ( $r=-.24$ ), the patterns of religious influence present something of a mirror image. In Model 1, Evangelical, Latter-day Saint, Catholic and (almost) Mainline affiliations depress *CI* scores, while Latino Catholic, black Protestant, and non-Christian affiliations have the opposite effect. (Note, however, that the secular and agnostic/atheist coefficients are not significant and actually point in the “wrong” direction.) Proximity to the religious left, belief in religious pluralism, and greater religious involvement all foster cooperative internationalism, while proximity to the religious right, traditionalist belief, and civil religion push in the other direc-

7 Because of the correlations among these religious measures we ran diagnostic tests for multicollinearity in the regressions but found that the Variance Inflation Factors were well within the limits of tolerance.

8 Note that religious involvement has a significant *positive* relationship with militant internationalism at the bivariate level; the sign reverses only when the religious traditionalism, civil religion and other “conservative” variables associated positively with religious activity are in the equation. Thus, this coefficient probably represents what might be called “residual liberal religious activism.”



tion. Interestingly, dispensationalism has no independent impact, despite its proponents' universal denigration of multilateral institutions (cf. Ruotsila 2008). Religious variables account for almost 14 percent of the variance, less than in the *MI* regression, but still a respectable figure.

Of course, other factors influence American attitudes on foreign policy. Model 2 adds those identified by previous scholarship as the most important: *ideology, partisanship, education, gender, income, and age* (cf. Holsti 2004; Page and Bouton 2006).<sup>9</sup> Not surprisingly, Republican partisanship contributes to militant internationalism, boosted mildly by conservative ideology. Those with higher educations and incomes are also modestly more supportive, as are males, but age washes out. Although these variables reduce slightly the coefficients for the significant religious variables in Model 1, almost all of the latter remain important *MI* predictors, although black Protestant affiliation is apparently absorbed by these additional variables, and a couple of other coefficients drop just below statistical significance. Adding political and demographic factors increases variance accounted for to an impressive 33 percent.

On the *CI scale*, the story is a little different. When the political and demographic variables are introduced, several religious affiliations lose independent influence, their influence presumably mediated by partisanship or ideology, as Democratic and liberal affinities bolster *CI* scores. Nevertheless, both Latino Protestant and Catholic affiliations provide added independent support for cooperative internationalism. The theological variables also retain much of their power, although civil religion drops out as a negative influence. *CI* support is also reduced slightly by education and income, but women and younger citizens are more inclined to support *CI*.<sup>10</sup> All variables combined account for one-quarter of the variance. As with the *MI* equation, this proportion surpasses those usually reported in the foreign policy opinion literature (cf. Maggiotto and Wittkopf 1981, 618; Page and Bouton 2006).

We conducted additional tests to uncover other possible influences. Unfortunately, several promising variables were asked only in the post-election NSRP, with a smaller sample. That data does suggest, however, that Americans who saw foreign policy and social issue questions as the most important for their electoral choices were significantly more likely to support *both* militant and co-

9 Race or ethnicity has often been found to influence foreign policy attitudes, but we have not incorporated separate controls for African-American or Latino ethnicity, as these variables are part of the *ethnoreligious* model, combined with religious affiliation. We have made no attempt here to apportion the relative influence of ethnicity and religion, although consistent differences between Latino Protestants and Catholics suggest a role for each "half" of ethnoreligious status.

10 The finding on the effects of education here reverse those of Holsti's analysis of data from the 1990s, when education was more conducive to cooperative internationalism than militant internationalism (2004, 224-225). Examination of the 2008 NSRP and 2012 Chicago Council on Global Affairs data shows a common pattern: support for militant internationalism increases with education up through college, but decreases substantially among those with advanced degrees. On the other hand, support for cooperative internationalism *decreases* with additional education through college, but increases among those with advanced degrees. Thus, the impact of education is not quite linear.

operative internationalisms. High levels of political information bolstered *MI*, but not *CI*. We also tested exposure to religious media, clergy leadership cues, and religious interest group contacts, but none had an independent influence on either scale. Region also drops out, suggesting that the substantial effects found in earlier studies for the “South” were really tapping unmeasured religious influences (cf. Holsti 2004, 226-227). On the whole then, ethnoreligious affiliation and religious beliefs—not leadership cues—influence attitudes (cf. Hero 1973).

### **Religious Groups and the Militant/Cooperative Internationalist Typology**

Finally, we combine the two scales to produce the Wittkopf typology, dividing each at the zero point to identify *hardliners* (high on *MI* and low on *CI*), *internationalists* (high on both), *accommodationists* (low on *MI*, high on *CI*), and *isolationists* (low on both). This procedure assigns roughly a quarter of the sample each to the hardliner and internationalist camps, a third to the accommodationists, and less than one-fifth to the isolationist group (Table 4).<sup>11</sup>

---

11 This distribution reveals something of the aggregate stability of the American public across time. Compared to Maggiotto and Wittkopf's 1974 survey, we have a few more hardliners and a few less isolationists. The major change is a six-point increase in the number of accommodationists and a comparable drop in the proportion of internationalists. This shift is certainly consistent with the changes in the composition of the American religious community over that period, as the growing contingent of minority ethnoreligious and secular groups are likely to be accommodationists.

**Table 4. Religious Distributions in Foreign Policy Attitude (MC/CI) Typology, 2008 (in percent)**

	<i>Hardliners</i>	<i>Internationalists</i>	<i>Accommodationists</i>	<i>Isolationists</i>
<b>Entire Sample</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>Evangelical Protestant</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>14</b>
Traditionalists	52	24	12	12
Centrists	25	26	32	16
Modernists	29	21	28	23
<b>Mainline Protestant</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>18</b>
Traditionalists	33	32	21	14
Centrists	26	28	29	18
Modernists	19	25	36	20
<b>Catholic</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>18</b>
Traditionalists	30	27	27	17
Centrists	33	25	27	16
Modernists	20	24	35	21
<b>Smaller Traditions</b>				
Latter-day Saints	36	34	14	16
Jewish	22	32	30	17
Latino Protestant	20	29	40	11
Latino Catholic	9	29	50	12
Unitarian/Liberal	7	13	56	24
Other Christian	14	10	61	15
Black Protestants	9	25	41	25
All Non-Christian	5	21	64	10
<b>Unaffiliated</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>25</b>
Believers	25	25	32	18
Secular	15	15	44	27
Agnostic/Atheists	8	5	54	33

Source: Fifth National Survey of Religion and Politics, University of Akron, 2008. (N=4000).

Several patterns are evident. First, Evangelicals are far more likely to be hardliners than any other religious group, reflecting the numerical predominance of traditionalists among Evangelicals. Evangelicals are proportionately represented among internationalists, but are far underrepresented among accommodationists and isolationists. Latter-day Saints are also more likely to be hardliners. Mainline Protestants and white Catholics are distributed like the public as a whole, but traditionalists gravitate toward the hardliner camp while modernists inch toward the accommodationists or isolationists. Except for Jews and Latinos, who have a slight surplus of internationalists, the smaller ethnoreligious traditions tend toward an accommodationist stance and, in a few cases, toward isolationism. Indeed, in each group accommodationists are either a plurality or majority. The unaffiliated are located overwhelmingly among accommodationists and isolationists. Once again, unaffiliated “believers” are a microcosm of the public, but seculars prefer accommodation, and agnostic/atheist citizens are more concentrated in accommodationist and isolationist camps.

Are these patterns relatively stable or do they vary with the political era? This is a difficult question to answer, given the paucity of studies addressing religion and foreign policy attitudes—and the variation in policy and religious variables in those studies. Nevertheless, there are some intriguing hints. Not only do our results match the broad descriptions of religious group opinion by Hero (1973), but Wittkopf’s own cursory analysis of crude religious categories in the 1970s and 1980s showed that “Protestants” tended to be hardliners, Catholics and Jews (especially the latter) were internationalists (cf. Greenberg and Wald 2001), and “nones” were accommodationists (1990, 44). Had he been able to differentiate ethnoreligious traditions further and draw on other religious measures, his findings might have been even more compelling, perhaps encouraging future efforts to unearth the religious roots of foreign policy opinion.

The stability of religious patterns is also supported by findings in other data sets over the past decade, including the 2004 NSRP (Guth 2009), the 2008 American National Election Study (Guth 2011a) and the 2012 Chicago Council on Global Affairs Survey (Guth 2013). For example, the analysis here of the 2008 NSRP and that of the 2012 CCGA both classify 42 to 43 percent of Evangelicals as hardliners, despite the use of very different measures of the foreign policy and religion variables and possible opinion changes from 2008 to 2012. Estimates for other religious groups also vary only by a few percentage points.<sup>12</sup> This suggests that such findings are quite robust and at least somewhat impervious to limitations in the measures employed—and, perhaps—to change over time.

---

12 The only substantial difference in religious group placement is an interesting one: Black Protestants are much more “militant” in 2012 than in the 2004 and 2008 surveys (but still heavily “cooperative” as well), pushing more of them into the “internationalist” camp, perhaps following President Obama’s greater “militancy” in continuation of the Afghan War.

## Conclusions

While political scientists and international relations specialists have paid increasing attention to the role of religious organizations and movements in world politics, there has been little sustained analysis of how religious factors influence American attitudes on foreign policy. We have investigated two recent themes in the journalistic and academic coverage of religion and foreign policy. The hegemonic theme stressed the influence that religious traditionalists, especially Evangelicals, have in supporting militant internationalism. We find that a good bit of the speculation is correct: Evangelicals and other traditionalists are indeed more likely to favor such policies. These religious influences are mediated in part by other belief factors such as civil religion, religious exclusivism and moralism, as well as by partisanship and ideology. On the other hand, minority ethnoreligious groups, theological modernists and secular citizens often fell on the other end of *MI*.

We have also considered the altruistic theme by identifying religious influences on cooperative internationalism, although these influences are not quite as sharp or clearly defined. In part, this may be due to the relative newness of some *CI* issues on the international and national agenda. Religious and political elites have not had the time—or, perhaps, the ability—to educate their constituencies on the connection between religious faith and these issues. And although there are a few commonalities in support for *MI* and *CI* perspectives, there is a clear tendency for religious factors providing support for one to have the opposite influence on the other agenda. Although traditionalist religious beliefs work against *CI*, modernist beliefs favor it. In addition, we find that the increasing “internationalism” of American religion augurs well for cooperative internationalism, as the growing numbers of citizens in “new” ethnoreligious groups are among its strongest supporters.

Thus, both ethnoreligious theory and restructuring theory play a role in explaining religion’s contributions to Americans’ foreign policy orientations. What difference does all this make for American foreign policy? Obviously, it is beyond the scope of this paper to settle the thorny questions of how and to what extent public opinion influences foreign policy decision-making (see Holsti 2004; Page and Bouton 2006). Foreign policy is primarily an executive prerogative and public opinion is most relevant in that context. We know that American presidents have often taken religion into account and attempted to mobilize religious forces on behalf of their foreign policy objectives (Inboden 2008; Preston 2012). There is also considerable evidence that the foreign policy views of political activists and legislators are shaped by religion in much the same way that public attitudes are (Aguilar, Fordham and Lynch 1997; Green and Jackson 2007; Guth 2007; Collins et al. 2011). This suggests that public attitudes present both constraints and op-

portunities for presidential leadership, both directly and indirectly through their influence on other political elites.

Nevertheless, we must exercise caution in interpreting the extent of that influence. In one sense, Evangelical and traditionalist hardliners did constitute a large part of the coalition supporting the policies of the George W. Bush administration. Nevertheless, even the most sensitive of the speculative work on the Bush administration's policies often attributed too much influence to his religious constituency (e.g. Marsden 2008). The closest observers of Bush's decision-making scoff at arguments that he was simply responding to demands of his religious constituency on foreign policy. Nor, in fact, did Bush share all the theological emphases common within that constituency, despite journalistic claims to the contrary (cf. Laurent 2004, 11, with Gerson 2007). It is clear, however, that attitudes shaped in part by religious factors often bolstered Bush's public support, whether for his invasion of Iraq, his support for Israel—or his commitment to fighting AIDS in Africa.

The Obama administration has also sought a “supportive” religious constituency for its foreign policy. Both the president and former Secretary of State Clinton are veteran participants in the world of religious politics and initially hoped to go beyond the confines of his religious electoral base to building a broader religious coalition backing the cooperative internationalist dimension of American policy (Guth 2011b). This coalition has taken a considerably different form than that supporting the Bush administration—but by necessity draws on elements of the same religious communities. This has been especially true in that the Obama administration has exhibited considerable continuity with the policies of its predecessor, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, and has disappointed some proponents of a more vigorous multilateral foreign policy (Skidmore 2012). And although cooperative internationalism has a long history of elite support in American religious communities, the specifics have often been a much tougher sell at the grass-roots, whether by religious (Hero 1973) or political leaders. Some observers now see globalization providing a wider base for cooperative internationalism among American church people (Wuthnow 2009); if so, the president's ability to exploit such developments can only enhance his prospects in mobilizing public support for cooperative international policies, especially in his second term.

Although the Democratic Party's “emerging majority coalition” may give it a long-term electoral advantage, the great diversity of its religious constituency presents obstacles to a coherent foreign policy, just as on domestic issues. Although ethnoreligious minorities and religious modernists may back cooperative internationalism, our data suggest that many secular Democrats have little stomach for extensive American engagement abroad, whether militant or cooperative, preferring to retreat to a more isolationist stance (see also Pew Research

Center 2009, 12).<sup>13</sup> Perhaps the Obama administration's reluctance to undertake more vigorous responses to crises in Egypt, Libya and Syria reflects not only presidential caution, bureaucratic influences and international pressures, but also a religious constituency with significant accommodationist and isolationist strains.

Religiously influenced constraints may also affect the current reassessment of foreign policy going on within the Republican Party. Retrospective public disapproval of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, fiscal concerns about defense costs and the loss of the 2012 presidential election have all contributed to a re-evaluation of GOP policy, with new leaders such as Senator Rand Paul urging a neo-isolationist approach to American involvement abroad. While in the past Republican foreign policy has shifted with changing presidential and elite perspectives (Dueck 2010), since World War II these have occurred within a framework of Republican opinion that emphasized varying mixes of hardliner and internationalist perspectives, shaped in considerable part by the GOP's religious coalition. But that coalition's core has been transformed over time from one centered on Mainline Protestantism, with a predominantly internationalist vision, to one dominated at the grassroots and in Congress by Evangelicals and other religious traditionalists, preferring a hardline approach. There is no reason to think that the latter influences will disappear soon. Thus, scholars would be well-advised to continue their exploration of the religious roots of American foreign policy.

In undertaking such studies, we confront a number of intriguing intellectual questions. First, we need to disentangle the roots of distinctive ethnoreligious opinions. Why, for example, do Latino Catholics score low on militant internationalism and high on cooperative internationalism? Do these postures reflect national origins? Receptiveness to "Catholic internationalism"? Or, perhaps, sympathy with "liberation theology" and its distinctive emphases? Why are Latino Protestants different? Are they simply more "assimilated" to dominant American perspectives, or are they shaped by traditionalist theology in much the same way as their white Evangelical brethren are? Black Protestants, especially, merit detailed attention, given their importance to the Democratic Party coalition, but the same could be said for almost all growing "new" ethnoreligious traditions represented in that coalition. Sorting the "ethno" from the "religious" will be a difficult but theoretically important task.

The influence of religious belief certainly requires more attention. We have seen that theological traditionalism produces more support for militant internationalism and depresses that for cooperative policies, but why is this so? Part of the explanation may be that traditionalism encourages civil religious, moralistic and exclusivist views that are more directly conducive to militant international-

13 Although Democrats in this survey were more isolationist than were the Republicans, the Pew Center did not report the extent to which religious groups contributed to this difference.



ism and hostile to the cooperative variant, but these paths do not account entirely for its impact, nor do the mediating factors of partisanship and general ideology. Although few surveys of foreign policy attitudes include enough detailed religious belief measures to allow deeper analysis, the impact of belief on foreign policy perspectives confirms the importance of achieving a better understanding of these vital forces.

## Appendix: Variables

*Militant Internationalism (MI)* is the score on the first factor of a principal components analysis of eight items, with a *theta* reliability of .75. Three have five responses ("strongly agree" to "strongly disagree"):

"The U.S. should mind its own business internationally and let other nations get along as well as they can on their own."

"The U.S. should support Israel over the Palestinians in the Middle East."

"Given the threat of terrorism, the U.S. must be able to take pre-emptive military action against other countries."

Five other items have varying response options:

"Which of the following statements comes closest to your views on the war in Iraq? (1) it was fully justified; (2) it was probably justified; (3) it was probably unjustified; (4) it was completely unjustified."

"Do you think the U.S. should keep military troops in Iraq until the situation has stabilized, or do you think the U.S. should bring its troops home as soon as possible? (1) Keep troops in Iraq; (2) Not sure; (3) Bring troops home."

"Which of the following statements comes closest to your view of the role of the U.S. in world affairs? (1) The U.S. has a special role to play in world affairs and should behave differently than other nations, or (2) The U.S. has no special role and should behave like any other nation."

Priority of "Maintaining superior military power worldwide" and of "Combatting international terrorism." "(1) Very Important; (2) Somewhat Important; (3) Not Important."

*Cooperative Internationalism (CI)* is the score on the first factor of a principal components analysis of four items, with a *theta* reliability score of .65:

Priority of "Strengthening the United Nations," "Combatting world hunger," and "Improving the global environment." "(1) Very Important; (2) Somewhat Important; (3) Not Important."

"Strict rules are necessary to protect the world's environment are necessary, even if they cost jobs or results in higher prices." (Five response options: "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree.").

*Theological traditionalism* is the factor score derived from a principal components analysis, utilizing five belief questions: belief in and the nature of God, life after death, the authority of scripture, the literal existence of the Devil, and the theory of evolution (Smidt, Kellstedt and Guth 2009, 25).

*Religious activity* is a factor score derived from a principal components analysis of five common religious practices: religious service attendance, scripture reading, prayer and small-group participation, and level of financial contributions. We should note that a single measure of attendance at religious services is only slightly less powerful than the full factor score (Smidt, Kellstedt and Guth 2009, 26).

*Moralism* is a single Likert-scale item on how strongly the respondent agreed or disagreed with: "There are clear and absolute standards for right and wrong."

*Pluralism* is a single Likert-scale item on how strongly the respondent agreed or disagreed with the statement: "All the great religions of the world are equally true and good."

*Civil religion* is a factor score derived from a principal components analysis of five items tapping sentiments about religion in public life. The importance of religious faith to the respondent's political thinking, whether or not the President should have a strong religious faith, whether politicians should discuss religion in public, and the appropriateness of the involvement of religious groups and institutions in the political process. (*Theta reliability*=.74).

*Dispensationalism* is measured by a single Likert-scale item on how strongly the respondent agreed or disagreed with the statement: "The world will end in a battle at Armageddon between Jesus and the Anti-Christ."

*Close to Religious Right* and *Close to Religious Left* are single Likert items asking how close the respondent felt toward these movements (five response options from "very close" to "very far.")

*Ideology and partisanship* are standard seven-point ANES scales from "extremely conservative" to "extremely liberal," and from "strong Republican to strong Democrat," respectively.

*Education* is measured by a six-point scale from grade school only to post-graduate work.

*Female* is a dummy variable for women.

*Income* is measured in ten categories, ranging from lowest (under \$5,000) to highest (over \$100,000).

<b>Table A1. Religious Affiliations of the American Public</b>		
	<i>(N=)</i>	<i>Percent of Sample</i>
<b><i>Entire Sample</i></b>	<b>4000</b>	<b>100</b>
<b><i>Evangelical</i></b>	<b>1015</b>	<b>25.5</b>
Traditionalists	606	15.2
Centrists	287	7.2
Modernists	122	3.1
<b><i>Mainline Protestant</i></b>	<b>606</b>	<b>15.1</b>
Traditionalists	140	3.5
Centrists	254	6.3
Modernists	212	5.3
<b><i>Catholic</i></b>	<b>696</b>	<b>17.5</b>
Traditionalists	108	2.7
Centrists	354	8.9
Modernists	234	5.9
<b><i>Smaller Traditions</i></b>	<b>1088</b>	<b>27.1</b>
Black Protestants	358	9.0
Latino Catholic	295	7.4
Latino Protestant	122	3.0
Latter-day Saints	98	2.4
Other Non-Christian	61	1.5
Jewish	59	1.5
Unitarian/Liberal	54	1.3
Other Christian	41	1.0
<b><i>Unaffiliated</i></b>	<b>595</b>	<b>14.9</b>
"Believers"	170	4.3
Secular	325	8.1
Agnostic/Atheists	100	2.5

Source: Fifth National Survey of Religion and Politics, University of Akron, 2008. (N=4000).

## References

Aguilar, Edwin E., Benjamin O. Fordham, and G. Patrick Lynch, The Foreign Policy Beliefs of Political Campaign Contributors, *International Studies Quarterly* 41, 1997.

Albright, Madeleine K., *The Mighty and the Almighty*, New York: HarperCollins, 2006.

Barker, David C., Jon Hurwitz, and Traci L. Nelson, Of Crusades and Culture Wars: 'Messianic' Militarism and Political Conflict in the United States, *Journal of Politics* 70, 2008.

Baumgartner, Jody C., Peter L. Francia, Jonathan S. Morris, A Clash of Civilizations? The Influence of Religion on Public Opinion of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East, *Political Research Quarterly* 61, 2008.

Boyer, Paul S., Biblical Policy and Foreign Policy, In: *Quoting God*, ed. Claire H. Badaracco. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2005.

Chittick, William O., Keith R. Billingsley, and Rick Travis, A Three-Dimensional Model of American Foreign Policy Beliefs, *International Studies Quarterly* 39, 1995.

Collins, Todd, Kenneth A. Wink, James L. Guth, and C. Don Livingston, The Religious Affiliation of Representatives and Support for Funding the Iraq War, *Politics and Religion* 4(3), 2011.

Croft, Stuart, Christian Evangelicals and U.S. Foreign Policy, in: Inderjeet Parmar, Linda B. Miller, and Mark Ledwidge, ed. *New Directions in US Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge, 2009.

den Dulk, Kevin R., Evangelical 'Internationalists' and U.S. Foreign Policy During the Bush Administration, in: Mark J. Rozell and Gleaves Whitney, ed. *Religion and the Bush Presidency*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Derber, Charles, and Yale R. Magrass, *Morality Wars*, Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2008.

Domke, David, *God Willing? Political Fundamentalism in the White House, the 'War on Terror' and the Echoing Press*, London: Pluto Press, 2004.

Dueck, Colin, *Hard Line: The Republican Party and U.S. Foreign Policy Since World War II*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.

Farr, Thomas F., *World of Faith and Freedom*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Froese, Paul, and F. Carson Mencken, A U.S. Holy War? The Effects of Religion on Iraq War Policy Attitudes, *Social Science Quarterly* 90, 2009.

George, Susan, *Hijacking America: How the Religious and Secular Right Changed What Americans Think*, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008.

Gerson, Michael, *Heroic Conservatism*, New York: HarperOne, 2007.

Green, John C., What Happened to the Values Voter? Believers and the 2008 Election. *First Things* 191(March), 2009.

Green, John C., Lyman A. Kellstedt, Corwin E. Smidt, and James L. Guth, *How the Faithful Voted: Religious Communities and the Presidential Vote*, in: *A Matter of Faith? Religion in the 2004 Election*, ed. David E. Campbell, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007.

Greenberg, Anna, and Kenneth D. Wald, *Still Liberal After All These Years?*, in: *Jews in American Politics*, ed. L. Sandy Maisel and Ira N. Forman. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001.

Guth, James L., *Religion and Roll Calls: Religious Influences on the U.S. House of Representatives, 1997-2002*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 2007.

Guth, James L., *Religion and American Public Opinion: Foreign Policy Issues*, in: *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and American Politics*, ed. Corwin E. Smidt, Lyman A. Kellstedt, and James L. Guth, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Guth, James L., *Religion and American Attitudes on Foreign Policy, 2008: Testing Theories of Religious, Cultural and Ideological Influences*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, 2011.

Guth, James L., *Obama, Religious Politics and the Culture Wars*, in: *Transforming America: Barack Obama in the White House*, ed. Steven Schier, Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011.

Guth, James L., *The Religious Roots of Foreign Policy Exceptionalism*, *The Review of Faith & International Affairs* 10(2), 2012.

Guth, James L., *Religion and American Public Attitudes on War and Peace, 2012*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 2013.

Hanson, Eric O., *The Catholic Church in World Politics*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987.

Hehir, J. Bryan, *Religious Freedom and U.S. Foreign Policy*, in: *The Influence of Faith: Religious Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Elliott Abrams. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001.

Hero, Alfred O., *American Religious Groups View Foreign Policy: Trends in Rank-and-File Opinion, 1937-1969*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1973.

Hertzke, Allen D., *Freeing God's Children: The Unlikely Alliance for Global Human Rights*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.

Holsti, Ole R., *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004.

Hout, Michael, and Claude S. Fischer, *Why Americans Have No Religious Preference: Politics and Generations*, *American Sociological Review* 67, 2002.

Hunter, James D., *Culture Wars*, New York: Basic Books, 1991.

Huntington, Samuel P., *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.

Inboden, William, *Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Judis, John, *The Chosen Nation: The Influence of Religion on U.S. Foreign Policy*, *Policy Brief* 37, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005.

Kellstedt, Lyman A., and James L. Guth, *Survey Research: Religion and Electoral Behavior in the United States, 1936-2008*, in: *Political Science Research in Practice*, ed. Akan Malici and Elizabeth S. Smith. New York and London: Routledge, 2013.

Kidd, Thomas S., *American Christians and Islam: Evangelical Culture and Muslims from the Colonial Period to the Age of Terrorism*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.

Kohut, Andrew, and Bruce Stokes, *America Against the World*, New York: Henry Holt, 2006.

Kristof, Nicholas, "Following God Abroad." *New York Times*, May 21, 2002.

Kurtz, Lester, and Kelly Goran Fulton, *Love Your Enemies? Protestants and United States Foreign Policy*, in: *The Quiet Hand of God: Faith-Based Activism and the Public Role of Mainline Protestantism*, ed. Robert Wuthnow and John H. Evans. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.

Laurent, Eric, *Bush's Secret World: Religion, Big Business and Hidden Networks*. trs. Eric Brown, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004.

Layman, Geoffrey, *The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.

Maggiotto, Michael A., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Public Attitudes toward Foreign Policy*, *International Studies Quarterly* 25, 1981.

McCleary, Rachel, *Global Compassion: Private Voluntary Organizations and U.S. Foreign Policy since 1939*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

McCartney, Paul, *American Nationalism and U.S. Foreign Policy from September 11 to the Iraq War*, *Political Science Quarterly* 119, 2004.

Marsden, Lee, *For God's Sake: The Christian Right and US Foreign Policy*, London: Zed Books, 2008.

Marsh, Charles, *Wayward Christian Soldiers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Martin, William, *The Christian Right and American Foreign Policy*, *Foreign Policy* 114 (Spring), 1999.

Mayer, Jeremy, *Christian Fundamentalists and Public Opinion toward the Middle East*, *Social Science Quarterly* 85, 2004.

Mead, Walter Russell, *Power, Terror, Peace, and War*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004.

Mead, Walter Russell, *Religion and U.S. Foreign Policy*, *Foreign Affairs* 85 (September/October), 2006.

Northcott, Michael, *An Angel Directs the Storm: Apocalyptic Religion and American Empire*, London and New York: I.B.Taurus, 2004.

Page, Benjamin I., with Marshall M. Bouton, *The Foreign Policy Disconnect*:

*What Americans Want from Our Leaders But Don't Get*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.

Peffley, Mark, and John Hurwitz, *Models of Attitude Constraint in Foreign Affairs*, *Political Behavior* 15, 1993.

Pew Research Center, *America's Place in the World 2009*, Washington, DC: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 2009.

Phillips, Kevin, *American Theocracy: The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil and Borrowed Money in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, New York: Viking, 2006.

Preston, Andrew, *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith*, New York: Knopf, 2012.

Rock, Stephen R., *Faith and Foreign Policy*, New York: Continuum, 2011.

Ruotsila, Markku, *The Origins of Christian Anti-Internationalism*, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008.

Singer, Peter, *The President of Good and Evil: The Ethics of George W. Bush*, New York: E.P. Dutton, 2004.

Skidmore, David, *The Obama Presidency and US Foreign Policy: Where's the Multilateralism?*, *International Studies Perspectives* 13, 2012.

Smidt, Corwin E., *Religion and American Attitudes towards Islam and an Invasion of Iraq*, *Sociology of Religion* 66, 2005.

Smidt, Corwin E., Lyman A. Kellstedt, and James L. Guth, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and American Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Swierenga, Robert P., *Religion and American Voting Behavior, 1830s to 1930s*, in: *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and American Politics*, ed. Corwin E. Smidt, Lyman A. Kellstedt, and James L. Guth, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Tipton, Steven M., *Public Pulpits: Methodists and Mainline Churches in the Moral Argument of Public Life*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.

Uslaner, Erik M., *American Interests in the Balance*, in: *Interest Group Politics*, 7<sup>th</sup> ed., ed. Allan J. Cigler and Burdett Loomis. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007.

Urban, Hugh B., *The Secrets of the Kingdom; Religion and Concealment in the Bush Administration*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007.

Wald, Kenneth, *Religious Elites and Public Opinion: The Impact of the Bishops' Peace Pastoral*, *Review of Politics* 54, 1992.

Williams, Rhys H., *Cultural Wars in American Politics*, New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1997.

Wittkopf, Eugene R., *Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1990.

Weyl, Ben, *In Human Rights, A Bridge to the Left*, *CQ Weekly* 67, 2009.

Wuthnow, Robert, *The Restructuring of American Religion*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.

Wuthnow, Robert, *Boundless Faith: The Global Outreach of American Churches*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009.



Џејмс Гут

## МИЛИТАНТНИ И КООПЕРАТИВНИ ИНТЕРНАЦИОНАЛИЗАМ У АМЕРИЧКОЈ ВЕРСКОЈ ЈАВНОСТИ

### Резиме

Иако постоји велики број спекулација о томе како религија обликује америчкеставовеу спољној политици, постојималибројемпиријскиханализа тог утицаја. Овај рад се заснива на великом узорку националне јавности из 2008. године који класификује верске групе према класичној димензији спољне политике Еугена Виткопфа (1990), *милитантни интернационализам и кооперативни интернационализам*. Ми налазимо различите верске јединице за сваку димензију и демонстрирамо утицај *етнорелигијских и теолошких* фактора на обе. Комбинујући ове две димензије, налазимо да верске групе у Америци стоје на различитим позицијама Виткопфове *тврде струје, интернационалиста, акомодациониста и изолациониста*.

**Кључне речи:** милитантни интернационализам, кооперативни интернационализам, ентрорелигијске традиције, верски интернационализам, америчка спољна политика

Примљен: 1.02.2013.

Прихваћен: 18.05.2013.