Thomas V. Feingold[1]
University of Virginia
United States of America

James L. Guth[2]
Furman University
United States of America

CATHOLIC PARTISANSHIP IN THE 2020 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: DEMOGRAPHIC AND CULTURAL CLEAVAGES

Abstract

Catholics have long been an important force in American electoral politics, but the direction of that influence has changed in recent decades. Once a mainstay of the New Deal coalition, the community's political loyalties have shifted away from the Democrats to a virtual partisan equilibrium, with white Catholics drifting to the Republican camp and the growing number of Latino and other "new ethnics" providing Democratic votes. Here we examine the demographic structure of Catholic partisanship, testing four perspectives used by Shafer and Spady to identify the social underpinnings of partisan orientations, perspectives which also characterize the literature on Catholic alignments. These alternative views stress (1) social class and education; (2) racial and ethnic influences; 3) "domestic roles," such as gender, sexuality, family structure, and residence; and, finally (4) religious cleavages. We find that ethnic divisions contribute massively to contemporary Catholic partisanship, but that socioeconomic influences have faded dramatically. Religious factors, especially theological views, have become much more salient. We also discover that socioeconomic status is more influential for Latinos, while religion matters more for white Catholics. Finally, we show that conclusions drawn about the structure of Catholic partisanship depend in part on the survey used and the specific measures available.

Keywords: partisanship, Catholics, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, religiosity

Perhaps the most quoted observation on electoral politics among contemporary American Catholics is E.J. Dionne Jr.'s witticism that "there is no Catholic vote – and it's important."[3] Indeed, the careful attention paid to Catholic voters in 2020 by

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[1] Thomas Feingold is a 2021 graduate of Furman University with a Bachelor of Arts in Politics & International Affairs and German Studies. He recently finished his second year of a Fulbright grant teaching English in Austria, and he is now a first-year law student at the University of Virginia School of Law. His academic interests include American voting behavior, electoral systems, and the relationship between law and politics. Contact E-mail: tomvfeingold@gmail.com

[2] James L. Guth is William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Furman University. He has written extensively on the role of religion in American and European politics. Contact E-mail: jim.guth@furman.edu

[3] E.J. Dionne, Jr., "There Is No Catholic Vote – And It's Important", in: *American Catholics & Civic Engagement: A Distinctive Voice,* Margaret O'Brien Steinfels (ed.), Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 2004, p. 251.

political strategists and analysts alike reflects the continued power of Dionne's paradox,[4] despite frequent scholarly warnings about "the myth of the Catholic vote."[5] And there was no less interest as the 2022 mid-term elections approached. Catholics constitute over one-fifth of American voters, but despite being part of a single hierarchical religious institution are hardly a unified bloc in national elections.[6] And although there are obvious methodological limitations to focusing on a single religious tradition, scholars are still justifiably intrigued by the task of delineating the social underpinnings of Catholic partisanship.[7]

That partisanship is a continually moving target as a result of dramatic changes in the Catholic population over the past half century. First, the Catholic community has gone from overwhelmingly white to multi-ethnic, as Latinos constitute at least of a third of Catholic parishioners, while immigration from Southeast Asia and domestic conversions have increased the numbers of Asian and Black Catholics.[8] Meanwhile, Catholics of European origin have increasingly moved from working to middle class in education and income: fewer than one in twenty white Catholics were college graduates in the 1950s, but well over one-third are today.

Furthermore, both white and "new ethnic" Catholics are less "metropolitan" and more geographically dispersed than in the 1940s heyday of big-city Northeastern and Midwestern concentrations. White Catholics are aging as well; the percentage over 65 years of age has more than doubled in the past six decades, reaching almost one-quarter today. As in other religious groups, Catholic marital patterns have also changed: in the 1950s seven of eight adult Catholics were married, compared to just over one-half today. White Catholics today also differ religiously from their 1950s counterparts. After Vatican II Catholic observance dropped significantly, from about 70 percent "regular" attendance in the 1960s to 44 percent in the 1970s, and to around a third in 2020, below that of white evangelicals and black Protestants.[9] And theological conflicts among Catholics have intensified as "traditionalists" face off against "progressives" (and even Pope Francis), producing what *The Economist* called "the fight for Catholic America."[10]

Not surprisingly, given these socioeconomic, ethnic, demographic and religious transformations, Catholic political behavior has also undergone profound changes.

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[4]   Corwin E. Smidt, Catholics and the 2020 Presidential Election, *Politics and Religion Journal,* Vol. 15, No. 2, 2021, pp. 283-311.
[5]   Matthew J. Streb and Brian Frederick, "The Myth of a Distinct Catholic Vote", in: *Catholics and Politics: The Dynamic Tension Between Faith & Power,* Kristin E. Heyer, Mark J. Rozell, and Michael A. Genovese (eds.), Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, 2008, pp. 93-112.
[6]   Michael Lipka and Gregory A. Smith, "Like Americans Overall, U.S. Catholics are Sharply Divided by Party", Pew Research Center, 2019. Available at: *https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/24/like-americans-overall-u-s-catholics-are-sharply-divided-by-party/* (accessed April 4, 2023).
[7]   *Catholics and US Politics After The 2016 Elections: Understanding the "Swing Vote",* Marie Gayte, Blandine Chelini-Pont, and Mark Rozell (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2018.
[8]   William B. Prendergast, *The Catholic Voter in American Politics: The Passing of the Democratic Monolith,* Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, 1999; Jeff Diament, Besheer Mohamed, and Joshua Alvarado, "Black Catholics in America", Pew Research Center, 2022. Available at: *https://www.pewforum.org/2022/03/15/black-catholics-in-america/* (accessed April 4,2023)
[9]   These estimates for Catholic adults drawn from the 2020 Cooperative Election Study.
[10] "The Fight for Catholic America", *The Economist,* February 19, 2022, p. 25.

Long the bulwark of the New Deal coalition,[11] white Catholics have recently distributed themselves more widely across the political spectrum, both in party identification and vote choice. White Catholics were strongly Democratic in the 1940s, with that partisanship reaching a peak in the Kennedy election of 1960 but receding significantly thereafter. By 2012 they were almost equally distributed on the partisan spectrum; the historic Democratic advantage had disappeared. In comparison, their Latino brethren – and other ethnic groups – have maintained solid Democratic attachments through the past three decades, as their growing numbers augured rising political importance. But even those ties were under threat in the 2020s.[12]

The Demographic Bases of Catholic Partisanship

In this essay, we examine the demographic bases of Catholic party ties, testing four perspectives used by Shafer and Spady[13] to identify the social underpinnings of partisanship. These perspectives stress (1) social class and education; (2) racial and ethnic influences; (3) "domestic roles," such as gender, sexuality, family structure and residence; and, (4) religiosity and theological cleavages.[14] As students of religion and politics will immediately observe, these categories correspond almost precisely to those used by most analysts in explaining the changing partisanship of Catholics.[15] We consider each perspective in slightly greater detail before moving to an empirical examination of Catholic partisanship in 2020.

Social Class and Education

Most accounts of partisan change among Catholics have focused on the role of economic status, especially among whites. Why have Catholics changed their electoral behavior since the Democratic ascendancy of the 1960s? "The most obvious answer is that they occupy a more elevated position in the socioeconomic order."[16] As European-origin Catholics climbed the economic ladder and achieved higher education, they began to desert their ancestral party, voting more frequently for Republicans (especially for higher offices) and shifting their identification away from the Democrats. Upward mobility presumably fostered more conservative attitudes on role of government and social welfare issues, leading to a shift toward the GOP. Blue-collar Catholics who remained part of the institutional outposts of the New Deal, such as labor unions, were less prone to defect, at least for a time.

[11] See: Robert Axelrod, Where the Votes Come From: An Analysis of Electoral Coalitions, 1952-1968, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 66, No. 1, 1972, pp. 11-20.
[12] Ruy Teixeira, "The Democrats' Hispanic Voter Problem," *The Liberal Patriot*, 9 December 2021. Available at: *https://theliberalpatriot. substack.com/p/the-democrats-hispanic-voter-problem-dfc?s=r* (accessed April 4, 2023).
[13] Byron E. Shafer and Richard H. Spady, *The American Political Landscape,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2014.
[14] Shafer and Spady also examine ideological factors but we leave that task for another article.
[15] Lyman A. Kellstedt and James L. Guth, Catholic Partisanship and the Presidential Vote in 2012: Testing Alternative Theories, *The Forum*, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2014, pp. 623-640.
[16] William B. Prendergast, *The Catholic Voter in American Politics . . .* p. 222.

Although educational advancement historically operated in tandem with economic mobility in producing less Democratic loyalty, in recent years scholars find education playing an independent role, especially among those with postgraduate work. Highly educated Americans have increasingly migrated toward the Democrats, perhaps as a result of their social liberalism, joining many with more modest educations in the Democratic ranks. On the other hand, many voters with intermediate levels of education lean Republican, especially in the "Trump era." Presumably, Catholics should exhibit the same tendencies.

Race and Ethnicity

Despite the collective image of American Catholics as an overwhelmingly Democratic constituency throughout history, there have always been significant ethnic and racial differences in support for the party. Ethnocultural historians found that Irish Catholics usually excelled in Democratic propensities, while their Italian, German and some other ethnic brethren were often less enthusiastic.[17] Such skepticism was strongest in areas where the Irish monopolized local politics or Republican machines offered an open door.[18] And although much of the scholarly interest on the growing ethnic complexity of American Catholics has focused on Latinos – themselves an internally diverse group[19] – there are substantial contingents of Black, Asian, and "other race" Catholic voters. Many controversies over faith and practice within today's Church have important ethnic implications, so we might expect to see such patterns in political life, as ethnic groups adopt varying partisan loyalties.

Domestic Roles and Locations

As Shafer and Spady argue, "domestic roles" have emerged as another source of American ideological and partisan differences.[20] These influences have appeared among Catholics as well in recent decades. The gender gap solidified by the 1990s, with men substantially less Democratic than women; some scholars found that married citizens and those with young children were more likely to be Republicans. Sexual orientation also plays a role, with "straight" Americans locating on the GOP side and sexual "minorities" supporting the Democrats. In the 1980s and 1990s younger Catholics were less Democratic, although this pattern may have reversed in the 21st century, as young people generally have favored the Democrats. Such age cohort

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[17]   Robert P. Swierenga, "Religion and American Voting Behavior, 1830s-1930s", in: *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and American Politics*, Corwin E. Smidt, Lyman A. Kellstedt, and James L. Guth (eds.), Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, pp. 69-94.

[18]   William B. Prendergast, *The Catholic Voter in American Politics. . .*; George Marlin, *The American Catholic Voter: 200 Years of Political Impact,* St. Augustine's Press, South Bend, 2004.

[19]   Adrian Pantoja, Matthew Barreto, and Richard Anderson, "Politics *y la Iglesia*: Attitudes toward the Role of Religion in Politics among Latino Catholics", in: *Catholics and Politics: The Dynamic Tension Between Faith & Power,* Kristin E. Heyer, Mark J. Rozell, and Michael A. Genovese (eds.), 2008, pp. 113-128; Geraldo Cadava, *The Hispanic Republican,* Ecco/HarperCollins, New York, 2020.

[20]   Byron E. Shafer and Richard H. Spady, *The American Political Landscape. . .* pp. 64ff.

differences may reflect the effects of maturing during specific political eras, but for Catholics they may also be shaped by seminal religious events, such as Vatican II and its aftermath.[21] Some evidence suggests regional differences: the growing Catholic population of the South has been more inclined toward the GOP than its counterparts in traditional Catholic heartlands of the Northeast and Midwest. At the same time, urban-rural differences may also have intensified in recent years.[22] Finally, scholars have found that veterans of the armed services tend to favor the GOP.

Religiosity and Religious Values

Although most work on Catholic political change has focused on socioeconomic, ethnic, and domestic influences, early social science studies saw religion itself as a key determinant of partisanship: "Catholics vote differently from Protestants, and this difference is not simply a function of differing demographic or ideological positions…And the more closely they are bound to their religion, the more Democratic they are."[23] Such observations not only posited a religious basis for Catholic behavior, but revealed a common pattern of ethnoreligious politics: the most committed believers were typically the strongest adherents to their tradition's "normative" party. Before the 1970s, regular Mass attendance predicted greater Catholic support for Democratic candidates, just as churchgoing produced Republican affinities among Protestants, thereby reinforcing traditional confessional patterns.[24]

The "culture wars" starting in the 1960s transformed the nature of religious influence, however, as traditionalists and progressives squared off against each other in many faith communities. As conservative positions on abortion, embryonic stem-cell research, gay rights, same-sex marriage and other cultural issues were correlated with "religiosity," Republican strategists used these "wedge issues" to lure observant Catholics away from the Democrats.[25] By the 1990s, both casual and professional observers pointed to the "God gap": regular Mass attenders were prone to vote Republican, while the less-observant leaned Democratic. Of course, this phenomenon

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[21] David C. Leege and Paul D. Mueller, "How Catholic is the Catholic Vote?", in: *American Catholics & Civic Engagement: A Distinctive Voice,* Margaret O'Brien Steinfels (ed.), Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham 2004, pp. 213-250; William V. D'Antonio, Michele Dillon, and Mary L. Gautier, *American Catholics in Transition,* Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2013.

[22] E.J. Dionne, Jr., "There Is No Catholic Vote – And It's Important…"; William B. Prendergast., *The Catholic Voter in American Politics*… p. 202.

[23] Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, *Voting,* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1954, pp. 70-71; cf. Mark Brewer, *Relevant No More? The Catholic/Protestant Divide in American Electoral Politics,* Lexington Books, Lanham, 2003.

[24] See: Phillip E. Converse, "Religion and Politics: The 1960 Election", in: *Elections and the Political Order,* Angus Campbell, Phillip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes (eds.), John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1966, pp. 96-124; J. Matthew Wilson, "The Changing Catholic Voter: Comparing Responses to John Kennedy in 1960 and John Kerry in 2004", in: *A Matter of Faith: Religion in the 2004 Presidential Campaign*, David E. Campbell (ed.), Brookings, Washington, DC, 2007, pp. 163-179; and, Lyman A. Kellstedt and James L. Guth, "Catholic Partisanship and the Presidential Vote in 2012"… pp. 623-640; Stephen T. Mockabee, "The Political Behavior of American Catholics: Change and Continuity", in: *From Pews to Polling Places,* J. Matthew Wilson (ed.), Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, 2007.

[25] William V. D'Antonio, Steven A. Tuch, and John Kenneth White, "Catholicism, Abortion, and the Emergence of the "Culture Wars" in the U. S. Congress, 1971-2006", in: *Catholics and Politics: The Dynamic Tension Between Faith & Power,* Kristin E. Heyer, Mark J. Rozell, and Michael A. Genovese (eds.), Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, 2008, pp. 129-54.

was not limited to – or even most pronounced – among Catholics.[26] Such divisions became more politically relevant as Mass attendance dropped from very high levels in the 1960s to much lower ones today.[27] While some scholars found that the salience of religion, rather than Mass attendance, was the best predictor of Catholic Republicanism, this trait and faithful observance are typically very highly correlated, making such distinctions problematic.

Unfortunately, the stress on "the God gap," whether measured by Mass attendance or religious salience, often obscured the fundamental source of partisan cleavages: theological differences. The foundational texts of the "culture wars" or "religious restructuring" perspective reminds us that the key divide in contemporary religious communities is not over observance, but theology – with "traditionalists" moving toward Republicans and "progressives" toward the Democrats.[28] Unfortunately, the paucity of belief measures in surveys has led most scholars and virtually all journalists to focus on proxies such as Mass attendance or religious salience. Although these items do roughly differentiate the two Catholic factions, as traditionalists are considerably more observant, it is certainly preferable to measure beliefs directly.

Data and Methods

The analysis here assesses the relative importance of all four categories of demographic factors in shaping Catholic partisanship, using two standard data sources: the 2020 American National Election Study (ANES) and the 2020 Cooperative Election Study (CES). Each survey has advantages: the ANES has a substantial subset of Catholics in its pre- and post-election surveys (usable *Ns*=1699 and 1537*)* and a much broader set of religious variables, found in both the pre- and post-election questionnaires. On the other hand, the CES has a much larger subsample of Catholics (usable *N*=11,191), permitting fuller analysis of racial and ethnic subgroups and, perhaps, surer estimates of the effects of other factors.[29] Unfortunately, the CES lacks items on religious belief – limiting conclusions about the full role of religion. Thus, by utilizing both surveys it allows us to examine all four demographic categories in some detail, looking at the socioeconomic, ethnic, domestic and religious roots of Catholic partisanship.

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[26]   See: Lyman A. Kellstedt and James L. Guth, "Religious Groups as a Polarizing Force", in: *Polarized Politics: The Impact of Divisiveness in the US Political System,* William Crotty (ed.), Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 2015, pp. 157-186. Some observers, however, doubt that this phenomenon is significant, finding only minor partisan differences: William V. D'Antonio, Michele Dillon, and Mary L. Gautier, *American Catholics in Transition. . . ,* or doubt that it is permanent, discovering that observant Catholics are sometimes still more Democratic, at least when other factors are controlled, see Mark M. Grey and Mary E. Bendyna, "Between Church, Party and Conscience: Protecting Life and Promoting Social Justice among U. S. Catholics", in: *Catholics and Politics: The Dynamic Tension Between Faith & Power,* Kristin E. Heyer, Mark J. Rozell, and Michael A. Genovese, (eds.), Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, 2008, pp. 75-72, and Matthew J. Streb and Frederick Brian, 2008, The Myth of a Distinct Catholic Vote. . . pp. 93-112.

[27]   William V. D'Antonio, Michele Dillon, and Mary L. Gautier, *American Catholics in Transition,* Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2013, 13ff.

[28]   Robert Wuthnow, *The Restructuring of American Religion,* Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1988; James D. Hunter, *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America,* Basic Books, 1991.

[29]   It is important to remember that the larger CES sample size will produce more statistically significant results, even in the absence of larger substantive "effects".

A First Cut: Considering Catholic Partisan Evaluations

One advantage of the ANES is its multiple measures of partisanship. Although most scholars focus on the classic "Michigan" seven-point party identification scale, we begin with a more nuanced approach, using seven independent partisan evaluations available in the pre-election survey. In Tables 1, 2 and 3 we report the impact of all four categories of factors on (1) "thermometer ratings" of the Democratic and Republican parties, (2) comparable evaluations of the parties' 2020 standard bearers, Joe Biden and Donald Trump; (3) scores summarizing the net "likes" and "dislikes" about each party; and finally (4) the classic "Michigan" party identification scale. Although these measures usually tell a similar story, some differences in the factors influencing each are instructive.

For each demographic category, we employ several standard measures: 1) for socioeconomic status we use family income and education level[30]; 2) for ethnicity, we distinguish whites, blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and other races; 3) for personal status, we include an age variable for Catholics born before or during the Vatican II era, which preliminary examination showed to be the only distinctive age cohort in the multivariate analysis[31]; Southern residence; sexual identity; gender; marital status; number of children; size of community; and, lastly, veteran status.

Finally, we incorporate religious measures. Although the ANES religious battery may have a "Protestant bias", as some scholars contend, such bias should work against strong relationships among Catholics. From the ANES pre-election survey, we use an additive measure of various traditionalist identifications; a religiosity score derived from Mass attendance and religious salience; and views of the Bible. We also include two post-election measures: a thermometer for "Christian fundamentalists" and an item asking how much "discrimination" Christians face in the US. Although not ideal for assessing traditionalist beliefs, both are reasonable proxies. "Fundamentalism" is not originally a "Catholic" term, but in popular parlance it has come to signify any religious conservatism, even among Catholics.[32] Positive Catholic responses may also reflect recent "co-belligerency" by traditionalists in different Christian confessions.[33] And a sense of social discrimination against Christians is held primarily by traditionalists in all American Christian groups, including Catholics.

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[30]   We initially included union membership but found it had little effect at either the bivariate or multivariate levels, so to simplify analysis we have omitted it.

[31]   A preliminary review of age effects among different Catholic ethnic groups in the ANES data revealed very complex patterns, due in part to the relatively few respondents in some categories (18-26; 27-41;42-59; 60-79; and 80+). There was a slight tendency for Democratic affiliation to decline through middle age, but dummies for the younger cohorts did not survive multivariate analysis. In the much larger CES sample, younger voters also tended to be more Democratic, but this effect appeared primarily among non-white Catholics and also did not survive multivariate analysis.

[32]   Mary Jo Weaver, "Catholic Fundamentalism", in: *Encyclopedia of Fundamentalism*, Brenda Brasher (ed.), Routledge, New York, 2001, pp. 86-91.

[33]   Mark J. Rozell, "Political Marriage of Convenience? The Evolution of the Conservative Catholic-Evangelical Alliance in the Republican Party", in: *Catholics and Politics: The Dynamic Tension Between Faith & Power,* Kristin E. Heyer, Mark J. Rozell, and Michael A. Genovese (eds.), Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, 2008, pp. 27-42. This conclusion is supported by intercorrelations: the fundamentalist thermometer correlates at *r*=.31 with both the Bible item and the religious identities scale, somewhat lower than among other religious groups, but still a solid relationship.

For example, a content analysis of the traditionalist *National Catholic Register* and the progressive *National Catholic Reporter* for the first six months of 2021 revealed over four times as many articles on religious freedom and discrimination against Christians in the former as in the latter.[34] Whatever their limitations, these measures provide a solid estimate of Catholic theological traditionalism.

As a first cut at the full contours of the American Catholic electorate, Table 1 summarizes bivariate correlations between demographic variables and the seven partisan measures. On the Democratic side, correlations are usually strongest with the party thermometer, followed by that for Biden, and then by likes and dislikes about the party. Nevertheless, as we should expect, the patterns are quite similar. Higher family income predicts cooler feelings toward the Democratic Party, but is not significant in the other two cases. Grade and high school graduates feel warmer toward the party, but they are not more Democratic on the other partisan measures. On the other hand, those with some college tend to be cooler toward the party and Joe Biden – and have more "dislikes" than "likes" about Democrats. Interestingly, those with college and graduate degrees do not differ from the sample as a whole, but postgraduates tend to like Biden a little better.

The Republican measures often present the mirror image of their Democratic counterparts, although higher income also results in a dimmer view of the party, just as for the Democrats, and grade school graduates are also negative. The positive effect of a high school diploma on the Republican thermometer is notable, as is the negative effect of postgraduate work. The Trump pattern reveals modest positive coefficients for those with high school diplomas and some college, but more negative evaluations from those with college degrees and postgraduate work. Finally, virtually none of the SES factors influences the GOP like/dislike measure, except for the greater negativism of high school graduates. On the whole, then, we see only modest effects of social class on these six partisan evaluation measures.[35] And, finally, the SES measures are not much more predictive of the classic Michigan identification scale: higher income has a mild significant correlation with Republicanism, while those with only a grade school education tilt more strongly Democratic. But other educational groups do not differ from the rest of the Catholic public.[36]

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[34] Unpublished study conducted by the second author's Fall 2021 political analysis class.
[35] Interestingly, non-Catholics show a substantial impact of income and post-graduate education on all six measures and on party identification as well (see below for the Catholic case).
[36] Perhaps the partisan thermometers are more sensitive gauges of partisanship than the Michigan scale.

Table 1. Socioeconomic, Ethnic, Domestic and Religious Roots of Catholic Partisanship (Pearson's r)

	Democratic Partisanship			GOP Partisanship			Party ID
	Party Warmth	Biden Warmth	Like Democrats	GOP Warmth	Trump Warmth	Like GOP	(GOP High)
SES							
Income	-.067**	-.020	-.014	-.043*	.025	.040	.060*
Grade school only	.112***	.009	-.014	-.073*	-.041	-.052*	-.133***
High school grad	.043*	.025	-.003	.100***	.044*	-.003	.030
Some college	-.077***	-.060	-.053*	.055*	.073**	.025	.045
College graduate [a]	.031	-.002	.026	-.039	-.046	-.014	.020
Postgrad Work	-.001	.05*	.020	-.096***	-.058*	.010	-.016
Race and Ethnicity							
White [a]	-.292***	-.228***	-.179***	.218***	.260***	.204***	.294***
Hispanic	.235***	.175***	-.131***	-.191***	-.208***	-.169***	-.265***
Black	.091***	.092***	.075***	-.080***	-.099***	-.094***	-.084***
Asian	.032	.056*	.014	-.019	-.063**	-.004	-.026
Other Non-white	.034	.021	.057*	-.014	-.015	-.039	-.039
Domestic Status							
Vatican II and Pre	.064**	.077***	.002	-.035	-.015	-.022	-.050*
South	-.035	-.049*	-.033	.104***	.057*	.069**	.072**
Straight	-.097***	-.089***	-.069**	.104***	.085***	.050*	.099***
Male	-.071**	-.050*	-.029	.048*	.075**	.028*	.129***
Married	-.024	.006	-.021	.065**	.081***	.075**	.080**
Number children	-.076***	-.084***	-.042*	.030	.042*	.055*	.035
Size of place	.103***	.121***	.095***	-.109***	-.138***	-.033	-.136***
Veteran	-.079**	-.056*	-.065*	.065*	.098***	.039	.099***
Religious Factors							
Traditionalist ID	-.138***	-.165***	-.125***	.239***	.236***	.196***	.189***
High religiosity	-.102***	-.089***	-.075**	.161***	.160***	.135***	.141***
Biblical authority	.087***	-.110***	-.139***	.236***	.189***	.181***	.156***
Sectarianism	-.229***	-.270***	-.245***	.366***	.329***	.324***	.322***
See Discrimination	-.250***	-.241***	-.211***	.238***	.294***	.184***	.235***
Born again	.042*	.030*	.004	.016	.009	.035	-.042

Source: ANES 2020 (N=1537)
*p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001

To no one's surprise, racial and ethnic factors are much more strongly associated with partisanship – and can be summarized quickly. White Catholics on balance exhibit negative evaluations of both the Democratic Party and Joe Biden (although less so about the candidate), and also have more to complain about than like about the party. On the other hand, white Catholics reveal positive evaluations of the Republican counterparts – with Donald Trump getting the strongest endorsement, rather than the GOP. Hispanics tend to be more positive about the Democratic Party than about candidate Biden, and a little more negative on Trump than on the GOP. The small contingent of black Catholics is solidly favorable on all the Democratic indicators, and negative on the Republican ones, while Asian and other minority Catholics appear marginally on the "Democratic" side of the correlations. Finally, the Michigan scale data shows a strong preference of whites for the GOP, of Hispanics and blacks for the Democrats, with Asian and other race Catholics not differing from

other Catholic respondents. As a first look, these correlations portray a deep ethnic partisan chasm among Catholics.

The domestic status factors work mostly as expected. Interestingly, initial examination shows that the one distinctive Catholic age group in the ANES survey is the oldest, the Vatican II generation – who lean toward the Democrats on the party and Biden thermometers, but do not otherwise differ from other age groups. Southern Catholics are significantly more positive on all the GOP measures and slightly more negative toward the Democratic ones. Straight, male, married, and veteran Catholics give positive ratings to the GOP and are generally negative on the Democratic evaluations, although not always significantly so. Number of children under 18 works solidly against positive Democratic sentiments, but only modestly in favor of the GOP. And residents of larger communities favor the Democrats, but rate the GOP and Trump negatively. The classic Michigan scale tends overall to reflect the solid influence of all these factors, with the exception of number of children, which just misses significance.

Finally, employment of ANES religious measures bears fruit in the last section of the table. Traditionalist religious self-identification works solidly against positive Democratic evaluations and even more strongly in favor of Republican ones. And, although one should not make too much of this, traditionalists were even more negative about Joe Biden – a fellow observant Catholic – than they were about the Democratic Party, perhaps reflecting the well-publicized "wafer wars" involving pro-abortion rights Democrats. A similar pattern, but with more modest correlations, is seen in results for religiosity. Those who say religion is important in their lives and attend Mass regularly tend to give the Democrats negative ratings, and the Republicans more generous positive ones. A similar effect is seen for the "Bible" item. Although often seen as a "Protestant" measure of Christian orthodoxy, literalism is nevertheless associated with Catholic partisanship, especially on the "pro" Republican side. "Born-again" Catholics are a just little more likely than the non-born again to favor the Democratic Party and Joe Biden – a pattern quite different than that among Protestants.[37] The most powerful measures, however, are the post-election items tapping theological "culture wars": Catholics who feel warmly toward "Christian fundamentalists" and perceive discrimination against Christians downgrade the Democrats and approve the Republicans. Finally, the Michigan scale shows the solid influence of all the religious measures, except for born-again status, with the fundamentalist thermometer, perceptions of discrimination against Christians, and theological self-identification having the strongest relationships.

Thus, apart from the seeming anomaly of the born-again measure, the implications are clear. All the measures tapping religious "traditionalism" or "orthodoxy" (including the proxy of religiosity) are solidly associated with partisan assessments. Although not all are ideal conceptually or in measurement terms, their collective message is that religious restructuring within the American Church is a powerful shaper of partisan affect, joined by stark racial and ethnic divisions.

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[37]   The meaning of this unusual effect is unclear, as born-again status has the "normal" pro-Republican effect among Catholics in the larger CES sample analyzed below.

Table 2. Variance in Catholic Partisan Evaluations Explained by SES, Ethnicity, Domestic Status, and Religion (OLS regressions, Adj. R squared)

Model	Democratic Evaluations			Republican Evaluations			Party ID
	Party Warmth	Biden Warmth	Like Dems	Party Warmth	Trump Warmth	Like GOP	
SES	.016	.003	.001	.021	.010	.001	.013
Race and Ethnicity	.081	.046	.028	.050	.070	.046	.086
Domestic Status	.031	.035	.013	.031	.037	.015	.059
Religion (Pre-)	.025	.033	.026	.086	.071	.052	.049
Religion (All)	.102	.118	.091	.183	.174	.125	.142

Source: ANES 2020 (N=1537)

To gain some sense of the relative influence of each demographic category, we ran OLS regressions on the partisan measures, using the variables in each category in turn. (We ran two regressions for the religious variables: one using only the pre-election items, and another adding the post-election measures.) Table 2 reports the variance explained by each set of demographic factors for all seven partisan evaluations. As the earlier discussion hinted and Table 2 confirms, an "SES" model explains little variation on any measure of partisanship, doing best for both party thermometers and the "Michigan" scale. Ethnic and racial identities do considerably better, especially for the classic scale, and then the Democratic Party and Trump thermometers. The domestic factors do not match ethnicity in power, but far outperform socioeconomic status, explaining the Michigan scale best of all the partisan evaluations. Finally, the pre-election survey religious items are modest predictors of Democratic evaluations, but explain much more variance in the GOP measures than the three previous models. If we add the post-election fundamentalism and discrimination items, the model explains substantial variance on the Democratic scores and even more on the GOP evaluations – as well as on the classic Michigan scale.

For a comprehensive analysis of influences, Table 3 reports the results of OLS regressions for the seven measures, directly incorporating all the independent variables. Some demographic measures clearly have more direct impact than others. First, as the earlier analysis portended, socioeconomic status virtually disappears from the explanation: "New Deal" class-based party divisions are hard to see, leaving only traces which sometimes work in the *wrong* direction, such as the negative coefficients between both higher income and postgraduate education and the Republican Party thermometer (although, as noted earlier, these trends may well be a feature of new party alignments). Achievement of some college education seems to provide a fillip for favorable Trump evaluations, but *none* of the income and education items has a significant independent effect on the Michigan scale.[38]

Race and ethnicity are much more powerful, as minority Catholics line up with the Democrats and, of course, whites with the GOP. Indeed, even under controls the *beta* coefficients for "ethnic" groups are often comparable to the bivariate correlations in Table 1 – or actually a little enhanced. The historically minded would argue that the Democratic Party remains the home of "ethnics," – just a different set from the Europeans of the classic party machine era. Indeed, the electoral divisions be-

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[38] Analysis of non-Catholics shows a small but significant influence of higher income favoring the GOP.

tween Catholic Democrats and WASP Republicans – "ethnics" versus native "whites" – have come to structure partisan divisions *within* the Church.

Not surprisingly, most domestic status variables have some direct influence. The Vatican II age cohort is more Democratic (and younger Catholics more Republican), southerners are more Republican, as are male and heterosexual Catholics. Those with young children tend not to like the Democrats but living in a larger community has a mild pro-Democratic effect. And almost across the board, Catholic veterans dislike Democrats and favor the GOP.

Table 3. Socioeconomic, Ethnic, Domestic Status, and Religious Roots of American Catholic Partisanship (OLS regression betas)

	Democratic Partisanship			GOP Partisanship			Party ID
	Party Warmth	Biden Warmth	Like Democrats	GOP Warmth	Trump Warmth	Like GOP	(GOP high)
SES							
Income	-.004	-.005	-.008	-.058*	.017	.005	.010
Grade school only	.049	-.045	-.036	-.024	.033	-.015	-.040
High school grad	.057	.036	-.004	.042	.038	-.026	-.007
Some college	-.041	-.037	-.058	.050	.081**	.021	.032
College graduate [a]	---	---	---	---	---	---	
Postgrad Work	.017	.040	-.010	-.053*	-.029	.015	-.016
Race and Ethnicity							
White [a]	---	---	---	---	---	---	----
Hispanic	.290***	.236***	.176***	-.247***	-.263***	-.216***	-.289***
Black	.112***	.105***	.087***	-.098***	-.116***	-.101***	-.097***
Asian	.060**	.073**	.019	-.031	-.074***	-.016	-.051**
Other Non-white	.070**	.049*	.080***	-.040	-.043*	-.055*	-.065**
Domestic Status							
Vatican II and Pre	.105***	.118***	.038	-.132***	-.105***	-.077**	-.137***
South	-.049*	-.050*	-.030	.067**	.054*	.078***	.081***
Straight	-.076***	-.075***	-.052*	.083***	.053*	.029	.070***
Male	-.062**	-.035	-.019	.037	.059*	.047	.116***
Married	.046	.060*	.032	.041	.020	.031	.023
Number children	-.074**	-.080***	-.046	.014	.036	.034	.010
Size of place	.033	.063**	.051*	-.036	-.057*	.019	-.065**
Veteran	-.076**	-.070**	-.064**	.047*	.083***	.023	.064**
Religious Factors							
Traditionalist ID	-.061*	-.086***	-.034	.103***	.101***	.090***	.070**
High religiosity	-.002	.028	.062*	-.029	-.015	-.035	.003
Biblical authority	-.047	-.049	-.104***	.152***	.099***	.114***	.099***
Sectarianism	-.139***	-.188***	-.171***	.243***	.201***	.240***	.233***
See Discrimination	-.229***	-.191***	-.167***	.143***	.222***	.104***	.172***
Born again	.073**	.087***	.055*	-.061**	-.067**	-.024	-.095***
Adj. R squared=	***.227***	***.204***	***.131***	***.269***	***.273***	***.183***	***.279***

Source: ANES 2020 (N=1537)

*p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001

a Omitted reference categories

Finally, religion demonstrates significant power: traditionalist religious identification favors the Republicans, as does belief in biblical authority. The most powerful indicators, however, are from the "culture wars": sectarian approval and a sense of Christian discrimination militate against the Democrats and in favor of Republicans. Sectarian sentiments especially boost warmth toward the GOP, while perception of discrimination pumps up Trump's evaluations. Born-again status, however, once more characterizes Democratic Catholics, rather than Republicans. Note, however, that when theological belief and identification are in the picture, religiosity drops out. This confirms that survey researchers should do more to tap religious belief, rather than relying on church attendance or religious salience as proxies.

Each equation explains respectable amounts of variance, with the results strongest for the Michigan party identification scale (27.9 percent), followed closely by the "GOP" measures: Trump thermometer rating (27.3 percent) and GOP thermometer (26.9 percent). The results are somewhat weaker in explaining Democratic and Biden thermometers (22.7 and 20.4 percent, respectively) and the less extensive likes/dislikes measures (18.3 percent for the GOP and 13.1 percent for the Democrats).

To summarize the ANES results: among contemporary American Catholics, socioeconomic factors have very little influence over partisan affections, in either bivariate or multivariate analysis. Racial and ethnic identities are much better predictors of virtually all these measures. Domestic status, on the other hand, usually has the expected influences: elderly voters are on net somewhat more Democratic, while southerners, heterosexuals, men, rural residents, and veterans lean toward the GOP. Finally, theological divisions add a considerable amount to the explanation of Catholic partisanship: traditionalists (on all measures) are aligned with the GOP and progressives with the Democrats.

Catholic Party Identification: A Comparison and Robustness Check

Although the rich partisanship measures in ANES 2020 provide valuable insights into nuances in party evaluations, we want to validate and extend our findings by examining data from another major academic survey, the 2020 Cooperative Election Study (CES), which has a Catholic subsample of over 11,000. This not only permits comparison with the ANES, but also allows use of more detailed ethnicity measures, with larger numbers of non-white Catholics. At the same time, we show that the limited CES religious measures produce an underestimate of religious influences on Catholic partisanship.

We begin with the same analysis applied earlier to the ANES, matching as closely as possible the variables available in both studies. (We have divided the ANES "Hispanics" in Table 3 into Mexican, Puerto Rican and "Other" to match the CES cat-

egories.[39]) Table 4 compares results from three OLS regressions: one using the four sets of ANES variables, but restricted to the pre-election religious items; a second ANES analysis adding the two post-election religious items; and, the third replicating as far as possible this analysis in the CES. The table 4 reveals some familiar patterns and offers some cautionary notes, both about adequate specification of variables and about drawing conclusions from single surveys. The first column shows patterns quite familiar from our earlier look at the ANES: when everything is in the equation, socioeconomic status has virtually no independent influence on Catholic party identification, while race and ethnicity reveal a powerful white vs. minority division, and most domestic status variables operate in the expected directions, although married folks and those with minor children are not significantly more Republican. The religious effects are also familiar, with traditionalist identification, high religiosity, and belief in Biblical authority all producing more Republican identifiers. This regression explains almost one-fifth of the variance in party identification among Catholics.

If we use the additional post-election religious measures (the fundamentalist Christian thermometer and discrimination against Christians items), we improve the variance explained to well over one-quarter, a substantial boost.[40] Note that this addition has little effect on coefficients in the other three categories (sometimes actually increasing them), but reduces substantially that for traditionalist identification, trims that for biblical authority, and eliminates that for religiosity. Although we should be cautious in our interpretation, this suggests that all these items (except for born again status) do get at the conservative end of the religious restructuring continuum, even among Catholics. (And that religiosity is best thought of as an indirect proxy for theological orientation.)

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39   We might have included more detailed Latino "ethnicity" data in "race/ethnicity" category for both surveys, but some ANES items were still restricted at the time of writing and, in any event, with the exceptions of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, other ANES Latino subgroups would be quite small. The different way ethnicity questions were asked also makes it difficult to "line up" comparable categories. We use the more detailed CES ethnicity data later.

40   With this formulation, the four categories explain, respectively: SES, 1.3 percent; race and ethnicity, 8.6 percent; domestic status, 5.5 percent; and religion, 14.3 percent.

КАТОЛИЦИ И САВРЕМЕНА АМЕРИЧКА ПОЛИТИКА

Table 4. Comparative Analysis of the Socioeconomic, Ethnic, Domestic and Religious Roots of Catholic Party Identification: ANES 2020 and CES 2020 (OLS regression betas)

	ANES (Pre-) (N=1,699)	ANES (Post-) (N=1,537)	CES (N=11,696)
Socioeconomic Status			
Income	.010	.011	.063***
Grade school only	-.018	-.035	.038***
High school graduate	.000	-.005	.064***
Some college	.041	.033	.066***
College graduate [a]	---	---	---
Postgraduate work	-.033	-.016	-.071***
Race and Ethnicity			
Mexican heritage	-.272***	-.240***	-.188***
Puerto Rican heritage	-.087***	-.084***	-.126***
All Other Hispanic	-.181***	-.175***	-.102***
Black	-.118***	-.096***	-.189***
Asian	-.066**	-.051*	-.010
All Other Races	-.065**	-.064**	-.050***
White [a]	---	---	---
Domestic Status			
Vatican II/Pre-Vatican II	-.134***	-.140***	-.040***
South	.116***	.079***	.062***
Straight	.086***	.073***	.061***
Male	.098***	.115***	.071***
Married	.020	.023	.065***
Number of children	.033	.013	.003
Size of place	-.050*	-.063**	-.096***
Veteran	.074**	.065**	.041***
Religious Factors			
Traditionalist identifications	.144***	.073**	---
High religiosity	.068*	.005	.138***
Biblical Authority	.115***	.098***	---
Born again	-.051*	-.098***	.063***
Sectarianism	---	.221***	---
See Discrimination	---	.169***	---
R squared=	**.194**	**.276**	**.154**

Source: American National Election Study, 2020; Cooperative Election Study, 2020
*p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001
a Omitted reference category

The CES provides a much larger Catholic sample, more information on ethnicity, and some cautionary tales. First, in contrast to the ANES, the CES data suggest continued presence of class-based partisanship, if not entirely along classic lines. Higher incomes produce more GOP identifiers, but education has the new effects discovered by recent studies: those with less than a college education are moving in a Republican direction, while post-graduates are becoming significantly more Democratic. The race and ethnicity variables, on the other hand, work very much like those in the ANES models (first two columns), as do most domestic status items, with the exception of a considerably smaller age Vatican II cohort effect in favor of the Democrats and a solid and significant CES tendency for married persons to

move toward the GOP. But the CES religious measures have less explanatory power: religiosity has a solid coefficient, as expected, capturing a good bit of unmeasured theological "traditionalism," but "born-again" status works in the other direction from that in the ANES, producing a slight pro-Republican effect, more like its effect among Protestants. But the absence of other belief and identification measures means that the CES underestimates religious influences. This largely accounts for the reduced variance explained by the CES analysis – about 15 percent.

Thus, comparison of the ANES and CES produces several conclusions. First, given conflicting results on socioeconomic indicators, we must hold open the question of continuing social class influences on Catholic party identification. Second, the strong effects of the ANES religious measures suggest that surveys lacking belief measures are likely to underestimate religious influences. Finally, in many ways the two surveys produce comparable results, emphasizing the cleavages created by ethnicity and domestic status variables, especially gender and sexuality. These findings largely conform to our theoretical expectations.

Party Identification Among Catholics: Racial and Ethnic Groups

The power of the racial and ethnic factors in structuring American Catholic partisanship is certainly evident. But do the other influences we have analyzed work in the same fashion in these major Catholic "constituencies"? We extend the previous analysis first to the two major internal components of the contemporary Catholic electorate: white or "Anglo" Catholics and Latinos, both with large contingents in the CES sample, and then, more cautiously to Blacks, Asians and other racial groups, with smaller but not trivial numbers in the huge CES sample. Do socioeconomic, domestic and religious variables influence these Catholic constituencies in the same way? We examine the four groups on the three non-ethnic demographic categories, and also run a model adding country of origin to the Hispanic model.

Table 5. Comparative Analysis of the Socioeconomic, Domestic Status and Religious Roots of Catholic Party Identification by Racial/Ethnic Group (OLS betas)

	White (7410)	Hispanic (2935)	Hispanic + Ethnicity	Black (527)	Asian (437)	Other (386)
Socioeconomic Status						
Income	.049***	.123***	.111***	.132**	-.075	.079
Grade school only	.044***	.013	.020	.054	.154**	.020
High school graduate	.072***	.038	.042	.113*	.042	-.239***
Some college	.073***	.021	.023	.001	.117*	-.040
College graduate [a]	----	----	----	----	----	----
Postgraduate work	-.084***	-.029	-.034	-.110***	-.097*	-.069
Domestic Status						
Vatican II/Pre-Vatican II	-.024	-.078***	-.080***	-.123***	-.117*	-.018
South	.050***	.133***	.095***	-.021	.081	.068
Straight	.091***	.030	.033	.027	-.049	.062
Male	.079***	.087***	.095***	.035	.061	-.018
Married	.051***	.099***	.102***	-.055	.142**	.059
Number of children	.019	-.026	-.018	.044	.001	-.161***
Size of place	-.096***	-.063***	-.075***	-.117**	-.092*	-.228***
Veteran	.046***	-.006	.002	.086***	.002	.085
Religious Factors						
Religiosity	.162***	.102***	.106***	-.069	.137***	.216***
Born again	.074***	.030	.033	.117**	.060	.120*
Hispanic Ethnicity						
Puerto Rican	----	----	-.078***	----	----	----
Mexican	----	----	-.053**	----	----	----
Central American	----	----	.020	----	----	----
U.S. Born	----	----	.072***	----	----	----
Cuban	----	----	.161***	----	----	----
Others [a]	----	----	----	----	----	----
Adj. R squared=	***.100***	***.076***	***.113***	***.077***	***.111***	***.212***

Source: Cooperative Election Study, 2020
*p<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001
a Omitted reference category

As an examination shows, many variables operate in somewhat different fashion among racial groups. As in Table 4, higher income produces movement toward the GOP, but this "social class" influence is strongest among Latinos and blacks, much weaker among whites, and close to significantly negative among Asians. On the other hand, the "novel" effects of education are consistently significant only among whites, with those lacking a college education more Republican, and postgraduates more Democratic. The oldest age cohort (the Vatican II generation) is significantly more Democratic only among Latino, black and Asian Catholics, not white Catholics. Southern residence moves all groups except black Catholics toward the GOP, although the effect is not significant among Asians and other race Catholics. While men, married folks and rural dwellers are more Republican in most groups, sexu-

al identity influences only whites. Finally, religiosity has a stronger pro-Republican influence among whites, Asians and other races – but the effect is present among Latinos as well (no doubt giving hope to Republicans and discomfiting Democrats). On the other hand, religiosity nudges black Catholics toward the Democrats (the coefficient just misses significance). In this and some other ways, the black Catholic partisan profile is distinct from those of other Catholic groups.

What about the effects of national origin among Hispanics? As many observers have noted, American Hispanics are a diverse group, coming from many national backgrounds, with varied histories in this country. The third model in Table 5 incorporates country of ancestry in the model for Latinos. This procedure has very little impact on the coefficients seen in Model 2, but substantially bolsters the variance explained. With everything in the equation, Puerto Ricans are most inclined toward the Democrats, followed by Mexican-Americans. On the other side, Latinos born in the US have a significant Republican slant and Cuban-Americans an even stronger one. Central Americans do not differ much from the "miscellaneous Latinos" omitted reference group (or from the entire Latino subsample, for that matter). All this confirms considerable partisan diversity among Latino communities, despite overall Democratic propensities. The weaker Democratic ties of native-born American Hispanics especially threaten the party's hopes of political hegemony based on the "coalition of the ascendant" social groups, depending on the Democrats' ability to capture the votes of ethnic minorities.[41]

Partisanship in the Voting Booth: 2020 Presidential Choices

Our last task is to consider the influence of demography on the paradigmatic partisan choice, the vote for president. Table 6 reports the results of two logistic regressions (in the ANES and CES) on the presidential choice among Catholics. Again, we have matched variables from the two surveys as closely as possible. Although the analyses reveal some common features, we find some of the same differences seen earlier. First, the impact of SES measures is much clearer in the CES, where higher income produces a higher Republican vote, as do levels of education below college graduation, with postgraduate work leading in the other direction. The ANES shows only traces of these relationships. Nevertheless, as the summaries for variance explained at bottom show, SES measures in both surveys improve prediction only marginally beyond one based simply on the distribution of the vote.

Partisan divisions created by race and ethnicity are also evident in the presidential vote, with Latino, black and Asian Catholics more likely than their white brethren to cast Democratic ballots. In both surveys, ethnicity does a much better job in

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41   John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira, *The Emerging Democratic Majority*, Scribner, New York, 2002.

predicting the vote than SES variables do. And the domestic status variables almost match ethnicity in predictive power, and line up quite well across the surveys, with southerners, straights, men and married folks as well as rural Catholics favoring the GOP, although some coefficients in the smaller ANES subsample miss statistical significance. And Catholic veterans clearly favored Trump.

The ANES' major strength appears in its richer assessment of religious influences. Even with the relatively small sample and everything else in the equation, the religious variables remain statistically significant, with the Bible item just missing. As is often the case when religious beliefs are well-measured, religiosity here "flips signs" from the bivariate relationship and favors Biden, while born-again status also becomes a much stronger predictor of a Democratic vote. In the CES, on the other hand, religiosity is conducive to a Trump vote, presumably reflecting unmeasured effects of traditionalism. Also in contrast to the ANES, born-again status favors a Republican vote, suggesting that the pro-Democratic effect in the ANES is partly a residual one, apparent primarily when other measures of traditionalism are in the analysis. In any case, ANES religious variables alone predict 72 percent of the vote correctly, compared with only 57 percent for the two CES measures. The better ANES measurement of religion is a major source of its stronger performance accounting for electoral partisanship.

Table 6. SES, Ethnic, Domestic and Religious Influences on the Catholic Trump Vote, 2020 (Logistic regression analysis)

	ANES (*N=1125*)			CES (*N=9399*)		
	B	S.E.	Odds Ratio	B	S.E.	Odds Ratio
SES						
Income	-.010	.015	.990	.046***	.009	1.047
Grade School	-.176	.390	.839	.220	.128	1.246
High School	.136	.238	1.145	.385***	.072	1.469
Some college	.417*	.205	1.517	.406***	.070	1.501
Grad school	-.163	.253	.849	-.449***	.084	.638
Race/Ethnicity						
Hispanic	-2.154***	.239	.116	-1.248***	.065	.287
Black	-2.076***	.565	.125	-2.245***	.151	.106
Asian	-1.449**	.540	.235	-.778***	.146	.459
All other races	-1.068*	.485	.344	-.237	.147	.789
White [a]	---	---	---	---	---	---
Domestic Status						
Vatican II/Pre-	-.484*	.194	.616	.100	.059	1.105
South	.434*	.185	1.543	.451***	.054	1.570
Straight	1.129*	.491	3.092	.749***	.095	2.115
Male	.130	.162	1.139	.448***	.053	1.565
Married	.098	.187	1.103	.302***	.058	1.352
Number children	.149*	.076	1.161	.030*	.032	1.072
Size of place	-.167*	.083	.846	-.228***	.026	1.255
Veteran	.816**	.278	2.261	.392***	.085	1.479
Religion						
Traditional IDs	.337***	.088	1.401	---	---	---
High Religiosity	-.233*	.113	.792	.145***	.058	1.561
Biblical authority	.176	.110	1.193	---	---	---
Born again	-.821**	.289	.440	.366***	.075	1.442
Sectarian	.034***	.004	1.035	---	---	---
See Discrimination	.812***	.087	2.252	---	---	---
Constant	-4.397	.689	.012	-2.113	.124	.121
Nagelkerke R=²		**.464**			**.236**	
Correctly Predicted						
Model 1 SES	57.5			56.1		
Model 2 Race	60.3			61.9		
Model 3 Status	58.3			61.3		
Model 4 Religion	72.0			56.7		
All Variables	**77.9**			**68.4**		

a Omitted reference category

Of course, voting models in the "Michigan" tradition must always incorporate party identification – V.O. Key's famous "standing decision" – as an important influence. When we add party identification to the analysis, we obviously boost the predictive power of each model to over 90 percent, but find that many demographic

traits remain significant. Even in the smaller ANES sample, virtually all the ethnic and religious variables remain significant direct predictors, while both socioeconomic and domestic traits drop out, seemingly absorbed by party identification. In the much larger CES sample, the two religious measures also retain very solid influences, as do the ethnicity variables, but they are joined by most domestic variables in predicting partisan electoral choice. Only income washes out, seemingly absorbed by partisanship, while educational effects are more marginal, though working in the expected directions (data not shown).

Summary and Conclusions

We have examined the many divisions among Catholics which have produced the sharp partisan divisions in this large religious community. There is some tantalizing evidence that traditional social class factors are no longer the primary determinants of Catholic party choices, but have been superseded by ethnic, domestic status and religious cleavages. Of course, that assessment depends in part on the data sources considered: ANES Catholics appear less likely to ground their partisanship in their socioeconomic status, at least in comparison with those surveyed by the CES. In a different vein, the greater power of religious factors in the ANES is easier to explain: it has more measures tapping religious belief, the driving force behind the "culture wars" affecting Catholics and other religious communities. The CES lacks such items.

We have also seen that different communities of Catholics connect their own life positions to partisanship in varying proportions: even in the CES, income is a much more important predictor of partisanship among Latinos than it is among Anglos. For the latter, religious belief is a bigger factor, along with some domestic status variables, although there are signs that religion matters for Latinos as well. And we have confirmed that Latino partisanship is not uniform, but varies with many other factors, including national origin, age, religiosity and region – a good reason for the recent soul-searching by Democratic strategists worried about the GOP's stronger showing among Latinos in 2020.[42]

A fuller understanding of Catholic partisanship will require several kinds of future research. First, we still need to address the old question asked primarily by Catholic thinkers but also by other scholars: is there a distinct "Catholic" component to partisanship? Or is Catholic partisanship simply an artifact of all the influences affecting Americans generally? That is a big question and one that is hard to get at, but we have seen here that there is some evidence that SES factors may not influence white Catholics in the same way as those in other religious traditions. Is there a "Catholic perspective" that modifies the operation of these other factors? Perhaps. But if we rerun the equations for party identification and presidential vote reported for the ANES in Tables 5 and 6 for the full sample with dummy variables

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[42]   Ruy Teixeira, *The Democrats' Hispanic Voter Problem*…

for "Catholic," "Evangelical Protestant," "Mainline Protestant," and "Jewish," only the coefficients for "Evangelical Protestant" (a very substantial one at that) and "Jewish" remain, while those for Catholics and Mainliners drop out. This strongly suggests that simple *membership* in the latter two traditions does not add to the explanatory power of other social, demographic, personal and religious variables in predicting partisan choices. The story is a little different in the CES: although "Evangelical" and "Jewish" affiliations still produce greater GOP and Democratic choices respectively, net of all other influences, Mainline membership also has a substantial net Democratic effect.[43] But again, even in this huge sample, the "Catholic" coefficient is not significant. Perhaps Dionne's famous quip needs modification: "there are many kinds of Catholic votes and they are all important."

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[43]   In comparison with the ANES results, this probably reflects the CES's absence of belief measures and the predominant liberalism of Mainline Protestant denominations.

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Томас Фајнголд, Џејмс Л. Гут

ПАРТИЈСКО ОПРЕДЕЉЕЊЕ КАТОЛИКА НА ИЗБОРИМА 2020.: ДЕМОГРАФСКИ И КУЛТУРОЛОШКИ РАСЦЕПИ

Сажетак

Католици су дуго били важна сила у америчкој политици, али њихов утицај је променио у последњим неколико декада. Некада основа коалиције Нови договор, ова заједница је променила своју лојалност Демократама за виртуелни еквилибријум – у ком белци католици нагињу према Републиканској партији, док латиноси и остале етничке групе католика нагињу према Демократама. У овом раду ми истражујемо демографску структуру католичке партијске идентификације и тестирамо четири перспективе које су развили Shafer и Spady. Ове перспективе дају посебан фокус на: (1) друштвену класу и образовање, (2) расне и етничке разлике, (3) „домаће улоге", као што су род, сексуалност, структура породице, место живота, и (4) верски расцепи. Наш закључак је да етничке разлике битно доприносе савременој партијској идентификацији католика, али и да су социо-економски утицају значајно нестали. Верски фактори, нарочито теолошки погледи, постали су много истакнутији. Поред тога, открили смо да је социо-економски статус много утицајнији за латиносе, док је религија битнија за беле католике. На крају, показујемо и да резултати зависе и од тога које се истраживање користи, и које мере.

Кључне речи: партијска идентификација, католици, етницитет, социо-економски статус, религиозност