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Original scientific paper
<https://doi.org/10.54561/prj1602179h>
Date received: December 29, 2020
Date accepted: September 15, 2021

THE COMPATIBILITY OF ISLAM AND PANCASILA IN INDONESIA'S DECLINING DEMOCRACY

Abstract

The article addresses ambiguous politics-religion relations within resilient democratization. It specifically examines the relations between Islam and Pancasila as the nation's civil religion in the transitioning Indonesian democratic reform from both philosophical and actor-centered viewpoints of the changing government-society relations. The foci are twofold: first, the extent to which the national civil religion Pancasila retakes place in Indonesian political transition; and second, in what sense and in which ways religious movements might correspond to the national civil religion Pancasila in contemporary Indonesia's democracy. It suggests that establishing Pancasila as a formal ideology imposed by anyone currently holding power may provoke risks of Indonesia's democratization back to autocratization. While maintaining Pancasila as an open ideology is necessary to prevent that risk, openness in a political transition may also attract various interests. The recent decline of Indonesia's democracy also prompts the necessity of constructive roles of civil society organizations in supporting resilient democratization in the country. Political turbulence that threatens democratization in Indonesia requires the independence of the established Muslim community organizations to build constructive power relations against but not be captured by the political regime.

Keywords: Civil Religion, Declining Democracy, Political Islam, Religious Movements, Political Ideology

Introduction

Both in secular and religious societies, discourses of politics and religions tend to posit them within a continuum rather than a dichotomy.² The continuum is also

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- 2 Avi Astor and Maryl Damon, *Culturalized Religion: A Synthetic Review and Agenda for Research*, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 59, No. 2, 2020, pp. 209-226; Samantha May, Erin K. Wilson, Claudia Baumgart-Ochse, and Faiz Sheikh, *The Religious as Political and the Political as Religious: Globalization, Post-Secularism and the Shifting Boundaries of the Sacred*, *Politics, Religion & Ideology*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2014, pp. 331-346; Eyal Lewin and Etta Bick, "Introduction: Civil Religion and Nationalism on a Godly-Civil Continuum", in: *Comparative Perspectives on Civil Religion, Nationalism, and Political Influence*, Eyal Lewin, Etta Bick, and Dan Naor (eds.), *Advances in Religious and Cultural Studies (ARCS)*, Information Science Reference (IGI Global), Hershey, 2017, pp. 1-31.

the case of even secular societies holding certain civil religions and reflecting values and norms shared under spirits of nationalism. While the concept gets derived from Rousseau's social contract,³ its articulation in US political history replaces the conceptual deficit of nationalism featured by predominantly utilitarian values within its history instead of the sacred religious ones.⁴ The articulation is the true deterioration of civil religion conceptualized by Bellah⁵ that the agreed and shared values by the people might be well institutionalized along with religious ones. Nonetheless, recent discourses across countries, such as those in Europe, focus more on linkages between nation and religion, whereby its reinforced linkage might heighten the salience of culturally religious identities.⁶ Such a salience is also related to politics-religion relations. The latter has become a political modality and national identity, although bringing religious symbols and norms in the secular public sphere remains controversial in the US and European countries.⁷ Therefore, such a position has not necessarily made other framing identification of religions based on cultural heritage,⁸ ethnicity,⁹ or patrimonialism¹⁰ obsolete. Do these discourses reaffirm Danielson's¹¹ argument that posits civil religion as a living myth in our political realms?

The discourses mentioned above are insufficient to explain the politics-religion relations in developing countries experiencing fluctuate political transitions. Bsoul¹² and Ciftci¹³ address Dobbelaere's concern mentioned earlier on the role of civil religion in the integration of society by examining premises of various Islamic teachings that underpin senses and ways provided in the religion's values and norms to consolidate the society in modern nation-state systems. The Islamic belief system manifested in communities' identities and behaviors have gone to the fore of the public sphere against which other religions-practicing communities show

- 3 Jean Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right*, Translation: Cole G.D.H., 1762, available at: https://www.ucc.ie/archive/hdsp/Rousseau_contrat-social.pdf (accessed November 20, 2020).
- 4 Karel Dobbelaere, Civil Religion, and the Integration of Society: A Theoretical Reflection and an Application, *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2/3, 1986, p. 132.
- 5 Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, *Dædalus, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, Vol. 96, No. 1, 1967, pp. 1-21.
- 6 Avi Astor and Damon Maryl, Culturalized Religion: A Synthetic Review and Agenda for Research. . . pp. 220-222; Brent F. Nelsen, James L. Guth, and Brian Highsmith, Does Religion Still Matter? Religion and Public Attitudes toward Integration in Europe, *Politics and Religion*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2010, pp. 18-19.
- 7 Randolph T. Beard, Robert B. Ekelund, George S. Ford, Ben Gaskins, and Robert D. Tollison, Secularism, Religion, and Political Choice in the United States, *Politics and Religion*, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2013, pp. 753-777; Egbert Ribberink, Peter Achterberg, and Dick Houtman, Deprivatization of Disbelief?: Non-Religiosity and Anti-Religiosity in 14 Western European Countries, *Politics and Religion*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2013, pp. 101-120.
- 8 Marian Burchardt, *Regulating Difference: Religious Diversity and Nationhood in the Secular West*, New Rutgers University Press, Brunswick, 2020, p. 3.
- 9 Daniela Hervieu Léger, "The Role of Religion in Establishing Social Cohesion", in: *Religion in the New Europe*, Krzysztof Michalski (ed.), Central European University Press, Budapest, 2006, pp. 45-63.
- 10 Alan Aldridge, "The Sovereign Consumer? Religious Allegiance and Disaffiliation in a Detraditionalised World", in: *Joining and Leaving Religion: Research Perspectives*, Leslie J. Francis and Yaacov J. Katz (eds.), Redwood Books, Trowbridge, 2000, pp. 9-19.
- 11 Leilah Danielson, Civil Religion as Myth, Not History, *Religions*, Vol. 10, No. 6 (374), 2019, pp. 6-7.
- 12 Labeeb A. Bsoul, The Islamic Episteme of Politics Development in International Affairs, *Politics and Religion Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2020, pp. 447-449.
- 13 Sabri Ciftci, Islam, Social Justice, and Democracy, *Politics and Religion*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2019, pp. 553.

their anti-sentiments.¹⁴ Gu and Bomhoff's¹⁵ examination further explains this matter in contexts of nation-building progress and demographic profiles. They suggest that supports for democracy have a consistently positive attachment to Catholic-majority countries to a collection of more implicitly tolerant civil values. At the same time, the reverse is found in Muslim-majority countries. Omelicheva and Ahmed¹⁶ suggest contrary findings that the underpinning secular values trigger citizens for more active public participation in democratizing countries while religions deter it.

The article seeks to address these ambiguous circumstances of politics-religion relations by putting it into a democratizing Muslim-majority country that has attempted resilient democratization and attempted to finding the fittest civil religion based on national consensus. To make it manageable, we examine Indonesia that represents that profile.

Despite its Muslim-majority in demographic figures, Indonesian founding fathers have chosen to not be a country constitutionally based on Islamic teaching. The teaching that any supposedly freed human being from overpowered by other people has triggered Indonesian nationalism in Indonesia's early state formation to get back its independence from colonial powers. Nationalism had been the center of institutionalization of state-building in the aftermath of colonialization. The process has coincided with efforts of integrating various societal groups within the society by establishing a consensus upon an agreed national consensus comprising the shared political values across the population: *Pancasila* or literally interpreted from Sanskrit as the *five moral principles*.

The ontological foundation of Pancasila was agreed throughout simultaneous discourse shortly in a couple of months until the nation proclaimed its independence and established a solid constitution two days in a row: 17-18 August 1945. The five moral principles composing Pancasila are:

1. The belief in the Only Almighty God;
2. A just and civilized humanity;
3. The unity of Indonesia;
4. A democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity resulting from deliberations among representatives, and
5. social justice for the whole Indonesian people. Humanitarianism, equality, and deliberation are among cosmopolitan-oriented core national philosophies contained therein.

14 Allyson F. Shortle and Ronald Keith Gaddie, Religious Nationalism and Perceptions of Muslims and Islam, *Politics and Religion*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2015, pp. 435-457.

15 Man-Li Gu and Eduard J. Bomhoff, Religion and Support for Democracy: A Comparative Study for Catholic and Muslim Countries, *Politics and Religion*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2012, pp. 308-310.

16 Mariya Y. Omelicheva and Ranya Ahmed, Religion and Politics: Examining the Impact of Faith on Political Participation, *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2018, p. 5.

These are also the very core of Islamic teachings, ranged from *Tauheed* or oneness of the Almighty God to humanity and social justice. As abundant literature puts it,¹⁷ despite its universal nature, Pancasila has been inhibited by Islamic moral values promoted by Muslim founding fathers along with their non-Muslim colleagues from the very beginning of its ideation. Therefore, Pancasila has become a national civil religion that stands above all heterogeneous features of Indonesian nation while being inspired by traditional religion as the moral guidance.

Meanwhile, Indonesian society has recently returned to being nationalistic amidst a solid direction to cosmopolitan-oriented reform and development.¹⁸ Against the trend of preferences towards Pancasila, the said nationalistic tendencies seems to be diametral confront with those practicing Moslems perceiving Islam as the way of life. The former campaign for making Pancasila as the single formal ideology, as previously took into effect by the New Order Regime, while the latter have committed counter narratives against it. The circumstances ignite further autocriticism to the extent to which Islam and Pancasila are not compatible with each other.

The article seeks to examine the relations between Islam and the national civil religion Pancasila in the transitioning Indonesian democratic reform from both philosophical and actor-centered viewpoints of the changing government-society relations. Not only does the analysis start unpacking the substantive philosophical elements within Pancasila, but it also provides actor-centered explanations rather than normative Islamic doctrines. Therefore, the foci are twofold: first, the extent to which the national civil religion Pancasila can be repositioned in the political transition of Indonesia; and second, in what sense and in which ways religious movements, specifically Muslim community organizations, correspond to the national civil religion Pancasila in the contemporary democratic reform in Indonesia.

Following this Introduction, we assess the extent to which political ideology might determine Indonesian political realms and the position of Pancasila in this circumstance. A better counter-narrative against our examination of Pancasila's position is to redefine it to fit a contextual notion within the transitioning political transition in Indonesia. We subsequently examine ways that some Muslim community organizations deal with the debatable position of the national civil religion Pancasila. We complete the article with concluding remarks.

17 See, for instance: Shofwan A. B. Choiruzzad, To Build the World Anew: Decolonization and Cold War in Indonesia, *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2020; Nur M. Ichwan, Secularism, Islam, and Pancasila: Political Debates on the Basis of the State in Indonesia, *Bulletin of the Nanzan Center for Asia-Pacific Studies*, No. 6, June 2011; M.K.Ridwan, Penafsiran Pancasila dalam Perspektif Islam: Peta Konsep Integrasi, *Dialogia*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2017, pp. 203-224; Leo Suryadinata, *Pancasila and the Challenge of Political Islam*, ISEAS Publishing, Singapore, 2018; Hamdan Zoelva, Islam Relasi, Negara, dan Pancasila dalam Perspektif Tata Hukum Indonesia, *De Jure: Jurnal Hukum dan Syariah*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2012.

18 Defny Holidin, "Perkembangan Aktual Reformasi Birokrasi di Indonesia", in: *Reformasi Birokrasi dalam Transisi*, Defny Holidin, Desy Hariyati, and Eka Sri Sunarti (eds.), 2nd Edition, Prenada Media Group, Jakarta, 2017. p. 21.

Indonesia's Democracy Decline

Once renowned for its promising democracy in the recent two decades, Indonesia has brought democracy back in the government system since 1998 after the downfall of Soeharto's 32-year-old authoritarian dictatorship, known as the New Order. To conform with the global agenda of democratization, the Indonesian constitutional amendment primarily reshapes the balance of power between the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary.¹⁹ Nonetheless, various studies and methods indicate Indonesia's backsliding democracy amidst being stuck in authoritarianism.²⁰ While we come to the remembrance of the Old Order and the New Order regimes, the contemporary reform period remains closely associated with its authoritarian features. In subsequent transitions to democracy after the 1998 reform movement, the New Order's long-standing patronage structure and implications have been consistently apparent.²¹

Departed from problematic democratization in Indonesia, a question raises again about Pancasila's determination as a guiding principle political ideology on the reforming Indonesia in the aftermath of the New Order Regime dismantlement in 1998. Mietzner indicates that Indonesian democracy has displayed signs of regression since the second phase of the Yudhoyono government (2009-2014).²² However, along with this slowdown, the Bertelsmann Transition Index assessed certain factors that made substantial progress in 2006-2014.²³ They refer to the unity and the stabilization of the institutions of government.

However, the status of Indonesia's democracy has subsequently decreased by 6.5 over the last five years and continues its trend so forth. To make it precise, under the current Jokowi Administration (2014-2019 & 2019 to date), the executive has begun to consolidate power under its feet while also weakening the legislative control system, especially following the rise in electoral and parliamentary thresholds.²⁴ In this regard, Aspinall et al.²⁵ and Pepinsky²⁶ agree on voters' dealignment from contesting political parties amidst the rising identity politics in the light of growing nationalism-looking reform policies. Meanwhile, Warburton disagrees and claims

19 Eko Prasajo, *Reformasi Kedua: Melanjutkan Estafet Reformasi*, Penerbit Salemba, Jakarta, 2009, p. 18.

20 See, for instance: "Democracy Facing Global Challenges. V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy)", V-Dem Institute Annual Democracy Report, Gothenburg, 2019; "Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2020 Country Report: Indonesia", Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh, 2020.

21 Alexander Arifianto, What the 2019 Election Says about Indonesian Democracy, *Asia Policy*, Vol. 46, No. 4, 2019, pp. 46-53.

22 Marcus Mietzner, "Indonesia: Democratic Consolidation and Stagnation under Yudhoyono, 2004-2014", in: *Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Democratization*, William Case (ed.), Routledge, 2015, p. 373.

23 "Bertelsmann Transformation Atlas: Indonesia 2018 compared to 2014", Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh, 2018. Available at: <http://atlas.bti-project.org/share.php> (accessed November 21, 2020).

24 Marcus Mietzner, Authoritarian Innovations in Indonesia: Electoral Narrowing, Identity Politics and Executive Illiberalism, *Democratization*, Vol. 27, No. 6, 2020, pp. 1021-1036; Thomas P. Power, Jokowi's Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia's Democratic Decline, *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, Vol. 54, No. 3, 2018, p. 335.

25 Edward Aspinall, Diego Fossati, Burhanuddin Muhtadi, and Eve Warburton, Elites, Masses, And Democratic Decline in Indonesia, *Democratization*, Vol. 27, No. 4, 2019, pp. 505-526.

26 Tom Pepinsky, Islam and Indonesia's 2019 Presidential Election, *Asia Policy*, Vol. 46, No. 4, 2019, pp. 58-59.

that the pragmatic mechanisms are entangled with politics over religious ideology and partisan division, leading Indonesian democracy to receive double challenges.²⁷

The decline of Indonesia's democracy and the strengthening of political oligarchy are not merely symptoms of being exclusively Indonesian. This is an international trend in line with the development of populist politics that has even infected countries that are champions of secular liberal democracies. Regionally, Southeast Asia also has the seeds of historical traces that persistently support the seeding of authoritarian rule.²⁸ In addition, Southeast Asian countries have a genetic heritage of development-oriented politics, especially since they imitated the developmentalism of East Asia like Japan and Korea. However, it failed and fell into the Asian financial crisis in 1997.²⁹ However, especially for Indonesia, there is a pattern of repetition of poor democratization of political regimes that lead to autocratization, especially in the last five years of Joko Widodo's administration.³⁰ Interestingly, we found that features and patterns of political regimes from the Old Order to New Order eras thoroughly combine at the time of the reign of President Joko Widodo.

Furthermore, whenever Indonesia marks signs of underperformance of democratization, public sector reform, and development, some society organizations always flag alternate exit strategies based on values and norms from other political ideologies. Besides institutionalized neoliberal values entrenched in some parts of the amended version of the 1945 Constitution, some Muslim community organizations campaign for going back to the Quran and the Sunna—two legal sources in the Islamic doctrine. Other groups would disagree with this. Besides politics, there are other cleavages, and indifferent respects, political partisanship, and electoral rivalry have underpinned developments. In the big picture, the phenomena of the campaigns of Islamic teaching into the public sphere indicates that recent politics focused on religious and ethnic cleavages, once deeply institutionalized by the authoritarian regime, are on the rise, especially in the political discussions about the ideological basis of the state.³¹ This stage marks a turning point from which voters align their electoral behaviors with the political party identities and rational politics played by the elite between the 1998 reform movement and the first direct presidential election.³²

27 Eve Warburton, "Polarization in Indonesia: What if perception is reality?", *New Mandala*, April 16, 2019. Available at: <https://www.newmandala.org/how-polarised-is-indonesia> (accessed November 21, 2020).

28 Simon Springer, *Renewed Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia: Undermining Democracy through Neoliberal Reform*, *Asia Pacific Viewpoint*, Vol. 50, No. 3, 2009, pp. 271-276.

29 Hal Hill, *The Political Economy of Policy Reform: Insights from Southeast Asia*, *Asian Development Review*, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2013, pp. 108-130; "The Second East Asian Miracle?: Political Economy of Asian Responses to the 1997/98 and 2008/09 Crises", JICA Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development. Available at: https://www.jica.go.jp/jica-ri/research/growth/growth_20090101-20140331.html (accessed November 22, 2020).

30 Marcus Mietzner, *Authoritarian Innovations in Indonesia: Electoral Narrowing, Identity Politics and Executive Illiberalism*. . .

31 Shofwan A. B. Choiruzzad, *To Build the World Anew: Decolonization and Cold War in Indonesia*. . . p. 228; Nur M. Ichwan, *Secularism, Islam, and Pancasila: Political Debates on the Basis of the State in Indonesia*. . .

32 Saiful Mujani and William Liddle R., *Personalities, Parties, and Voters: Indonesia*, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2010, pp. 47-48.

Political-ideological Determinations in the Crisis of Democracy

The phenomenon of turning aside political actors, both at the elite and mass levels, from democratic values and norms shows a severe crisis. This crisis contradicts the efforts to consolidate democracy as initiated by Diamond,³³ that the people believe that democracy is the value, norm, and the best institution, even the only one, in the multidimensional life of the citizens. It is challenging enough to find out that the decline of democracy in today's Indonesia has characterized illiberal features and has also obtained normative justification from democratic values towards authoritarianism. It is no doubt that many observers pinned this trend with various trends, ranging from democratic decline,³⁴ competing populisms,³⁵ authoritarian turn,³⁶ to authoritarian innovation.³⁷

The democratic crisis, if we refer to the theory proposed by Schmidt and Kleinfeld,³⁸ is more of a failure of all elements of society to adapt themselves to the demands of change that have emerged. Historically, Indonesian society has experienced phases of socio-economic-political changes, neither easy nor cheap. All has changed very rapidly, from the proclaiming of *Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia* (NKRI, the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia) to the experimenting of *Republik Indonesia Serikat* (RIS, the Federal Republic of Indonesia), from the democratic government to the return of political brokers undertaking unsustainable ventures on the construction of physical infrastructure. The ongoing socio-economic-political changes have become the antithesis of the previous ones. A typical presidential candidate who is currently elected has the type of leadership and policy line 180 degrees opposite from the previous president. The public sector reform since 1998 has shown drastic leaps of change without an adequate learning experience, both for the community and the government.³⁹ Holidin et al.⁴⁰ specifically argue that the public sector reform had been more reactionary to the demands of the elite and the masses for the first five years but then had undergone uncoordinated trial-and-error processes for the next seven years. After a decade, Indonesia had a reliable strategic direction under the grand design of national bureaucracy reform. Even now, the latter still requires revision and actualization, which is not simple.

33 Larry J. Diamond, *Developing Democracy toward Consolidation*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1999, p. 64.

34 Edward Aspinall, Diego Fossati, Burhanuddin Muhtadi, and Eve Warburton, Elites, Masses, And Democratic Decline in Indonesia. . .

35 Vedi Hadiz and Richard Robinson, Competing Populisms in Post-authoritarian Indonesia, *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2017, pp. 426-440.

36 Thomas P. Power, Jokowi's Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia's Democratic Decline. . .

37 Marcus Mietzner, Authoritarian Innovations in Indonesia: Electoral Narrowing, Identity Politics and Executive Illiberalism. . .

38 *The Crisis of Democracy? Chances, Risks, and Challenges in Japan (Asia) and Germany (Europe)*, Carmen Schmidt and Ralf Kleinfeld (eds.), Cambridge Scholars Publishing, New Castle upon Tyne, 2020, p. 10.

39 Eko Prasajo and Defny Holidin, "Leadership and Management Development: The Indonesian Experience", in: *Knowledge Creation in Public Administrations: Innovative Governments in Southeast Asia and Japan*, Ayano Hirose-Nishihara, Masaei Matsunaga, Ikujiro Nonaka, and Kiyotaka Yokomichi (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, pp. 237-256.

40 Defny Holidin, Desy Hariyati, and Eka Sri Sunarti, *Reformasi Birokrasi dalam Transisi*, 2nd Edition, Prenada Media Group, Jakarta, 2017, p. 76.

Against that empirical background of contemporary political transition in Indonesia, as a dialectical philosophical view, Pancasila is rather pragmatic than a suited political ideology. We can posit at least two pieces of evidence to prove this remark: first, they are normative attribution in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, including strategic direction of public management reform; and second, the voters' electoral behavior in the aftermath of the New Order Regime dismantlement.

As for the first evidence, the vision of Pancasila, as explicitly articulated in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution, endeavors sufficient attainment of subsistent and primary attainment of public prosperity. It gets involved in maintaining global security order for the sake of the people across the world. The fourth article of the Preamble literally outlines the vision to form an Indonesian government that protects the entire Indonesian nation and all the Indonesian blood, promotes public prosperity, educates the nation's wellbeing, and participates in implementing a world order based on independence, peace, and social justice. Indonesian national independence was promulgated and structurally manifested in the chosen form of the Republic of Indonesia, which has the sovereignty of the people. This sovereignty is an issue of equal access to the public resources both administratively and politically. The state bears an obligation to prioritize the budget to realize this vision. The key herein is public resources managed in just ways to increase people's well-being in various aspects.

Nevertheless, all these terms lack the explicit ideological determination for Pancasila. To achieve this vision, the public resource governance is considered as a way for both production and provision of goods and services in a capitalist society. However, the 1945 Constitution prevents it. The Constitution attributes the state control over the public, or at least common resources, which the government perceives as necessary for the general public. This attribution remains therein regardless of the forms of the state control in the form of ownership or merely managerial in the terminology of recent governance paradigm, as Indonesia has adopted a neoliberal approach to governance reform.

As for the second evidence, we have found out pragmatic behavior of voters in the aftermath of the downfall of Soeharto's authoritarian regime. Starting from 1999 with the second democratic election after the 1955 election, numerous parties emerged. The multiparty system in elections without a restricted threshold allowed a segment of a political entity that represented a specific social division to have a wide variety of political parties. The existing social division is a crucial challenge to the stability of the Indonesian party system, which was forcefully simplified during the previous Soeharto era and signified a continuous change in political cleavages. While this phenomenon is still aggravated by the behavior of some voters whom the elite with money politics can still drive, we can interpret it as a way for voters to find out an appropriate democratic format and typically perceived capable elites representing their political interests. This behavior is considered by Mujani and

Liddle⁴¹ as a shift in the tendency of voters from initially associating themselves with religious, ethnic, and similar identities; then, switching to associations based on modern organizations, e.g., civil society organizations and political parties, and providing political supports to those who can show political performance better than before.

Even so, from Choiruzzad⁴² and Shambi,⁴³ we can agree that recent political developments have returned the political constellation to a social division based on religious identity even though ethnicity has begun to be abandoned. The polarization between voters marks the phenomenon into generally two pro and contra-government camps since the blasphemy controversy in Jakarta in 2016 and the vertical shortcut mobility of the current president, Joko Widodo.⁴⁴ However, this phenomenon also implies that voter behavior is still developing rationally amid the growing flow of information. Therefore, providing political supports to those who are the antithesis of previous political leadership.

With the pragmatism of voters' political behavior, we can still get a possibility that Pancasila will be more likely to be interpreted pragmatically per the open interests and opportunities. However, the recent developments in democratic decline should remind us to monitor the subsequent shifts in social cleavages in Indonesia.

The problematic situation in the contemporary Indonesian political transition is like a vicious circle, but the enabler is democratic governance reform. All these values manifest concretely by crafting all societal elements to impact national unity and the realization of fairness. The problem in Indonesian democracy is not only an essential issue of electability, but it is also a problem of representation, which was not known when the 1945 Constitution get frequently amended until 2002. Moreover, from an institutional point of view, the recent slowdown in democratization has led to slow-moving political reform in Indonesia by increasing clientelism structure and the pivotal trajectories of neoliberal government reform strategies.⁴⁵ If we combine the two concerns mentioned earlier with these institutional enablers of governance, one would question the determination of Pancasila as a reliable political ideology in Indonesian politics. If what has been practiced in Indonesia is a global, western model of democratization and public sector reform, and has subsequently been backsliding into counterproductive results, has Pancasila lost its rationality as a political ideology? What else can some Indonesians argue about maintaining such a position?

Any agreements on those critical questions would contradict all practices of the revitalization of Pancasila as the national political ideologies, more than a merely

41 Saiful Mujani and William Liddle R., *Personalities, Parties, and Voters: Indonesia* . . .

42 Shofwan A. B. Choiruzzad, *To Build the World Anew: Decolonization and Cold War in Indonesia* . . .

43 Natalie Shambi, "Indonesian in 2018: The Calm before the Election Storm", in: *Southeast Asian Affairs*, D. Singh and M. Cook (eds.), ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore, 2019, pp. 123-143.

44 Tom Pepinsky, *Islam and Indonesia's 2019 Presidential Election* . . .

45 Edward Aspinall, Diego Fossati, Burhanuddin Muhtadi, and Eve Warburton, *Elites, Masses, And Democratic Decline in Indonesia* . . .

national philosophical view as attributed in the Constitution. Shall we drive it away once again to cope with dilemmas of contending political and religious ideologies embraced by some Indonesian citizens?

Redefining Pancasila as Indonesian National Civil Religion

To address the problem, we need to examine Indonesian people's attitudes in viewing Pancasila within socio-cultural prevalence. There are competing results of recent surveys about how Indonesian people have perceived Pancasila in contemporary Indonesia. Therefore, these recent empirical trends portrayed in several surveys help us redefine Pancasila since they might hold the key to unpacking it as Indonesian national civil religion.

A survey conducted by CPCS (Center for Political Communication Studies) in 2020 found that most surveyed Indonesians show their commitment to the Pancasila-based unitary state of Indonesia (81.5%), while the other 13.3% prefer to change the state platform into a theocracy and the remaining respondents were showing abstain.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, this finding does not necessarily suggest dichotomic relations between the Pancasila-based democratic state and the religious-inspired one perceived by the Indonesian people. PPI (Parameter Politik Indonesia), in its survey in 2019, suggests the importance of both religion and Pancasila are equal. One existence is supposed to not neglect another, according to most respondents 81.4% surveyed by PPI.⁴⁷ There are only 15.6% of people expressed their preference of religion to Pancasila in this regard.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, this view does not necessarily correspond to an institutional formalization of religious values and norms into state development. About 6.7% of surveyed Indonesians agree to a high degree formalization of religious values and norms to the state. This number is less than the respondents who chose to abstain (9.2%). While most respondents agree to less formalization of religious values and norms underpinning the state development, the middle group number of respondents determine the preference by perceiving the religion as merely part of private individual properties. The PPI survey reaffirms the result released by SMRC (Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting) in 2017 that more than 70% surveyed Indonesians support the unitary state of Indonesia as the way it has been right now. In contrast, less than 10% prefer the most formalized "Islamic state" to replace it.⁴⁹ The conception of "the Islamic state" herein refers to the country's belonging as a caliph led them.

To what extent could we interpret these seemingly competing trends, which

46 "Survei Terbaru: 13,3 Persen Publik Ingin Indonesia Jadi Negara Agama", *JPNN*, available at: <https://www.jpnn.com/news/survei-terbaru-133-persen-publik-ingin-indonesia-jadi-negara-agama> (accessed November 25, 2020).

47 "Survei: 81,4 Persen Responden Sepakat Pancasila dan Agama Sama Penting", *KOMPAS*, available at: <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/11/29/15291631/survei-814-persen-responden-sepakat-pancasila-dan-agama-sama-penting?page=all> (accessed November 25, 2020).

48 Ibidem.

49 "Survei SMRC: 9,2 Persen WNI Setuju Indonesia Jadi Negara Khilafah", *KOMPAS*, available at: <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/06/04/18440061/survei.smrc.9.2.persen.wni.setuju.indonesia.jadi.negara.khilafah> (accessed November 25, 2020).

also imply our worldview in redefining Pancasila? Consideration of the socio-cultural prevalence of Indonesian society would be helpful for this purpose. To date, economic and social divisions have been a basis for the prevalence of the ideals adopted by the Indonesian communities. In the middle of globalization and deregulation, the fundamental valuation of Indonesia has remained similar over the last 30 years and has several derivative adjustments. According to the World Value Survey (WVS) map,⁵⁰ Indonesia has -0.75 over self-expression advice and -0.25 over secular-rational values, classified as African-Islamic values, with a marginally influential family-based culture of the same value. Besides religious values and norms, most Indonesians consider family as an essential part of their peers but do not impose the importance of selflessness to be trained for children. In addition to this importance, Indonesians remain loyal to the government as they see it as the head of the family. Nevertheless, in the circumstances of economic development, they prefer the government to preserve certain qualities which represent democratic principles.⁵¹

Given the approximately intermediary understanding mentioned above, we can redefine Pancasila as the Indonesian national civil religion in a moderate sense. The surveys mentioned earlier imply that the preference of Pancasila as the agreed and shared values remains high. In contrast, religious values and norms might be complementary in underpinning the state's philosophical foundation. These surveys also mean that the religion-inspired state and theocracy are not necessarily identical to one another. Nevertheless, as a national civil religion, Pancasila remains in controversies about whether the state and the citizen should perceive it as the state ideologies or merely a philosophical view of national values and norms.

To clarify the controversies, our examination suggests the position of Pancasila as an ideal philosophical foundation (the so-called "Landasan Idiil" informal Bahasa Indonesia, renown henceforth as "Philosophie Grundschaag" in Dutch or "Weltanschauung" in German) along with its overarching national vision, as explicitly stated in the 1945 Constitution. Pancasila shall be interpreted as an open ideology even though it does not appear as one. This openness character is a logical consequence of a consensus reached upon compromised and syncretized different ideologies upheld by the national founding fathers. They gathered in a meeting series of the Examination Agency of Preparation Endeavors for Indonesia Independence (in Bahasa Indonesia: *Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* or BPUPKI). These ideologies comprised liberal capitalism, socialism, and political Islam. It is very understandable that since its first inception, Pancasila had never been perceived by them as dogmatic norms but remains in a synthesis resulting from simultaneous constructive discourses.

Pancasila is a total-open ideology because of its nature which is always in

50 "Inglehart–Welzel Cultural Map: Findings and Insights", *World Values Surveys*, available at: <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp?CMSID=Findings> (accessed November 25, 2020).

51 Agus Dwiyanto, *Mengembalikan Kepercayaan Publik melalui Reformasi Birokrasi*, Gramedia Pustaka Utama, Jakarta, 2011; "Geographical Scope: Indonesia (WVS_Results: Technical Record)", *World Values Survey*, 2006.

the vortex of rational discourse, not dogmatic, from time to time. Preparing for Indonesian independence amid World War II, various versions of the nation's philosophy of life emerged. When referring to Republicans, such as Rousseau with his social contract, the state survives not only because its philosophy is open but also because there is a basis for moral legitimacy, which is generally based on religion,⁵² including, in this case, Pancasila. Here the secular problem arises because there is a dichotomy between the state and religion. Not everyone is willing to serve and fight only because of their status as citizens but also based on religion.⁵³ Indonesia had patriot citizens who were also prominent religious organizations even with the spirit of "jihad" which is currently a trademark for radicalisms, today the reform era political parties do not have a monologue profile, e.g., a nationalist-religious combination. Thus, in the Indonesian context, there must be a meeting point of moral values such as religion, that all people can accept based on this moral responsibility. In turn, public morals emerge to serve among the components of society. However, suppose this public morality is applied by force by the state and countries still looking for a democratization process like Indonesia. In that case, this philosophy becomes the basis for justifying thinking towards authoritarianism, as happened in the authoritarian era of the New Order regime.

In the socio-political realm, there is also a development gap. On the one hand, the pragmatism of the political parties is not sufficiently representative in articulating the interests of the community. On the other hand, the cleavages develop sharply towards a conflict that is increasingly difficult to mediate. Getting back to the controversial Bill of Pancasila Ideology, the legislative proposal clauses disregard the Decree of *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (MPRS, the Indonesian provisional people assembly) 25/1966 on the prohibition of the communist ideology and the dissolution of *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party) and all affiliated organizations. This substantial deficit gets reaffirmation by the speech by Megawati Sukarnoputri, the chief of PDIP and the eldest daughter of the first president). The speech promotes essential elements of the single *gotong-royong* (collective responsibility) virtue to which all the five moral principles of Pancasila might be compressed. As there is no consensus of this substantial compression, other societal elements disapprove of it and come up with prejudice of the party's hidden agenda of the restoration of communism.

Furthermore, the government's legislative proposal faces widespread public distrust due to perceived corruption surrounding infrastructure projects and the Chinese government's loan offer to the project's primary supporter. The situation is the context for a series of proposed legal reforms in the Omnibus Law agenda and proposed revisions to the Law on the Eradication of Corruption, which aims to remove key officials from the institution. These circumstances prompt critical concern on how these two implicate nation-building based on the national civil

52 Jean Jacques Rousseau. *The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right* . . .

53 Michael Buehler, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2009, pp. 52-54.

religion Pancasila and why this is relentlessly happening to date.

In the context mentioned above, Hegel was right to define the state as the manifestation of the public will whose freedom to exercise are tied to the so-called social contract.⁵⁴ However, historically rooted trajectories of the state formation and building in Indonesia determine the “ambtenaar” (interpreted from Dutch as to the officer holding the state power) style of the state apparatus to be predominantly manifested more than public service orientation.⁵⁵ Suppose we are consistent with both the political elites and the general public agreeing on Pancasila as a political ideology. Will Pancasila have thus been further used by any interest parties to manifest authoritarian state practices and, therefore, with it the political elite to find its moral justification?

Reinterpreting Conformity of Muslim Community Organizations with Pancasila

The existence and role of civil society groups are inevitable in fulfilling the prerequisites for substantial democracy. In contrast to political parties and legislators, civil society here is expected to facilitate the articulation process of the interests of various elements of society and organize what was initially an unstructured entity into a collective action movement. In the Hegelian perspective, civil society aligns with that society and, at the same time, is far from the holders of power. The independence of ideas and resources makes it suitable to play an advocate for the public interest. Even though civil society organizations have limited material resources, it is sufficient for them to take advantage of social capital to move as networks in society. This advocacy for the public interest promises the emergence of policy opportunities that better represent the needs of the broader community and, at the same time, signal public wisdom more substantially than the artificial mandate agreed upon by legislators.

Muslim community organizations aided in the formation of a national consensus in the form of the Indonesian nation's philosophy of life, Pancasila. In the Indonesian context beginning in 1945, shortly after Indonesia gained independence, by assisting in the draft of the original Constitution, which outlined Pancasila's ideology in its 1945 version. Likewise, despite the abolition of "seven words" in the Jakarta Charter, it feels very controversial until now, we can understand that the efforts of the Muslim community organizations, for instance, through Kasman Singodimedjo and his Muhammadiyah fellows was perhaps the best achievement amidst the disagreements at that time that threatened national integration.⁵⁶

Understanding the works of Muslim community organizations in the early days of independence will lead us to a similar journey pattern through the pressure of

54 Georg W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, Translation: Pinkard Terry and Baur Michael, Cambridge University Press, 2018; Jean Jacques Rousseau. *The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right*. . .

55 Eko Prasajo, *Reformasi Kedua: Melanjutkan Estafet Reformasi*. . .

56 Shofwan A. B. Choiruzzad, *To Build the World Anew: Decolonization and Cold War in Indonesia*. . .

Sukarno's revolutionary leadership during the Old Order and then Soeharto during the New Order. It is critical to recognize the positions and roles of Muslim community organizations, not only in terms of the advancement of the best cadres, which are difficult to describe individually in general, but also in terms of cooperative relations developed with the political regime and a moderate response (*wasathiyah*) to any negotiable choices within the constitutional agenda.⁵⁷

Most of the New Order era was characterized by binary relationships between civil society and the government,⁵⁸ so it was difficult to bridge the relationship between the two, except through the government's co-optation of civil society. During the reformation period since 1998, civil society has grown in quality and quantity according to the increased assistance of international institutions in governance reform in Indonesia.⁵⁹ Moreover, the relationship between the two parties develops into a partnership. On the one hand, civil society has an opportunity to play a role in advocating the public interest mutually with the government. However, on the other hand, the gap has opened for a change in the pattern of relations from initially equal partnerships to a new co-optation of the government of civil society activists in other forms in the recent years.

Collaborating in implementing government projects through civil society organizations is one form of this co-optation. In this case, patronage politics operates, wherein the government becomes the tap of resource distribution, in a legitimate way that could benefit it financially. The label "red plate" then became not exclusively attached to the bureaucratic apparatus but also to some civil society organizations. In recent years, efforts to assign positions to the ranks of the bureaucracy and state-owned enterprises (BUMN) for these organizational figures are certainly another form of that co-optation. The figures considered to represent civil society organizations are expected to have a further effect in the form of organizational support for government policies. While these new forms of co-optation were implemented without opposition during the first five years of Joko Widodo's administration, some of these civil society organizations were later relocated and returned to maintaining their distance from the government through constructive criticism only when the government (executive and legislative branches of power) demonstrated its most outrageous non-democracy, for instance, the revised Corruption Eradication Commission Law, the Pancasila Ideology Bill, and the Job Creation Law, just to name a few.⁶⁰

First, Islamic civil society represented by Muslim community organizations still maintains a relative distance from power even within the scope of the political

57 Nadirsyah Hosen, Religion and the Indonesia Constitution: A Recent Debate, *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2005, p. 421; Tom Pepinsky, Islam and Indonesia's 2019 Presidential Election. . .

58 Eko Prasjojo, *Demokrasi di Negeri Mimpi: Pemilu 2005 dan Good Governance*, Departemen Ilmu Administrasi FISIP Universitas Indonesia, Depok, 2005.

59 Ibidem.

60 Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation in Indonesia: Religious Intolerance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Accommodation, *Asian Studies Review*, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2018, pp. 485-487.

movements that they were born. During the New Order, for example, Muslim mass organizations would only take a useful role, or at least not create adverse impacts for the interests of the *ummah* and this nation. During the Reformation period, Muslim community organizations built constructive relationships with anyone in power without being trapped in the behavior of chasing rent-seeking in economic-political transactions which were prone to abuse of authority, let alone arbitrarily. When there were issues of inappropriateness, minimal accountability, and transparency that were absent in the *Program Organisasi Penggerak* (POP, the Movement Organization Program) imposed by the Minister of Education and Culture, Nadiem Makarim, recently, Muhammadiyah together with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) decided to withdraw from their participation.⁶¹

Some Muslim community organizations play roles as the generator and mass bases of political parties, such as Muhammadiyah for *Partai Amanat Nasional* (PAN, the National Mandate Party), Nahdlatul Ulama for *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP, the United Development Party) and *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (PKB, the National Revival Party), and *Persatuan Islam* (PERSIS, the United Islam) for *Partai Bintang Bulan* (the Star and Moon Party). However, these mass organizations neatly distinguish themselves as cultural organizations with no structural relationship with any political parties. Muslim community organizations do not position themselves as anti-political but are distant and elegant towards politics. According to *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI, the Islamic Defender Front), another organization was once renowned for its origins in the so-called "Pam Swakarsa" which is a minor independent community security force established under the Indonesian army in the early years following the 1998 reform movement. Nonetheless, it has recently transformed into one of the primary instigators of a series of mass rallies from 2016 onwards campaigning for sanctions against the former governor of the Greater Capital Province of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, popularly known as 'Ahok,' who is a double minority due to his non-Muslim and Chinese ancestors.⁶² Although FPI has made no indications of conducting a direct influence campaign in either the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial or 2019 presidential elections, it has enabled solidarity among Muslim societies across prominent Muslim community organizations. Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah are no exceptions to engaging in political activities in addition to their usual social activism in addressing social problems and disaffection. Those two community organizations also play important roles in moderating controversies, preventing the mass rally from growing further to be radical movements.⁶³

61 "Sengkarut Mendikbud Nadiem Ditinggalkan NU, Muhammadiyah, & PGRI", *Tirto*, available at: <https://tirto.id/sengkarut-mendikbud-nadiem-ditinggalkan-nu-muhammadiyah-pgri-ftd4> (accessed November 27, 2020).

62 Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation in Indonesia: Religious Intolerance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Accommodation. . .

63 Saefur Rochmat, The Fiqh Paradigm for the Pancasila State: Abdurrahman Wahid's Thoughts on Islam and the Republic of Indonesia, *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2014, pp. 309-329; Johannes Herlijanto, The Role of Moderate Muslims in the 2017 Jakarta Election, *ISEAS Perspective*, No. 52, 2017, pp. 2-4.

Second, some Muslim community organizations, such as Muhammadiyah, have continued socio-economic independence until today. Quoting Andi Maulana's notes from the organization's regional media institute in West Java, this Islamic mass organization has 4,623 kindergartens, 2,604 elementary, junior high and medium high schools, and 172 universities (Madrasah Digital, 18 / 11/2020).⁶⁴ A substantial number relating to an organization that does business independently certainly empowers people, especially in the education and social welfare sectors. The author agrees with the term "Ngopeni yang Kecil" translated from Javanese as "taking care of the little ordinary people," as expressed by Nadjib Hamid in the 108th anniversary of Muhammadiyah.⁶⁵ This charity effort is also an embodiment of the message of the Holy Quran Surah al-Quraish to ensure the fulfillment of essential needs, e.g., food and security, and it fulfills the rights of Allah (formal or *mahdhah* worship). The capacity of this Muslim community organization can be read as social capital, which is very important in maintaining their independence from the government in carrying out their role as part of civil society.

Doubts about socio-economic independence might exist when the cases are Muslim society organizations associated with some government institutions. In this regard, we could count FPI mentioned above with its debut track from being an agent under the Indonesian army to a leading driver of Muslim mass rallies. Although there is no indication of a direct influencing campaign in both the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial and the 2019 presidential elections, we could not close any opportunities of opposite presumptions and inferences in politics. Moreover, the mass rally also benefitted from the Islamic *fatwa* promulgated by Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, the Council of Indonesian Ulama) that acted against blasphemy and facilitated "shariatization" of the public sphere.⁶⁶ The institution receives funding incurred from the state budget. Nevertheless, it has shown frequent criticism to the government, regardless of the regime, from the New Order to date.

The two socio-cultural virtues of the Muslim community organizations mentioned above actually find their relevance to the current social development of the nation, especially if we return to this thesis of the democratic crisis as a problem of socio-cultural adaptation. The World Values Survey (WVS), in its seventh wave of survey in 2020, still places Indonesia in the quadrant map of the African-Islamic values culture group.⁶⁷ Its exact position shows that the orientation of survival based on fulfilling subsistence needs is greater than self-expression, while religious values are still sufficiently considered by the public even though secularism-liberal thinking

64 "Catatan Reflektif Milad 108 Tahun Muhammadiyah", *Madrasah Digital*, available at: <https://madrasahdigital.co/umum/catatan-reflektif-milad-108-tahun-muhammadiyah/> (accessed November 18, 2020).

65 "Spirit Milad Ke-108 Muhammadiyah: Momentum Ngopeni Yang Kecil", *Jawa Pos*, available at: <https://www.jawapos.com/opini/19/11/2020/spirit-milad-ke-108-muhammadiyah-momentum-ngopeni-yang-kecil/> (accessed November 19, 2020).

66 Saskia Schäfer, Democratic Decline in Indonesia: The Role of Religious Authorities, *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 92, No. 2, 2019, pp. 246-247; Syafiq Hasyim, Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) and its Role in the Shariatization of Indonesia, *Working Papers of Freie Universität Berlin*, 2013; Tim Lindsey, Monopolizing Islam? The Indonesian Ulama Council and State Regulation of the 'Islamic Economy,' *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2012, pp. 253-274.

67 "Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map: Findings and Insights"...

is increasingly eroded, something that Muslim community organizations also face.

Indonesian society can be viewed as a socio-economic plural entity, which portrays the differentiation of social identity and livelihood. In contrast, in a more accurate sense, this plurality can be interpreted as the social stratification gap of society based on economic capability with its various factors.

As a result of unfinished modernization in Indonesia since the birth of the republic, the modernized social lifestyle of the Indonesian people has further reduced the attachment of an individual to a community. The same has gone for the differentiation of status and socio-economic strata that has not been able to catch up with the acceleration of adaptation of various cultural factors, i.e., values, beliefs, and artifacts, in Indonesian society.⁶⁸ With the assumption that cohesiveness between groups of ordinary people manifests in collective activities, this pattern will become increasingly filled with barriers of relationships among community group members when an individual member adapts to the change at a different pace. Within this situation, society might define the relations based on individual values, e.g., deliberations that prioritize safeguarding self and family interests, which then look for points of contact with the interests of relatives and neighbors. This pattern also works in the form of *gotong-royong* (collective responsibility), e.g., loan management from cooperatives or local governments. These relations are no longer intended as a manifestation of cooperation but rather as an effort to secure the interests of each individual in a group from the negligence of other members.⁶⁹

The shift in the socio-economic lifestyle of the society above is not a binary change. Some people are shifting towards modern life, but it does not immediately leave some of the group's characters. Similarly, the change of materialistic behavior amid the hegemony of urban lifestyle and the rate of industrialization does not immediately eliminate the values and norms based on traditional family-based relationships. Going back to the previous wave of the WVS, its survey in 2006 captures the solid ground and the implication of religious beliefs and behavior in Indonesian cultures.⁷⁰ Faith beliefs and practices will not obstruct the empathy of Indonesians for those who follow other faiths; however, they will have little empathy for committing adultery, non-straight sexual orientation, alcohol, narcotics uses, and the like. All the aggregations of social development and fragmentation in Indonesian society indeed leave their problems.

Religious civil society organizations, especially Muslim communities, are within the socio-economic constellation and have taken steps against any progress corrupting its development in the reform era, as mentioned earlier. The economic-political elitism that has developed since the republic was established has been firmly instituted through the political patronage of developmentalism during the ruling New Order Regime. Not only does the policy create a group of economic shocks, but it also maintains economic inequality. The structural, neoliberal approach to reform

68 Edward Aspinall, *A Nation in Fragments*, *Critical Asian Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2013, pp. 27-54.

69 Mun'im Sirry, 'Contending Modernities,' in *Indonesia: An Introduction, Islam and Christian Relations*, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2020, p. 130.

70 "Geographical Scope: Indonesia (WVS_Results: Technical Record)"...

has instead led to an expanding spectrum of competitive patrons distributing public resources to offset the overall policy objectives.⁷¹ The expanding patronage continues until the era of reform in the last two decades, especially after the various series of economic liberalization packages carried out both before and after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. They culminated highly through the Omnibus Law package. The latter, especially the Job Creation Act of 2020, has triggered increased opposition from civil society organizations, especially from those that initially came from government support camps.

Conclusion

Indonesian politics has shown minor determinations from nationally institutionalized and shared philosophical foundations like Pancasila. As a national civil religion resulting from syncretization across well-established ideologies, indigenous values, and local wisdom, Pancasila plays the role of an intermediary for changing national values and as the framework for moderating trade-off effects within that syncretization. Nevertheless, these roles do not prevent Pancasila from a dilemma throughout political transitions in a democratizing Indonesia. Establishing Pancasila as a formal ideology imposed by anyone currently holding power may provoke risks of encountering democratization in Indonesia back to autocratization like in the New Order Regime. While maintaining Pancasila as an open ideology is necessary to prevent that risk, openness in a political transition may also attract various interests. The recent decline of Indonesia's democracy also prompts the necessity of constructive roles of civil society organizations in supporting resilient democratization in the country. Given the conformity of Islamic doctrine to the principal norms of Pancasila and the positive attitudes of Muslim society toward democratic reform, leading Muslim community organizations should keep paving the ways towards this orientation.

In the contemporary declining democracy of Indonesia, persistent patronage politics has benefited from the neoliberal approach to public sector reform and has manipulated it by altering the country's politico-administrative system without getting through the essence of the democratic reform. The institutionalized policies of neoliberal transformation, established under the direction of international institutions, have not weakened the patronage structure. Against these circumstances, we could argue that religious determination is rising in reaction to clientelism's social and political structures. It is the orientation of the Muslim community organizations to remain on track if their organizations are consistent with their current position and roles. Political turbulence that threatens democratization in Indonesia requires the independence of the established mass Muslim community organizations as part of civil society to build constructive power relations against but not to be captured by the political regime.

71 Alexander Arifianto, What the 2019 Election Says about Indonesian Democracy. . . pp. 51-52; Edward Aspinall, A Nation in Fragments. . . p. 31.

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КОМПАТИБИЛНОСТ ИСЛАМА И ПАНЧАШИЛА У ИНДОНЕЖАНСКОЈ КРИЗИ ДЕМОКРАТИЈЕ

Сажетак

Овај чланак анализира однос религије и демократије у процесима демократизације у Индонезији. Посебно се бави односом ислама и *панчашила*, која представља националну цивилну религију индонежанског друштва. Фокус рада је двострук: прво, анализира се до ког степена је национална цивилна религија панчашила успела да заузме своје место у политичкој транзицији Индонезије, и друго, на који начин различити верски покрети могу кореспондирати са панчашилом у оквирима индонежанске демократије. Чланак сугерише да би постављање панчашила као формалне идеологије изазвало ризике за демократију и последично довело до повратка ауторитаризма у Индонезији. Иако је очување панчашила као једне отворене идеологије важно да се избегне тај ризик, отвореност према политичкој транзицији би могла привући различите интересе. Скорији пад демократије у Индонезији позива на конструктивну улогу организација цивилног друштва, а политичке турбуленције које прете демократизацији захтевају независност муслиманске заједнице да гради конструктивне односе са државом.

Кључне речи: цивилна религија, пад демократије, политички ислам, верски покрети, политичка идеологија