

# The Genesis of Modern Jihadism: 1979 as a Geopolitical and Ideological Watershed

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**Abstract:** The history of the Muslim world and the development of terrorism underwent a significant sea change in 1979. Along with other noteworthy occurrences like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, the Iranian Revolution sparked a number of revolutionary processes that drastically changed the terrain of Islamic movements and political activism. This article looks at how these occasions led to the Islamic Awakening (Sahwa) and the rise of contemporary Political Islam movements, many of which would go on to become or serve as inspiration for terrorist groups. This study shows how the revolutionary fervor of 1979 produced favorable conditions for the spread of extremist ideologies and violent movements throughout the Muslim world by thoroughly examining historical developments, ideological shifts, and regional dynamics. Geopolitical events, religious ideology, and socio-political grievances all played a complex role in this transformation, which is traced in the article from legitimate political and religious revival movements to the rise of transnational terrorist networks.

**Keywords:** 1979, Iranian Revolution, Juhayman movement, Mecca, jihad, Afghanistan

## Introduction

As the start of what academics have referred to as the “fourth wave” of terrorism and the emergence of modern Political Islam, 1979 is considered one of the most significant years in modern Islamic history (Rapoport 2004, 55). Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s overthrow and the founding of the Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in February 1979 marked the end of the Iranian Revolution, which rocked the Muslim world and beyond (Abrahamian 2008). This revolutionary achievement showed that Islamic ideology could be a potent motivator that

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could overthrow seemingly established secular regimes, spark similar movements throughout the region, and radically change the course of political Islam (Nasr 2006).

The Iranian Revolution wasn't a singular event; rather, it was a part of a larger series of events that year that changed the political and religious landscape of the Muslim world (Gerges 2005). Juhayman al-Otaybi and his supporters' November 1979 takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca exposed the escalating conflicts between modernization and traditional Islamic values. Concurrently, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 served as a focal point for Islamic resistance groups and would later serve as a training ground for a new generation of jihadist combatants (Coll 2004).

The Islamic Awakening or Sahwa, a widespread religious and political revival movement that swept the Muslim world in the 1980s and beyond, was sparked by these events (Wehrey 2017). The Sahwa was a multifaceted phenomenon that included political activism, a genuine religious rebirth, and occasionally the seeds of violent extremism (Lacroix 2011). This movement was distinguished by a desire to establish Sharia-based Islamic governance, a renewed emphasis on Islamic identity, and a rejection of Western secular values (Mandaville 2014).

A complex interaction of factors, including state repression, foreign intervention, socioeconomic grievances, and ideological radicalization, led to the shift from religious revival to terrorist violence, which was neither immediate nor inevitable. To understand the origins of modern terrorist movements like Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and many regional jihadist groups that trace their operational and ideological roots to the revolutionary fervor unleashed in 1979, it is essential to understand this evolution (Burke 2003).

The Islamic Awakening offered the organizational structures and ideological framework that would later be used by extremist movements, according to this article, which explores the complex effects of the Iranian Revolution and associated events on the growth of terrorism in the Muslim world (Wiktorowicz 2005). This research aims to shed light on the intricate processes by which respectable religious and political movements can transform into violent extremist groups by closely examining significant occasions, significant personalities, and ideological advancements (Sageman 2004).

## **The Iranian Revolution: A Catalyst for Islamic Political Awakening**

A fundamental challenge to the Muslim world's established order, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 offered a new model for Islamic political action, and it was much more than a mere change of government (Abrahamian 2008). The success of the revolution in toppling a monarchy supported by the West and establishing an Islamic republic showed how effective religious ideology can be as a catalyst for political change (Keddie 2003). This accomplishment had a profound impact on the Muslim

world, igniting fear among secular governments and hope among Islamic activists (Brookings Institution 2019).

Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters established an ideological framework that introduced a number of revolutionary ideas that would have a significant impact on later Islamic movements. The idea of *velayat-e faqih*, or guardianship of the Islamic jurist, was fundamental to this framework because it questioned conventional Sunni notions of political authority and offered a theoretical defense of clerical rule. The general idea of Islamic governance founded on religious law became popular across sectarian boundaries, even though this particular doctrine remained mostly limited to Shia contexts (Nasr 2006).

The idea of *mustazafin*, or the oppressed, was also central to Khomeini's revolutionary ideology, which framed the conflict in terms of social justice and opposition to imperialism (Abrahamian 1993). The populist aspect of the revolution resonated with underprivileged groups across the Muslim world, who viewed Iran's achievements as a template for their own freedom from repressive and corrupt governments (Esposito 1999). The anti-Western rhetoric of the revolution, especially its criticism of the United States as the "Great Satan," offered a potent narrative framework that many later movements would use (Gerges 2005).

The influence of the Iranian Revolution went well beyond Iran's boundaries, influencing Islamic movements throughout the region and radically changing the political landscape of the Middle East (Nasr 2006). The success of the revolution in Iraq energized the Shia majority and fueled tensions with Saddam Hussein's Sunni-dominated government, which in turn sparked the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). The stability of the region would be significantly impacted by this conflict, which would also act as a trigger for additional sectarian tensions.

Hezbollah, one of the most successful and lethal products of the Iranian Revolution, was founded in Lebanon in 1985 thanks to the revolution's inspiration and support (Norton 2007). Many other movements in the region would follow Hezbollah's example of combining armed resistance with political engagement. The group's accomplishment of establishing a "state within a state" in southern Lebanon showed how Islamic movements could subvert established state authority and establish alternative forms of governance (Hamzeh 2004).

Despite its Shia roots, the revolution also had a big impact on the larger Sunni world (Nasr 2006). The success of the revolution in Egypt gave hope to Islamic organizations that had been fighting Anwar Sadat's secular government. The Iranian model served as a direct inspiration for the 1981 assassination of Sadat by members of the Islamic Jihad organization, who saw their act as a component of a wider Islamic awakening that was sweeping the region (Kepel 1985).

Perceiving their success as the start of a wider Islamic awakening that would eventually encompass all Muslim societies, Iran's new leadership actively worked to export their revolutionary ideology throughout the Muslim world (Brookings

Institution 2019). The creation of cultural and educational institutions, financial support for sympathetic movements, and the dissemination of revolutionary ideas through propaganda and the media were some of the various forms of this export endeavor (Al-Saigh and Al-Qaddafi 2025, 80).

Regardless of sectarian affiliation, the Iranian government generously supported a number of Islamic movements. This support included aid to various Palestinian organizations, financing for the Islamic Liberation Front of Bahrain, and support for the attempt on the life of the Kuwaiti emir. Even though many of these initiatives didn't have much immediate success, they helped create a more widespread climate of Islamic resistance and activism that would affect regional stability in the long run (Gerges 2005).

Perhaps the most important ideological contribution of the revolution was its proof that Islamic movements could effectively oppose and topple established regimes (Esposito 2002). Islamic activists across the region took note of this lesson and started to see revolutionary action and armed resistance as effective means of accomplishing their objectives. For movements looking to implement Islamic governance in their own societies, the Iranian model offered both motivation and useful advice (Roy 1994).

### **The Grand Mosque Seizure: Challenging Religious Authority**

Ten months after the Iranian Revolution, on November 20, 1979, Juhayman al-Otaybi and about 200-armed followers took over the Grand Mosque in Mecca, the holiest place in Islam, causing yet another tremor in the Muslim world (Wikipedia 2024). The event sent shockwaves through the Islamic world until the Saudi forces successfully reclaimed control of the mosque, the two-week-long seizure claimed hundreds of lives (Trofimov 2007).

The Grand Mosque seizure was noteworthy not only as a terrorist act but also as an indication of underlying conflicts about the legitimacy of religious authority and the course of Islamic governance in the larger Muslim world (Wright 2001). Because the seizure took place in the same year as the Iranian Revolution, it had a strong symbolic resonance that enhanced its impact well beyond its immediate military importance. The incident showed that political violence could occur in even the holiest places in Islam and that people who claimed to be more sincere and pure in their faith could challenge established religious leaders (Trofimov 2007).

Significant ramifications of the Grand Mosque seizure went well beyond Arabic Peninsula boundaries. In the Muslim world, there was a great deal of conjecture and conspiracy theories at first due to the uncertainty surrounding the attackers' identities and motivations (Trofimov 2007). Most importantly, massive anti-American riots broke out throughout the Muslim world, from Pakistan to Turkey to Libya, after

Ayatollah Khomeini falsely claimed that the seizure had been planned by the United States and Israel (Brookings Institution 2019).

These riots showed how easily political and religious grievances could be turned into violent action, as well as how erratic Muslim public opinion was in the wake of the Iranian Revolution (Esposito 2002). The widespread acceptance of Khomeini's unfounded charge demonstrated the intense mistrust of Western motives that had been cultivated by the Iranian Revolution and other local events (Gerges 2005). On July 31, 1987, tens of Iranian pilgrims gathered around the Grand Mosque in Mecca, which later descended into riots and attacks on peaceful pilgrims. Ironically, this attack was about to occur again by Khomeini's supporters. The incident was contained, the protesters were dispersed, and the roads were made accessible to pilgrims and citizens by government security forces. Numerous pilgrims and security guards were killed in the incident (Al-Aryan 2025, 46).

According to Wiktorowicz (2005), the Grand Mosque seizure in 1979 was an early example of what would later be known as Jihadist ideology, which combined traditional theology with a revolutionary political agenda and a readiness to use violence against established Islamic authorities. The rejection of the current Muslim leadership, the declaration of a purified form of Islam, and the use of violence to further political and religious objectives were some of the traits that Juhayman's movement displayed and would later come to define later jihadist organizations (Hegghammer 2007, 112).

Later organizations like Al-Qaeda would use similar justifications to support their attacks on Muslim targets and their larger campaign against those they referred to as "apostates," echoing the movement's criticism of Muslim governments as inadequately Islamic and tainted by Western influence (Burke 2003). Juhayman's willingness to attack the most sacred place in Islam set a precedent that showed extremist groups could push their violence beyond traditional political targets and attack mosques and religious gatherings without feeling ashamed of their faith (Sageman 2004).

Takfiri ideology, which holds that other Muslims are apostates and should be attacked, also emerged as a result of the ideological framework established by Juhayman's movement. Attacks on Muslim civilians and religious leaders who were thought to have strayed from true Islamic principles would be justified by this idea, which would later become central to the ideology of later jihadist groups (Kepel 2002).

It should be noted that the Iranian Revolution and the 1979 Haram Attacks, the two events previously mentioned, gave rise to the Islamic Awakening (Sahwa). During the 1980s and 1990s, one of the most important socio-religious phenomena in the Muslim world was the Islamic Awakening, or al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya in Arabic (Wehrey 2017). This movement was a complicated synthesis of political activism, cultural resistance, and religious revival that swept through Muslim societies following the historic events of 1979 (Lacroix 2011). Instead of being a single entity, the Sahwa was a heterogeneous group of movements, academics, and activists who shared the

goal of reclaiming Islamic identity and principles against what they saw as Western political and cultural dominance (Wehrey 2017).

Several fundamental ideological components set the Sahwa movement apart from both secular political movements and conventional religious scholarship (Mandaville 2014). The idea of Islamic authenticity, which involved a critical analysis of modern Muslim societies and their alleged departure from true Islamic principles, was fundamental to the Sahwa worldview (Wehrey 2017). The legitimacy of the current governments as well as the moral and cultural orientation of Muslim societies were questioned in this critique, which had both political and social facets (Lacroix 2011).

The political ideology of the movement placed a strong emphasis on Islam's comprehensiveness as a whole system of life that ought to regulate every facet of human existence, from individual behavior to governmental policy (Esposito 1999). This comprehensive interpretation of Islam promoted the creation of Sharia-based Islamic governance in place of the secular idea of keeping religion and politics apart (Mandaville 2014). However, unlike some more radical movements, the mainstream Sahwa generally advocated for gradual reform rather than revolutionary change, seeking to Islamize existing institutions rather than overthrow them entirely (Wehrey 2017).

The Sahwa also gave education and intellectual growth a lot of weight because they believed that real reform required the development of Islamic knowledge and consciousness. As a result of this emphasis on education, a large number of Islamic organizations, study groups, and publishing houses were founded, which helped spread Sahwa concepts and build networks of activists who shared similar views (Wright 2001). The movement's influence among educated middle-class Muslims was facilitated by its intellectual bent, which set it apart from more populist forms of Islamic activism (Mandaville 2014).

The Sahwa's engagement with contemporary social and political issues from an Islamic viewpoint constituted another distinctive feature of the movement (Wehrey 2017). On issues such as women's rights, economic justice, political participation, and international relations, movement intellectuals and activists offered Islamic perspectives that often contrasted with both secular and traditional religious viewpoints (Lacroix 2011). By talking about current issues, the movement was able to stay relevant and interesting to younger Muslims who were looking for real Islamic solutions to today's problems (Mandaville 2014).

The Sahwa movement's ties to violence and extremism were one of the most complicated and debated parts of it. The mainstream Sahwa generally pushed for peaceful reform and gradual change, but the movement's ideas and way of organizing could be used by more radical groups to justify violence (Wiktorowicz 2005).

The Sahwa's criticism of current Muslim governments for not being Islamic enough and its focus on how all aspects of Islamic governance should work opened the door for more extreme views that saw violent resistance as acceptable or even necessary

(Wehrey 2017). Moreover, the movement's focus on Islamic authenticity and its dismissal of Western values offered ideological justifications for assaults on Western entities and their Muslim allies (Kepel 2002). Nonetheless, it is crucial to recognize that the connection between the Sahwa and violent extremism was neither direct nor predetermined (Lacroix 2011). Numerous Sahwa intellectuals and organizations unequivocally denounced violence and terrorism, contending that these approaches were antithetical to Islamic principles and detrimental to the movement's enduring goals (Wehrey 2017). The movement's focus on education and gradual change was very different from what terrorist groups did (Mandaville 2014).

The Sahwa's intellectual and organizational contributions to the broader Islamic revival, however, fostered an environment conducive to the emergence and flourishing of more radical movements (Wiktorowicz 2005). The movement's success in spreading Islamic political awareness and criticizing the political scenes in most of Muslim societies gave terrorist groups a base on which to build their own more extreme ideas and find people who agreed with Sahwa ideas (Sageman 2004).

### **The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Crucible of Modern Jihad**

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 24, 1979, was the last event that changed the way Islamic militancy and terrorism worked (Coll 2004). The Iranian Revolution and the Grand Mosque seizure had more of an ideological and symbolic effect than the Afghan conflict, which gave Islamic activists a real chance to fight against a non-Muslim occupying force. This conflict would function as both a training ground and a source of inspiration for a generation of jihadist fighters who would subsequently constitute the foundation of various terrorist organizations (Burke 2003).

The portrayal of the Afghan conflict as a jihad against foreign occupation resonated profoundly across the Muslim world, transcending sectarian and national boundaries in a manner rarely seen in other conflicts (Kepel 2002). The portrayal of Muslim fighters defending their homeland against a superpower viewed as atheistic and imperialistic created a compelling narrative that garnered support from various sectors, including governments, religious authorities, and individual volunteers (Coll 2004).

The global support for the Afghan mujahideen was unprecedented in its breadth and coordination. The United States gave the resistance movements billions of dollars in weapons, training, and money. Thousands of volunteers from all over the Muslim world went to Afghanistan to fight in what they saw as a holy war (Coll 2004). The combination of government support and popular mobilization created a unique situation that would have long-lasting effects on the growth of international terrorism (Gerges 2005).

One of the most important things to come out of the Afghan War was the rise of the “Afghan Arabs,” foreign volunteers who went to Afghanistan to fight with the local mujahideen (Hegghammer 2010). These volunteers, mostly from Arab countries but also from other Muslim areas, were thought to be about 35,000 fighters who would be very important in the growth of international jihadist networks (Behloul 2011). The Afghan Arabs were driven by a mix of religious beliefs, political problems, and the need for adventure and purpose that the war gave them (Ibrahim 2009). A lot of people were affected by the larger Islamic awakening that happened in the Muslim world after 1979. They saw the Afghan jihad as a chance to put their religious beliefs into action and help protect the Muslim community (Kepel 2002).

The experience of fighting in Afghanistan gave these volunteers military training, combat experience, and exposure to radical ideas that they would later bring back to their home countries or to other places where there is fighting (Hegghammer 2010). The conflict may have been even more important because it brought people together and gave them shared experiences that would be the basis for future terrorist groups (Sageman 2004). The connections made in Afghanistan’s mountains and valleys would last a long time and make it easier for terrorists to work together across borders for many years to come (Burke 2003).

Osama bin Laden was the most well-known Afghan Arab. He was a rich Arab who came to Afghanistan in the early 1980s. Over time, he went from being a financier and organizer of Arab volunteers to a military commander and finally the leader of Al-Qaeda (Bergen 2001). Bin Laden’s time in Afghanistan had a big impact on how he saw the world and how he thought about international terrorism. It gave him the ideas and the hands-on experience he needed to start a global jihadist movement (Wright 2006).

The Afghan conflict functioned as a testing ground for the evolution and enhancement of jihadist ideology, amalgamating various strands of Islamic thought and political activism within a framework of armed conflict (Kepel 2002). The brutal realities of war, along with the influence of radical clerics and ideologues, led to the radicalization of many people and the rise of more extreme interpretations of Islamic doctrine (Wiktorowicz 2005).

The concept of jihad was at the heart of this ideological change. It was rethought and expanded beyond its usual defensive limits to include a wider fight against people who were seen as enemies of Islam (Cook 2005). The mujahideen’s success in ultimately compelling Soviet withdrawal was regarded as confirmation of the efficacy of armed jihad and evidence that military action could attain political goals unattainable through diplomatic and peaceful methods (Coll 2004).

The Afghan experience also helped shape takfiri ideology, which says that other Muslims are apostates and therefore fair game for violence (Wiktorowicz 2005). The complicated nature of the Afghan conflict, with its many groups and changing alliances, made it easy for Muslims to fight other Muslims in the name of religious

purity (Kepel 2002). A notable ideological advancement was the rise of a globalized interpretation of jihad that surpassed national borders and localized grievances (Roy 2004). The Afghan conflict's international nature, marked by foreign volunteers and external supporters, fostered a sense of global Muslim solidarity and responsibility, which terrorist organizations later exploited to rationalize attacks far from their original operational territories (Gerges 2005).

The end of the Soviet-Afghan War in 1989 left thousands of battle-hardened jihadist fighters without a clear mission or purpose. This is what some analysts have called the "blowback" effect (Johnson 2000). Many of these fighters went back to their home countries, where they often clashed with the governments and social conditions there. This led some of them to do terrorist acts or look for new wars where they could use their military skills and beliefs (Gerges 2005). The most important change in the organization that came out of the Afghan War was the creation of Al-Qaeda in 1988, near the end of the war (Wright 2006). Al-Qaeda was started by Osama bin Laden and other experienced jihadists. It was meant to be a vanguard group that would carry on the global jihad after Afghanistan and work to set up Islamic rule in all Muslim countries (Bergen 2001). The Afghan experience and the networks that were formed during the war had a big impact on how the group was set up, what it believed, and how it worked (Burke 2003).

The fact that Al-Qaeda grew into a global terrorist network that was responsible for many attacks, including the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, shows how the Afghan conflict has affected international security in the long term (Wright 2006). The group's ability to work across borders, its smart use of modern technology and communication, and its appeal to angry Muslims all over the world all showed what it learned and what it could do during the Afghan jihad (Sageman 2004). Al-Qaeda also managed to set up and keep a strong source of money, which later became known as the "jihadist economy." This economy relied on cross-border financing through donation and relief networks and charitable offices that pretended to be doing missionary or humanitarian work. This financial structure allowed it to become independent of any state or central authority, which made the organization stronger and better able to survive and grow even when it was being persecuted internationally (Al-Dosari 2023, 147).

The Afghan conflict set an example for later jihadist groups by showing that small groups of dedicated fighters can reach important political goals through long-term guerrilla warfare (Kepel 2002). This model would subsequently be utilized in conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq, Syria, and various other regions, frequently involving veterans of the Afghan war who acted as trainers and advisors for subsequent generations of jihadist combatants (Hegghammer 2010). Also, the Afghan conflict may have had the most important long-term effect on the idea of jihad, changing it from a mainly local and defensive duty to a global and offensive strategy (Roy 2004). The Afghan mujahideen's victory over a superpower through armed resistance

strongly supported the effectiveness of jihadist methods and led to similar movements in other situations (Cook 2005).

The Afghan conflict's international nature, characterized by foreign volunteers, external funding, and global media scrutiny, fostered a sense of transnational Islamic solidarity that transcended conventional ethnic and national divisions (Gerges 2005). This change was very important because it made it possible for global terrorist networks to form that could work in many countries and plan attacks on a large scale (Sageman 2004).

This Jihadist ideology, in its transnational manifestation, has transitioned from a collective duty to an individual obligation, independent of any governing authority or central leadership. The experiences of fighters in Afghanistan gave rise to new concepts: The House of War, Migration, The Caliphate, and International Jihad. These ideas, which were based on what was really happening in Afghanistan, quickly spread to other parts of the world in the 1990s and became the ideological basis for many armed groups in the Muslim world (Al-Sharif 2018).

The ideological framework that emerged during the Afghan conflict also legitimized the expansion of jihad beyond the immediate context of foreign occupation to include a more extensive struggle against perceived adversaries of Islam, such as Muslim governments considered inadequately Islamic and Western nations viewed as antagonistic to Muslim interests (Kepel 2002). This broadening of jihadist ideology would significantly affect global security and lead to the rise of many terrorist groups in the years that followed (Burke 2003).

## **Conclusion: The Enduring Legacy of 1979**

The year 1979 was a turning point in the growth of Islamic political awareness and the rise of modern terrorism. The Iranian Revolution, the Grand Mosque seizure in Mecca, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan all happened at the same time, and they all had a huge impact on Islamic movements around the world. These events showed how religious beliefs can be used to get people to take political action, and they also gave future movements both inspiration and practical examples to follow.

The Iranian Revolution's success in toppling a secular regime supported by the West demonstrated that Islamic movements could attain substantial political goals and create alternative governance structures grounded in religious principles. This success echoed across the Muslim world, giving Islamic activists hope and making secular governments afraid. The revolution's ideas about fighting imperialism and setting up Islamic rule were used as a model by many other movements that came after it.

The seizure of the Grand Mosque, which failed in the end, showed that radical Islamic groups can challenge even the most sacred institutions and strongest

authorities in the Muslim world. The event showed how tensions are rising between traditional religious leaders and new radical movements. It also showed how quickly religious and political grievances can change in the modern Muslim world.

The swim through the transport of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union gave Islamic activists a real chance-- to fight against groups that were not Muslim, creating a generation of battle-hardened fighters who would later become the core of several terrorist groups. The Afghan conflict had an international aspect, with foreign volunteers and outside supporters. This helped create transnational networks that would make it easier for global terrorism to grow.

The events of 1979 and their aftermath had far-reaching effects that went beyond the Muslim world. They helped international terrorism become a major security threat for the whole world. The transnational networks formed during the Afghan conflict established the groundwork for organizations like Al-Qaeda, which subsequently executed catastrophic assaults on Western targets and incited a multitude of imitator organizations globally. The ideological frameworks established during this era persist in shaping modern terrorist movements, encompassing ISIS and its affiliates, as well as various regional jihadist groups that derive their intellectual and operational foundations from the revolutionary zeal ignited in 1979. The ideas of global jihad, takfiri ideology, and martyrdom that came up during this time are still very important to the way many terrorist groups see the world today.

More than 40 years after the events of 1979 changed everything, the Muslim world is still dealing with the effects of that year. The ideological frameworks, organizational structures, and transnational networks that emerged during this period continue to influence contemporary political and security dynamics, while new generations of activists and extremists draw inspiration from the revolutionary achievements and failures of their predecessors. Policymakers, scholars, and civil society organizations face the challenge of comprehending the intricate historical processes that resulted in the rise of contemporary terrorism, while simultaneously formulating effective strategies to tackle its underlying causes and avert its further proliferation. This necessitates a sophisticated comprehension of the interplay among religious revival, political activism, and violent extremism, alongside a dedication to resolving the legitimate grievances and aspirations that extremist movements frequently manipulate for their own ends.

The story of how terrorism changed in the Muslim world after 1979 is really about the power of ideas and how important it is to give people good ways to express their political and religious views. By comprehending this history and assimilating its lessons, it may be feasible to avert future generations from traversing the trajectory from revival to radicalization that has defined a significant portion of the Muslim world's recent history.

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Лилија Шентух

## Развој модерног джихадизма: 1979. као геополитичка и идеолошка прекретница

**Сажетак:** Историја муслиманског света и развој тероризма претрпели су значајан преокрет 1979. године. Поред других важних догађаја, као што су совјетска инвазија на Авганистан и заузимање Велике џамије у Меки, Иранска револуција покренула је низ револуционарних процеса који су из корена променили простор исламских покрета и политичког активизма. Овај рад разматра како су ови догађаји довели до Исламског буђења и успона савремених покрета политичког ислама, од којих су многи касније постали терористичке организације или послужили као инспирација за њихово настајање. Студија показује како је револуционарни занос из 1979. године створио повољне услове за ширење екстремистичких идеологија и насилних покрета широм муслиманског света, кроз детаљну анализу историјских развоја, идеолошких промена и регионалне динамике. У раду се прати сложена улога геополитичких догађаја, религијске идеологије и друштвено-политичких незадовољстава у овој трансформацији — од легитимних политичких и верских препородних покрета до успона транснационалних терористичких мрежа.

**Кључне речи:** 1979., Иранска револуција, Џухајманов покрет, Мека, джихад, Авганистан